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 “Cuando creíamos que teníamos todas las respuestas,  
de pronto, cambiaron todas las preguntas” 
Mario Benedetti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
La reciente crisis económica y financiera ha enfrentado a empresas, 
administraciones públicas, organizaciones y sociedad en general a un escenario 
plagado de dificultades y desafíos. Esta realidad no ha sido ajena al ámbito 
académico, centrándose los investigadores en los últimos años en analizar, no solo 
las causas que provocaron esta crisis, sino también sus consecuencias sobre 
gobiernos, familias y empresas. En este contexto, uno de los topic más abordados 
en la literatura reciente ha sido el estudio de los factores determinantes de las 
quiebras empresariales (e.g., Darrat, Gray & Wu, 2016; De Maere, Jorissen & 
Uhlaner 2014; Lins, Volpin & Wagner, 2013; Tinoco & Wilson, 2013). La habitual 
consideración de la crisis como un shock exógeno en el análisis microeconómico ha 
permitido testar desde un enfoque positivo la eficiencia en la empresa de factores 
como la estructura de propiedad, el gobierno corporativo o la estructura de capital. 
Esta profusión en los estudios sobre empresa contrasta sin embargo con la escasa 
atención que ha recibido la investigación del efecto que la crisis ha tenido sobre la 
supervivencia de otras organizaciones relevantes en la sociedad, tales como las 
entidades no lucrativas (ENLs en adelante). Las ENLs constituyen una parte 
esencial en la vertebración de la sociedad civil al atender, en muchas ocasiones, 
necesidades que el sector público no puede cubrir. Y la crisis económica ha puesto 
a prueba de manera especial la eficiencia de estas organizaciones. Por una parte, 
porque la demanda de sus servicios se ha incrementado exponencialmente. Y, por 
otra parte, porque la caída tanto de las subvenciones públicas (debido al déficit 
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que han soportado las arcas públicas) como de las donaciones privadas (como 
consecuencia de las dificultades económicas que han atravesado muchos hogares 
familiares durante este periodo) han puesto en peligro la continuidad de las ENLs. 
De hecho, son numerosas las organizaciones que han cesado su actividad como 
consecuencia de una inadecuada financiación (como ejemplos, la Fundación 
Desarrollo Sostenido [FUNDESO1], la Confederación de Minusválidos Físicos de 
Castilla-La Mancha [COCEMFE2], o la Asociación Emaús de Altea3).  
 
Es precisamente en este contexto en dónde se enmarca la presente tesis doctoral al 
abordar la interrelación entre la estructura financiera de estas organizaciones, su 
estructura de gobierno corporativo materializada en el consejo (board of trustees 
en terminología anglosajona) y su probabilidad de quiebra medida a través de su 
vulnerabilidad financiera. El estudio de los factores que atañen a la quiebra y al 
financial distress de las organizaciones del sector no lucrativo constituye ya un 
auténtico reto en sí mismo porque, entre otras dificultades, la información sobre 
las ENLs desaparecidas no se suele transmitir de manera automática a los registros 
pertinentes (Hager, 2001). Es por ello que la literatura sobre el tercer sector ha 
optado por el estudio indirecto de la quiebra a través de lo que se ha denominado 
vulnerabilidad financiera, entendida esta como la “probabilidad de que la 
organización reduzca su oferta de servicios cuando experimente un shock 
financiero” (Tuckman & Chang, 1991: 445). No obstante, aunque existe cierto 
consenso en la definición del concepto de vulnerabilidad financiera, la manera de 
materializarlo está aún lejos de ser comúnmente aceptada. Si bien la literatura ha 
testado diversas medidas hasta el momento, las variables y modelos utilizados 
tradicionalmente como predictores de la situación de vulnerabilidad financiera de 
las ENLs no parecen ser muy eficaces (Jegers, 2008). No obstante, la investigación 
se encuentra aún en ciernes analizándose, entre los mecanismos para evitar la 
vulnerabilidad financiera (y en última instancia de quiebra), la estructura de 
gobierno de estas organizaciones. En concreto, cabe destacar el papel del órgano 
                                               
1 https://www.facebook.com/fundeso/  
2 http://www.latribunadetoledo.es/noticia/Z3C68B3A9-E360-3732-
6A813258351E1A33/20140517/cocemfe/clm/entra/concurso/acreedores/22/millones/deuda  
3 http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-
valenciana/2015/05/29/55682c84268e3e85518b457d.html  
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de gobierno interno por excelencia, esto es, el consejo. El papel del consejo en las 
ENLs resulta especialmente relevante dado, no lo olvidemos, el carácter no 
lucrativo de estas organizaciones. La restricción legal de no distribución de 
beneficios determina la inexistencia de derechos residuales económicos y, por 
tanto, de propietarios reales con incentivos a ejercer labores de control y 
supervisión. En ausencia de propietarios, el consejo se convierte en el órgano 
central de gobierno de estas organizaciones. Es por ello que uno de los objetivos de 
la presente tesis doctoral sea analizar el papel del consejo, como principal órgano 
de gobierno de las ENLs, sobre su grado de vulnerabilidad financiera. 
 
El objeto de nuestra tesis requiere enmarcarla dentro de un contexto, teórico y 
social. De acuerdo con Holmstrom y Tirole (1989), cualquier planteamiento de un 
marco económico coherente para explicar una organización, requiere esclarecer 
por qué existen dichas organizaciones (la teorías o teorías que explican su 
existencia) y cuál es su ámbito de actuación, esto es, sus límites. Así, en el caso que 
aquí nos ocupa, antes de profundizar en la relación entre el consejo y la 
vulnerabilidad financiera de las ENLs, procederemos a describir brevemente las 
teorías que explican la existencia de estas organizaciones y el papel que este sector 
ocupa en la sociedad actual.  
 
Con respecto a la existencia del tercer sector en las sociedades modernas son 
varias las teorías que justifican su existencia. Siguiendo la agrupación realizada por 
Romero Merino (2007) podemos encontrar dos grandes grupos de teorías, desde 
el lado de la demanda (considerando las motivaciones de agentes externos, tales 
como donantes, administraciones públicas, beneficiarios, etc.) y desde el lado de la 
oferta (teniendo presentes las motivaciones de los agentes internos de la propia 
organización). 
 
En el lado de la demanda, incluiríamos a la teoría del fallo del gobierno, la teoría 
del fallo del voluntariado y la teoría del fallo contractual. Según la primera de ellas, 
las ENLs nacen fruto de la imposibilidad del Estado para garantizar la provisión de 
todos los bienes colectivos demandados por sus ciudadanos. De esta manera, las 
ENLs aparecerían para proveer esta clase de bienes (Weisbrod, 1975, 1977). Por 
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su parte, la teoría del fallo del Voluntariado (Salamon, 1987a, 1987b) señala que la 
aparición de las ENLs es previa a la acción gubernamental, y que estas entidades 
perviven cuando la realización de las mismas actividades por los poderes públicos 
es menos eficiente que cuando son efectuadas por las propias ENLs. Finalmente, de 
acuerdo a la teoría del fallo contractual, la ausencia de información perfecta para 
todos los partícipes, la racionalidad limitada de los mismos y la imposibilidad de 
diseñar contratos completos, provocan que la asignación de recursos no sea 
siempre lo más eficiente posible. En este contexto, la restricción de no distribución 
de las ENLs (Hansmann, 1980) parecería limitar la aparición de los problemas del 
oportunismo precontractual (selección adversa) y postcontractual (riesgo moral). 
 
En el lado de la oferta, hemos de referirnos a la teoría del control del consumidor, 
la teoría del apoyo del Estado, la teoría del emprendedor no lucrativo y la teoría 
del emprendedor con motivaciones lucrativas. La teoría del control del 
consumidor comparte la restricción de no distribución apuntada anteriormente, 
pero añade que la parte menos informada del intercambio (donantes, 
beneficiarios), debería incorporarse a la ENL para ejercer un control sobre la 
organización (Ben-Ner & Gui, 1993). La teoría del apoyo del Estado apunta al 
apoyo recibido por las administraciones públicas (manifestado en subvenciones 
directas e indirectas, ventajas fiscales, etc.) como pilar en el que se sustenta la 
creación de las ENLs (Weisbrod, 1998). La teoría del emprendedor no lucrativo 
(Young, 1981) se basa en la existencia de motivaciones de índole no económica en 
los individuos a la hora de desarrollar sus iniciativas personales. En esta línea se 
encuadrarían todas aquellas ENLs surgidas al amparo de las motivaciones 
religiosas. Por último, de acuerdo con la teoría del emprendedor con ánimo de 
lucro, no se puede obviar la existencia de ENLs que se han aprovechado de la 
confianza inspirada por su condición jurídico-formal de carecer de ánimo lucrativo 
para atraer un mayor volumen de recursos. Así, en estos casos, los dirigentes se 
han servido de ellas para llevar a cabo una expropiación de los beneficios (Glaeser 
& Shleifer, 2001), bien de manera formalmente legal, o ilegal (las denominadas 
“empresas disfrazadas” o “for-profit in disguise”). 
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Con respecto a los límites y el ámbito que el sector no lucrativo ocupa en la 
sociedad actual, es necesario comenzar acotando el concepto de ENL. Basándonos 
en la caracterización que de estas entidades han realizado numerosos estudios 
llevados a cabo por la Universidad Johns Hopkins (Anheier & Salamon, 1998; Ruiz 
Olabuénaga, 2000, 2001), definimos a las ENLs como aquellas entidades jurídicas 
constituidas legalmente, privadas, sin ánimo de lucro, que poseen una gestión 
autónoma y que cuentan con un nivel significativo de participación voluntaria. En 
relación con su papel en las sociedades actuales, contrasta la creciente relevancia 
del sector con la ausencia de datos concretos que se presenten de manera 
sistemática. Así, la cuantificación del sector dista mucho de ser unánime. Para el 
caso concreto de España, en 2002 el número de organizaciones de este sector se 
elevaba a 362.654, el número de voluntarios era de 4,2 millones de personas, el 
número de empleos equivalentes a jornada completa ascendía a 692.336, y el gasto 
total suponía el 4,7% del Producto Interior Bruto (PIB), sin incluir a los 
voluntarios, o el 6,4% incluyendo a estos últimos (Ruiz Olabuénaga, 2006). Años 
más tarde, la importancia del tercer sector, considerado en sentido amplio, se eleva 
hasta el 10% del PIB (Gimeno, 2005). En todo caso, estos estudios coinciden en la 
creciente importancia económica del sector no lucrativo en conjunto durante las 
últimas tres décadas.  
 
Es precisamente el incremento del volumen de recursos (humanos y financieros) 
que gestionan las ENLs lo que ha generado un aumento en la preocupación de la 
sociedad por la correcta utilización de tales recursos, así como por la búsqueda de 
mecanismos que aseguren la utilización eficiente de los mismos. Durante años se 
pensó que las características esenciales de estas entidades –la ausencia del ánimo 
de lucro, la restricción de no distribución, el apoyo explícito de las 
administraciones públicas y el carácter voluntario de muchos de sus trabajadores– 
hacían de estas organizaciones agentes sin riesgo de comportamientos subóptimos 
u oportunistas. Sin embargo, la realidad ha demostrado que el sector no está 
exento de estos problemas (ejemplo de ello son algunos de los recientes 
escándalos en los que se han visto involucradas ENLs como la Fundación Deporte, 
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Cultura e Integración Social4, Anesvad5, la Fundación Trías Fargas6, la Asociación 
Nadia Nerea7 o L’Arche de Zoé8). Tales escándalos han suscitado inquietud social, 
lo que ha acentuado la necesidad de revisar los mecanismos de gobierno que 
existen en estas organizaciones y su capacidad para supervisar y controlar las 
actuaciones llevadas a cabo por los distintos partícipes de la organización. 
Precisamente en la búsqueda de mecanismos de gobierno efectivos en estas 
organizaciones, los autores han puesto su mirada en la literatura del sector 
lucrativo (e.g., Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010; Cornforth, 2012; Hyndman & 
McDonell, 2009; Ostrower & Stone, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). En la mayoría 
de estos estudios, el consejo se erige como principal protagonista no solo porque 
legalmente es el responsable último de la organización y tiene la obligación de 
velar por la continuidad y el buen funcionamiento de la misma sino porque, como 
ya se ha explicado, la ausencia de propietarios en las ENLs lo convierte en el 
principal mecanismo de gobierno. Estos estudios se han centrado generalmente en 
analizar la influencia del consejo sobre medidas de performance adaptadas al 
sector, tales como la eficiencia administrativa, asignativa o en términos de 
captación de recursos (performance financiera) (Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela 
& Romero-Merino, 2010; Andrés-Alonso, Martín-Cruz, Romero-Merino, 2006; 
Brown, 2005; Callen & Falk, 1993; Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003). Sin embargo, 
el consejo no solo ha de tener presente la eficiencia de la organización, sino que ha 
de velar por evitar la consecuencia última de un funcionamiento inadecuado de la 
ENL, como es la desaparición de la misma, para permitir así que continúe 
prestando sus servicios a la sociedad de forma continuada y sostenible. De esta 
manera, nuestro planteamiento en esta investigación se aparta de la línea 
tradicional, ya que no analiza la relación entre consejo y eficiencia, sino que se 
centra, siguiendo el trabajo de Hodge y Piccolo (2005), en el efecto de la 
composición del consejo sobre la probabilidad de supervivencia financiera de la 
entidad medida en términos de vulnerabilidad financiera. Para ello, el consejo ha 
de desempeñar un doble rol: supervisor de las decisiones y conductas de los 
                                               
4 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/25/baleares/1364241024.html 
5http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2013/04/22/actualidad/1366628230_788563.html 
6 http://www.abc.es/20121113/espana/abcp-fundacion-financio-donaciones-constructoras-
20121113.html 
7 http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/12/04/ciencia/1480885662_129527.html  
8 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/01/28/internacional/1201523246.html  
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directivos al mismo tiempo que asesor, contribuyendo a la elaboración de la 
estrategia de la organización. Consideramos que un correcto desempeño de tales 
roles, permite al consejo afrontar con garantías los efectos de un shock económico 
como el que ha supuesto la reciente crisis financiera y económica para el sector no 
lucrativo (altamente dependiente de subvenciones públicas y donaciones privadas 
voluntarias) y evitar situaciones de vulnerabilidad financiera o, en última 
instancia, de quiebra. 
 
La presente tesis doctoral centra el análisis de la relación entre consejo y 
vulnerabilidad financiera anteriormente nombrada en un sector concreto de las 
ENLs. De forma específica, la muestra utilizada en los capítulos segundo al cuarto, 
está conformada por aquellas ENLs que destinan parte de sus recursos a la 
cooperación al desarrollo, las denominadas Organizaciones No Gubernamentales 
para el Desarrollo (ONGDs). La elección de esta muestra se debe a varios motivos. 
En primer lugar, por la homogeneidad de estas organizaciones en comparación con 
otros subsectores del entorno no lucrativo. Así, la Coordinadora de ONGDs de 
España (CONGDE) (2008) establece una definición de ONGDs común al definirla 
como una organización estable, sin ánimo de lucro, que trabaja activamente en el 
campo de la Cooperación para el Desarrollo y la solidaridad internacional, con 
voluntad de cambio o de transformación social, que tiene respaldo y presencia 
social, que es independiente, con recursos (tanto humanos como económicos), que 
actúa con mecanismos transparentes y participativos de elección o nombramiento 
de sus cargos, que es transparente y, finalmente, que se articula en torno a los fines 
de solidaridad internacional y cooperación. En segundo lugar, porque el sector de 
las ONGDs ha experimentado un considerable aumento tanto en su importancia 
social como en el volumen de fondos que gestiona (García Cebrián & Marcuello 
Servós, 2007; Marcuello Servós, 1999). Según la Plataforma del Voluntariado de 
España (2016) en 2015 participan como voluntarias en actividades de cooperación 
internacional 262.000 personas. Asimismo, las ONGDs se han convertido en 
gestores de una parte importante de la Ayuda Oficial al Desarrollo (AOD en 
adelante) canalizando cerca del 12% de las subvenciones y ayudas que las 
administraciones públicas destinan a AOD (Secretaría General de Cooperación 
Internacional para el Desarrollo, 2016). Una tercera razón para centrar nuestra 
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investigación en estas organizaciones es que, como consecuencia de su papel como 
actores de la AOD, las ONGDs han padecido de forma especialmente significativa el 
impacto de la crisis en España. Así, entre 2009 y 2015 la AOD española descendió 
en torno al 70% de su cuantía, pasando de suponer el 0,46% de la Renta Nacional 
Bruta al 0,13% (Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos 
[OECD], 2016), lejos del objetivo del 0,7%. Por último, en este subsector, cobran 
gran importancia las coordinadoras nacionales de ONGDs debido a que agrupan a 
las entidades más importantes, inciden en la divulgación de buenas prácticas y, a 
nivel práctico, permiten acotar la muestra. A nivel europeo existe una 
confederación de estas coordinadoras (CONCORDE), que agrupa a las 28 
plataformas nacionales. En nuestro caso, a lo largo de la investigación empírica, 
hemos acudido a la CONGDE y a Bond en Reino Unido. En el caso español, es 
especialmente relevante la actividad dinamizadora que la CONGDE ha adoptado en 
los últimos años, promulgando un Código de Conducta de obligado cumplimiento 
para sus miembros y con el diseño de unos indicadores de transparencia y buen 
gobierno que inciden en la responsabilidad que estas organizaciones tienen frente 
a la sociedad, pues sus fondos provienen fundamentalmente de donaciones 
privadas y de subvenciones públicas. En conjunto, estas herramientas de 
autorregulación del sector nos han permitido un mejor acceso a datos sobre 
composición del consejo de las entidades, así como a su información económico-
financiera. Todas estas razones justifican, desde nuestro punto de vista, el análisis 
de las ONGDs en términos de gobierno corporativo y vulnerabilidad financiera.  
 
Para abordar el estudio de la influencia del consejo sobre la vulnerabilidad 
financiera de las ONGDs, articulamos la presente tesis en cuatro artículos 
académicos, recogidos en los capítulos del primero al cuarto. Así, comenzaremos 
nuestro primer capítulo con una revisión teórica de la literatura sobre gobierno en 
las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro. En el mismo se presenta un recorrido por el 
estado del arte de la cuestión, que parte de la literatura prescriptiva, continúa con 
el enfoque de dependencia de recursos y la teoría de la agencia, y culmina en un 
modelo ampliado de gobierno basado en un enfoque ecléctico y contingente. En los 
capítulos segundo y tercero nos centramos de manera exhaustiva en la revisión del 
concepto de vulnerabilidad financiera en las organizaciones no lucrativas 
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relacionadas con la cooperación al desarrollo. De esta manera, en el capítulo 
segundo se centra en la adecuación de los predictores clásicos a nuestro contexto 
(ONGDs de Reino Unido en época de crisis económica). Concretamente, analizamos 
el poder explicativo y predictivo del índice elaborado por Trussel, Greenlee y 
Brady (2002), basado en la predicción de la reducción de activos netos en un 
periodo de tres años a través de cinco variables: la ratio de endeudamiento, el 
grado de concentración de ingresos, el margen operativo, la ratio de gastos 
administrativos y el tamaño de la organización. Por su parte, el tercer capítulo se 
centra en las medidas de vulnerabilidad financiera per se, revisando las medidas 
que han hecho operativa este concepto por las investigaciones de este ámbito. A tal 
fin, analizamos y mostramos las diferencias existentes entre las principales proxies 
empleadas por la literatura, como son la reducción de activos netos, la reducción 
de gastos en programas y la reducción de ingresos, para finalmente proponer un 
modelo multidimensional que recoge, a nuestro juicio, los aspectos más 
determinantes para cuantificar la vulnerabilidad financiera. En concreto, nuestra 
propuesta de modelo incluye la variación de activos netos durante un periodo de 
tiempo (dimensión operativa) y la relación entre el activo y el pasivo, tanto en 
términos totales (dimensión de apalancamiento) como considerando únicamente 
el corto plazo (dimensión de liquidez). Por último, en el cuarto capítulo, 
analizamos, desde una perspectiva ampliada, el efecto que tiene el órgano de 
gobierno sobre la vulnerabilidad financiera de las ONGDs y, en definitiva, sobre su 
probabilidad de supervivencia en momentos de carencia de recursos. Por una 
parte, empleamos el modelo multidimensional propuesto en el capítulo anterior 
para determinar aquellas ONGDs españolas que son financieramente vulnerables. 
Por otra parte, el modelo de gobierno considerado se fundamenta en la teoría de la 
agencia y en el enfoque de dependencia de recursos e incluye tanto las variables 
tradicionalmente empleadas en este tipo de estudios (tamaño e independencia del 
consejo, dualidad en los puestos de Chief Executive Officer [CEO] y presidente del 
consejo, presencia de fundadores) como otras de índole más cognitivo (educación 
y experiencia de los consejeros). Finalizaremos la presente tesis doctoral con las 
conclusiones más relevantes derivadas de la investigación realizada en los cuatro 
capítulos anteriores, así como las limitaciones de las que adolece y las futuras 
líneas de investigación a emprender. 
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“When we thought we had all the answers,  
suddenly, all the questions changed” 
Mario Benedetti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent economic and financial crisis has faced companies, public 
administrations, organizations and society in general with a scenario riddled with 
difficulties and challenges. This reality has not been foreign to the academic 
sphere, as, in recent years, researchers have focused on analyzing not only the 
causes that provoked this crisis, but also its consequences on governments, 
families and companies. In this context, the study of the determinants of business 
failures has been one of the most addressed topics in the literature (e.g., Darrat, 
Gray & Wu, 2016; De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014; Lins, Volpin & Wagner, 
2013; Tinoco & Wilson, 2013). The usual consideration of the crisis as an 
exogenous shock in the microeconomic analysis has allowed to test, from a 
positive approach, the efficiency that factors such as ownership structure, 
corporate governance or capital structure have in the company. However, this 
profusion of company studies contrasts with the scarce attention given to the 
study of the effect of the crisis on the survival of other relevant organizations in 
society, such as the nonprofit organizations (NPOs). NPOs constitute an essential 
part of the structuring of civil society, as they often deal with those needs that the 
public sector cannot meet. And the economic crisis has especially tested the 
efficiency of these organizations. On the one hand, because the demand for their 
services has grown exponentially. And, on the other hand, because the reduction in 
both public subsidies (due to the deficit of public finances) and private donations 
(as a result of the economic difficulties experienced by many family households 
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during this period) have jeopardize the continuity of the NPOs. In fact, numerous 
organizations have ceased their activity as a result of an inadequate funding (as 
example, Fundación Desarrollo Sostenido [FUNDESO 9 ], Confederación de 
Minusválidos Físicos de Castilla-La Mancha [COCEMFE10], or Association Emaús de 
Altea11). 
 
It is precisely in this context where this PhD thesis is framed, as it addresses the 
interrelationship between the financial structure of these organizations, their 
corporate governance structure embodied in the board of trustees and their 
probability of bankruptcy measured through their financial vulnerability. The 
study of the factors concerning bankruptcy and financial distress of NPOs is 
already a real challenge in itself because, among other difficulties, information on 
defunct NPOs is not often automatically transferred to the appropriate registers 
(Hager, 2001). This is why the literature on the third sector has opted for the 
indirect study of bankruptcy through what has been called financial vulnerability, 
understood as “the likelihood that the organization cuts back its service offerings 
immediately when it experiences a financial shock" (Tuckman & Chang, 1991: 
445). Nevertheless, although there is some consensus referring to the concept of 
financial vulnerability, its operationalization is still far from being commonly 
accepted. Despite the literature has tested various measures to date, the variables 
and models traditionally used as predictors of the financial vulnerability of NPOs 
do not appear to be very effective (Jegers, 2008). However, the research is still in a 
preliminary stage, as it analyzes, among the mechanisms to avoid the financial 
vulnerability (and ultimately the bankruptcy), the governance structure of these 
organizations. In particular, it is important to highlight the role of the internal 
governing body par excellence, that is, the board of trustees. The role of the board 
in NPOs is especially relevant given (we should not forget it) the nonprofit nature 
of these organizations. The legal restriction of the non-distribution of profits 
determines the lack of residual economic rights and, therefore, of real owners with 
                                               
9 https://www.facebook.com/fundeso/  
10 http://www.latribunadetoledo.es/noticia/Z3C68B3A9-E360-3732-
6A813258351E1A33/20140517/cocemfe/clm/entra/concurso/acreedores/22/millones/deuda  
11 http://www.elmundo.es/comunidad-
valenciana/2015/05/29/55682c84268e3e85518b457d.html 
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incentives to exercise control and supervision. In the absence of owners, the board 
becomes the central governing body of these organizations. This is why one of the 
objectives of this doctoral thesis is to analyze the role of the board, as the main 
governing body of the NPOs, on its level of financial vulnerability. 
 
The object of our thesis requires framing it within a theoretical and social context. 
According to Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), any approach of a coherent economic 
framework to explain an organization requires elucidating why these 
organizations exist (the theory or theories that explain their existence) and their 
scope of action, that is, their limits. Thus, in our case, before going deeper into the 
relationship between the board and the financial vulnerability of NPOs, we will 
briefly describe the theories that explain the existence of these organizations and 
the role that this sector occupies in the current society. 
 
With regard to the existence of the third sector in modern societies, there are 
several theories that justify its existence. Following the classification proposed by 
Romero Merino (2007), we can find two large groups of theories, from the demand 
side (considering the motivations of external agents, such as donors, public 
administrations, beneficiaries, etc.) and from the supply side (taking into account 
the motivations of the internal agents of the organization itself). 
 
From the demand side, we include the theory of government failure, the theory of 
voluntary failure and the theory of contract failure. According to the first of them, 
NPOs are born because of the impossibility of the State to guarantee the provision 
of all the collective goods demanded by its citizens. In this way, NPOs would 
appear to provide this class of goods (Weisbrod, 1975, 1977). The theory of 
voluntary failure (Salamon, 1987a, 1987b) notes that the appearance of NPOs is 
prior to the governmental action, and that these organizations survive when the 
execution of the same activities by the public bodies is less efficient than the 
execution of them by the NPOs themselves. Finally, according to the theory of 
contract failure, the absence of perfect information for all participants, their 
limited rationality and the inability to design complete contracts, mean that the 
allocation of resources is not always as efficient as possible. In this context, the 
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non-distribution constraint of NPOs (Hansmann, 1980) would seem to limit the 
occurrence of the problems of pre-contractual (adverse selection) and post-
contractual opportunism (moral hazard). 
 
From the supply side, we include the customer control theory, the theory of 
government support, the theory of nonprofit entrepreneur, and the theory of the 
for-profit entrepreneur. Consumer control theory shares the non-distribution 
constraint noted above, but it adds that the less informed part of the relation 
(donors, beneficiaries) should join the NPO to exercise control over the 
organization (Ben-Ner & Gui, 1993). The theory of government support denotes 
that the support received by public administrations (manifested through direct 
and indirect subsidies, tax advantages, etc.) is the pillar on which the creation of 
NPOs is based (Weisbrod, 1998). The nonprofit entrepreneur theory (Young, 
1981) is based on the existence of non-economic motivations in individuals when 
developing their personal initiatives. In this line, this theory would allow to explain 
the formation of those NPOs that arose from religious motivations. Finally, 
according to the theory of the for-profit entrepreneur, we cannot ignore the 
existence of NPOs that have taken advantage of the confidence inspired by its 
legal-formal status of lacking a lucrative aim to attract a greater volume of 
resources. Thus, in these cases, their managers have used them to expropriate the 
profits (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2001), either formally legal or illegal (the so-called "for-
profit in disguise"). 
 
With respect to the limits and scope that the nonprofit sector occupies in the 
present society, it is necessary to begin by limiting the concept of NPO. For this 
purpose, we base on the characterization of these entities developed by 
researchers from the Johns Hopkins University (Anheier & Salamon, 1998; Ruiz 
Olabuénaga, 2000, 2001). In this way, we define NPOs as those organizations 
which are legally constituted, private, without lucrative aim, that also have a self-
governing management and a significant level of voluntary participation. In 
relation to its role in current societies, the growing relevance of the sector 
contrasts with the lack of regular and concrete data. Thus, the quantification of the 
sector is far from being unanimous. In the specific case of Spain, the number of 
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NPOs was 362,654 in 2002, the number of volunteers was 4.2 million, the number 
of full-time equivalent jobs was 692,336, and the total expenditure represented 
4.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), not including volunteers, or 6.4% when 
including them (Ruiz Olabuénaga, 2006). Some years later, the importance of the 
third sector, broadly considered, amounts to 10% of GDP (Gimeno, 2005). In any 
case, these studies agree on the growing economic importance of the nonprofit 
sector over the last three decades. 
 
This rise in the volume of resources (both human and financial) managed by NPOs 
has generated an increase in the society's concern for the correct use of such 
resources, as well as for the search for mechanisms to ensure the efficient use of 
them. For years, it was thought that the essential characteristics of these 
organizations –the lack of for-profit aim, the non-distribution constraint, the 
explicit support of public administrations and the voluntary nature of many of 
their workers– turned NPOs into agents without risk of suboptimal or 
opportunistic behavior. However, the reality has shown that the sector is not 
exempt from these problems (examples of these problems are some of the recent 
scandals involving NPOs such as Fundación Deporte, Cultura e Integración Social12, 
Anesvad13, Fundación Trías Fargas14, Asociación Nadia Nerea15 or L’Arche de 
Zoé16). Such scandals have raised social concerns, which has accentuated the need 
to examine the governance mechanisms that exist in these organizations and their 
ability to monitor and control the actions carried out by the different stakeholders 
of the NPO. Indeed, when searching for effective governance mechanisms in these 
organizations, the authors have looked at the literature in the for-profit sector (e.g., 
Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010; Cornforth, 2012; Hyndman & McDonell, 2009; 
Ostrower & Stone, 2010; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). In most of these studies, the 
board becomes the main protagonist not only because it is the ultimate legal 
responsible for the organization and has the obligation to ensure its continuity and 
proper functioning, but also because, as already explained, the absence of owners 
                                               
12 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/03/25/baleares/1364241024.html 
13http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2013/04/22/actualidad/1366628230_788563.html 
14 http://www.abc.es/20121113/espana/abcp-fundacion-financio-donaciones-constructoras-
20121113.html 
15 http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/12/04/ciencia/1480885662_129527.html  
16 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2008/01/28/internacional/1201523246.html  
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in the NPOs makes it the main governance mechanism. These studies have 
generally focused on analyzing the influence of the board on organizational 
performance measures adapted to the sector (i.e., administrative efficiency, 
allocative efficiency or fundraising efficiency) (Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela 
& Romero-Merino, 2010; Andrés-Alonso, Martín-Cruz, Romero-Merino, 2006; 
Brown, 2005; Callen & Falk, 1993; Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003). However, the 
board should not only keep in mind the efficiency of the organization, but it must 
also ensure that the ultimate consequence of an inadequate functioning of the NPO 
(i.e., its disappearance) is avoided, so that it can continue to serve society on a 
continuous and sustainable basis. In this way, our approach in this research 
deviates from the traditional line, since it does not analyze the relationship 
between the board and efficiency, but, following the study of Hodge and Piccolo 
(2005), it focuses on the effect of the board composition on the probability of 
financial survival of the NPO measured in terms of financial vulnerability. To do 
this, the board has to play a double role: monitor of the managers’ conduct and 
decisions, as well as advisor, contributing to develop the organizational strategy. 
We consider that a correct performance of such roles allows the board to 
successfully face the effects of an economic shock, such as the recent financial and 
economic crisis has meant for the nonprofit sector (highly dependent on public 
subsidies and voluntary private donations), and also to avoid situations of financial 
vulnerability or, ultimately, the bankruptcy. 
 
This doctoral thesis focuses on the analysis of the relationship between the board 
and financial vulnerability in a particular subsector of the nonprofit field. 
Specifically, the sample we use in the second to fourth chapters is composed by 
those NPOs that allocate part of their resources to the development and 
international cooperation, the so-called Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations (NGDOs). We have chosen this sample due to several reasons. First, 
because of the homogeneity of these organizations compared to other subsectors 
of the nonprofit scope. Thus, the Spanish platform of NGDOs (CONGDE) (2008) 
provides a common definition of NGDOs as they are defined as organizations that 
are stable, without for-profit aim, active in the field of development cooperation 
and international solidarity, with willingness of social change or transformation, 
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which have social support and presence, they are independent, transparent, with 
resources (both human and economic), with transparent and participatory 
mechanisms of election or appointment of their board positions, and, finally, they 
are articulated around the goals of international solidarity and cooperation. 
Second, we choose the NGDOs subsector because it has experienced a substantial 
increase both in its social importance and in the volume of funds it manages 
(García Cebrián & Marcuello Servós, 2007; Marcuello Servós, 1999). According to 
the Spanish Volunteer Platform (Plataforma del Voluntariado de España, 2016) 
262,000 people participated as volunteers in international cooperation activities in 
2015. In addition, NGDOs have become agents of a large part of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), because about 12% of the subsidies and aid that 
public administrations allocate to ODA is channeled through NGDOs (Secretaría 
General de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, 2016). A third reason for 
focusing our research on these organizations is that, as consequence of their role 
as agents in ODA, NGDOs have significantly suffered the impact of the crisis in 
Spain. Between 2009 and 2015, Spanish ODA fell by around 70% of its amount, 
from 0.46% of the Gross National Income to 0.13% (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2016), which is far from the target of 0.7%. 
Finally, national platforms of NGDOs are highly important in this subsector, as they 
bring together the most important organizations, insist on the dissemination of 
good practices and, on a practical level, they allow us to delimit the sample. At 
European level, there is a confederation of these platforms (CONCORDE), which 
groups the 28 national platforms. In our case we have resorted to CONGDE and to 
Bond in the United Kingdom (UK) throughout the empirical research. In the 
Spanish case, it is relevant to note the revitalizing activity that CONGDE has 
adopted in recent years, as it has promulgated a mandatory Code of Conduct for its 
members and it has designed transparency and good governance indicators that 
emphasize the responsibility that these organizations have towards society, since 
their funds come mainly from private donations and public grants. Together, these 
self-regulation tools of the subsector have facilitated our access to data on the 
composition of NGDOs’ boards, as well as to their economic and financial 
information. From our point of view, all these reasons justify the analysis of NGDOs 
in terms of corporate governance and financial vulnerability. 
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To approach the study of the influence of the board on the financial vulnerability of 
NGDOs, we articulate this doctoral thesis in four academic articles, included in the 
chapters from the first to the fourth. Thus, we will begin our first chapter with a 
theoretical review of the literature on governance in NPOs. In this chapter, we 
present a journey through the state of the art of nonprofit governance. This 
journey leaves from the prescriptive literature, it continues with the resource 
dependence approach and the agency theory, and it culminates in an extended 
model of governance based on an eclectic and contingent approach. The second 
and third chapters focus comprehensively on the review of the concept of financial 
vulnerability in NPOs related to development cooperation. In this way, the second 
chapter focuses on the adaptation of classic predictors to our context (NGDOs from 
the UK in times of economic crisis). Specifically, we analyze the explanatory and 
predictive power of the index elaborated by Trussel, Greenlee and Brady (2002), 
which is based on the prediction of the reduction in net assets over three years 
through five variables: debt ratio, revenue concentration, operating margin, 
administrative costs ratio and organizational size. Meanwhile, the third chapter 
focuses on the measures of financial vulnerability per se, reviewing the measures 
that have made operative this concept by prior research on this area. To this end, 
we analyze and show the differences between the main proxies used by the 
literature, such as the reduction in net assets, the reduction in program expenses 
and the reduction in revenues, in order to finally propose a multidimensional 
model that, in our view, includes the most determining aspects for quantifying the 
financial vulnerability. Specifically, our multidimensional proposal includes the 
variation of net assets over a time period (operational dimension) and the ratio of 
assets to debt, both in total terms (leverage dimension) and considering only the 
short-term (liquidity dimension). Finally, in the fourth chapter, we analyze, from 
an extended perspective, the effect that the board has on the financial vulnerability 
of NGDOs and, ultimately, on their survival probability in times of lack of 
resources. On the one hand, we utilize the multidimensional model proposed in the 
previous chapter to determine those Spanish NGDOs that are financially 
vulnerable. On the other hand, the governance model we consider is based on the 
agency theory and the resource dependence approach and it includes both the 
variables traditionally used in this type of studies (size and independence of the 
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board, duality in the positions of Chief Executive Officer [CEO] and chairman of the 
board, presence of founders) as well as others of a more cognitive nature 
(directors' education and experience). We will conclude this doctoral dissertation 
with the most relevant findings derived from the research conducted in the four 
previous chapters, as well as its limitations and the future lines of research to be 
undertaken. 
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GOOD GOVERNANCE IN PHILANTHROPY AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS17 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews the literature on governance of nonprofit organizations. After 
defining the concepts of governance and governance mechanisms of the nonprofit 
sector, we review the different approaches and theories that previous literature has 
used to explain the problem of governance, focusing on both resource dependence 
and agency theories. In this way, we reach an extended model of governance that 
combines aspects coming from different approaches. Finally, we present the main 
lines of future research.  
 
Keywords: governance, nonprofit organizations, agency theory, resource 
dependence approach, prescriptive literature 
 
 
Resumen 
Este capítulo repasa el estado del arte de la literatura sobre gobierno de las 
entidades no lucrativas. Después de definir los conceptos de gobierno y mecanismos 
de gobierno en el sector no lucrativo, se realiza un repaso a los diferentes enfoques y 
teorías que se han empleado para explicar el problema de gobierno, centrándonos en 
el enfoque de dependencia de recursos y en la teoría de la agencia. De esta manera, se 
llega a un modelo ampliado de gobierno que combina aspectos provenientes de 
distintos enfoques. Finalmente, se presentan las principales líneas de investigación 
futura. 
 
Palabras clave: gobierno, entidades no lucrativas, teoría de la agencia, enfoque de 
recursos, literatura prescriptiva 
 
 
                                               
17 A version of this chapter is published as “Romero-Merino, M. E. & Garcia-Rodriguez, I. (2016). 
Good governance in philanthropy and nonprofits. In T. Jung, S. D. Phillips & J. Harrow (eds.), The 
Routledge Companion to Philanthropy. London: Routledge, 395-407”. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As philanthropy, and the nonprofit sector more generally, has grown in size and 
importance, questions of governance have become an ever more prominent 
concern. Various scandals, combined with a realization that “the angelic” sector 
has a “darker side”, explored by Smith, Eng and Albertson (2016), have led to 
increasing calls for novel perspectives on, and approaches to, governance research 
and practice within the field (Cornforth & Brown, 2014). Traditionally, work on 
governance within the nonprofit sector has focused on boards’ performance, on 
their roles in fundraising and their linking to the community. Furthermore, such 
studies have tended to be descriptive, normative and lacking strong theoretical 
and empirical foundations (Miller-Millesen, 2003). When attempting to explain the 
complexities of nonprofit governance systems, and the contexts within which these 
operate, such an approach seems too narrow. Not only does it overlook the more 
holistic meaning of the word “governance”, from the Greek kybernân, “steering a 
ship or a chariot”, and the broader governing responsibilities derived therefrom, 
but it also ignores wider aspects of governance mechanisms relevant for 
philanthropic organizations. 
 
This chapter provides a chronological journey through the most prominent 
theoretical perspectives relevant to philanthropic organizations’ governance; it 
travels from traditional perspectives, such as the role of board size or 
independence, to seeking more dynamic and diverse governance mechanisms as 
key to understanding and increasing the effectiveness, and consequently the 
performance, of philanthropic organizations. While a number of perspectives have 
been proposed in relation to nonprofit governance, including signaling theory, 
which points to information asymmetries between different stakeholders (Marcus 
& Goodman, 1991; Spence, 1973), or stewardship theory, which focuses on the 
stewardship roles taken on by directors (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; 
Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012), there are 
two underlying, fundamental, factors: resource dependency and agency. These two 
ideas also play a special role in the changing relationship dynamics between 
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grantmakers and grantees that arise from a stronger focus on measuring impact in 
philanthropy (Schnurbein, 2016).  
 
The most used approach in the early studies on nonprofit governance is the 
resource dependence theory, which is focused on explaining the service role of the 
board. This approach views boards as a resource absorption mechanism, and the 
human and social capital of their members as the core of its effectiveness. The 
other relevant economic approach to corporate governance is the agency theory. 
Although featured in the corporate governance literature in the for-profit field, the 
agency arguments have been applied, later and more reluctantly, to NPOs. For 
many years, the altruism and voluntary character of the workers in the nonprofit 
sector seemed to be enough to protect donors from expropriation, fraud, or 
opportunistic managerial behavior. Unfortunately, scandals such as United Way18 
or Covenant House19 drew attention to agency issues, and the monitoring role of 
the governance systems (not only the board) became common subjects of research 
in the nonprofit sector. However, despite the progress, none of the theories in 
isolation seemed to provide valid responses for the optimal configuration of the 
governance system of nonprofits. To overcome their limitations, recent studies 
have opted to include arguments from both of the approaches to build a multi-
theory and multidisciplinary perspective of nonprofit governance more complete 
in scope and content. This chapter will therefore concentrate on the issues raised 
by resource dependency and by agency theory, and how their insights can, and 
should, be integrated with more recent ideas from cognitive perspectives.  
 
Within the philanthropy arena, governance studies have tended to focus on 
private, grant-making foundations. The argument has been that these display 
certain characteristics that make them distinct from other nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) and their governance requirements. Such foundations: usually have a 
single donor and do not need to fundraise from a broader donor base; tend to 
spend the earnings from their capital investment; and fund other organizations to 
                                               
18 https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/charitywatch-hall-of-shame/63 
19 http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/28/nyregion/after-scandal-revisiting-covenant-house-
special-report-reeling-its-own-crisis.html?pagewanted=all 
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do their work (Stone, 1975). However, as Harrow, Jung and Phillips (2016) and 
Leat (2016) highlight, private foundations are only one set of players within the 
wider philanthropic foundation game. As such, it is important to acknowledge that 
some of the insights provided by the governance literature in general, and the one 
on nonprofit governance in particular, might not be applicable across the entire 
foundation field. Simultaneously, though, one should not take too narrow a 
perspective. With philanthropic foundations reinventing themselves in the social 
finance and social investment landscape, and some traditional grantmaking 
foundations reflecting on, and moving towards, fundraising approaches to 
counteract decreasing capital income and/or increasing social needs, broader 
nonprofit governance issues suddenly arise in, and become relevant to, this area. 
Consequently, this chapter takes a broad perspective; it draws on the wider 
insights that emerge on nonprofit governance and reflects how these relate to the 
composition of philanthropic foundations’ boards. 
 
 
2. DEFINING NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS 
 
Unlike in the private sector, where a variety of different, and at times conflicting, 
perspectives on corporate governance exist, specific definitions of governance for 
the nonprofit field have been less prominent (Cornforth, 2012; Ostrower & Stone, 
2006). Instead, the focus has frequently been on simply transferring definitions 
from the corporate to the nonprofit field. This is illustrated in the writings of 
authors such as Hyndman and McDonell (2009) or Jegers (2009) who follow the 
corporate finance perspective on governance put forward by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997: 741) when stating that “governance deals with the ways in which suppliers 
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their 
investment”. Such a direct transfer is, however, problematic. Notwithstanding the 
increasing discourse on “social return on investment” and the financialization of 
philanthropy (Thümler, 2016), it is not easy to translate the conceptual 
underpinnings of investment and financial perspectives to an environment where 
profit distribution has traditionally not been a priority.  
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This is not to say that there is no potential for drawing insights from the private 
sector literature. Charreaux (1997, cited in Charreaux, 2004: 2), for example 
argues that governance is “the set of organizational and institutional mechanisms 
that define the powers and influence the managers’ decisions, in other words, that 
‘govern’ their conduct and define their discretionary space”. In this line, Cornforth 
and Chambers (2010: 1) cast nonprofit governance as “the systems and processes 
concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control and accountability of an 
organization”. This definition then follows the etymological roots of the 
governance concept, by referring to the ways in which the organization (and its 
managers) is guided and controlled. To do so, governance mechanisms must play a 
dual role. They must be able to act as both advisors to, and monitors of, the 
executive team. Governance, thereby, covers what has traditionally been referred 
to as “service and control tasks” (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Service tasks are related 
to the organization’s guidance. It includes not only advice and counsel for 
managers, but also the provision of external legitimacy and networking (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). The governance mechanisms can thus be considered as an active 
part, as playing a critical role in guiding management in strategic decision making 
processes (Andrews, 1980; Minichilli, Zattoni & Zona, 2009). The control or 
monitoring task, on the other hand, supposes that managers are opportunistic. 
Consequently, the main task of governance mechanisms is to protect the resource 
contributors (shareholders in firms, or founders, funders and donors in 
philanthropic foundations) from managerial misappropriation. To do so, 
governance mechanisms must control the organization’s performance, monitor its 
activities, and assess the management team or its philanthropic equivalent 
(Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996).  
 
As part of this, the place and context of these mechanisms must be clarified. In the 
bulk of the nonprofit governance literature, this is considered to be the board. 
While the board is the most important governing part within a NPO, it is by no 
means the only one. Albeit less researched, other external, governance 
mechanisms include government, private donors, capital structures and financial 
disclosure or transparency arrangements of a foundation. As has been highlighted 
in other parts of this volume, governments are taking an increasingly strong 
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interest, and role, in the foundation world (Healy & Donnelly-Cox, 2016; Phillips & 
Smith, 2016), a trend that extends to the wider nonprofit field: governments set 
standards for the configuration of the internal structure of NPOs by encouraging 
professionalization (Guo, 2007) and by supporting only those organizations that 
meet codes of good governance requirements (Ostrower, 2007). Furthermore, 
governments decide the activities or projects they support by setting clear 
boundaries. This can influence the strategic plans and ambitions of these 
organizations and serve as an organizational control mechanism (Andrés-Alonso, 
Martín-Cruz & Romero-Merino, 2006). Within philanthropy, this is prominently 
reflected, for example, in the case of governmental flow-through funding for 
community foundations. This directive and control function is likely to increase as 
governments focus on “impact” philanthropy. Finally, governments also act as 
regulators for the field through legislation, though the empirical evidence base in 
how far this translates to good governance warrants further development 
(Alexander, Young, Weiner & Hearld, 2008; Hyndman & McDonell, 2009; Ostrower, 
2007).  
 
Mirroring governments, in the case of philanthropic foundations the founder(s), 
and/or the individuals or organizations providing the resources can similarly act 
as a guide and monitoring body. They can influence both the type of activities 
pursued by a foundation and the composition of its board. In this way, although 
lacking ownership rights, private donors can also act as a guide and monitoring 
body, especially when they bring significant money to the NPO. Donors, as 
investors, act rationally trying to maximize the usefulness of the resources 
provided to the organization (Manne, 1999). Hence, they hope NPOs behave 
responsibly (Speckbacher, 2008; Wellens & Jegers, 2014). When a NPO is 
significantly supported by a private donor, this donor usually plays a role as a 
governing body in the same way governments do. These donors can influence not 
only the type of activities the NPOs develop but also the composition of their board 
(Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela & Romero-Merino, 2009).  
 
As happens in firms, and especially with the wider move to venture philanthropy, 
social investment, and social finance (Salamon, 2014), capital structure can also act 
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as a governance mechanism in so far as that a higher level of financial resources 
involved (either to the foundation or from the foundation) is likely to result in 
increased financial monitoring. Across the wider nonprofit field research on this 
topic is still in its infancy, but a number of studies have been emerging over the last 
few years (Jegers, 2011; Jegers & Verschueren, 2006). In addition, foundations can 
use accounting information and transparency in financial statements to monitor 
financial performance, especially by using external auditing to reduce uncertainty 
about the validity of the figures (Jegers, 2002). Thus, transparency and 
accountability measures can be considered as positive governance mechanisms for 
NPOs as in many countries these are open to public inspection (Boozang, 2007; 
Harrow, 2016).  
 
Finally, one should not forget boards of trustees as absolute protagonists in the 
nonprofit governance literature. Boards of trustees –the nonprofit equivalent of 
boards of directors– are responsible for protecting the interests of the founders, 
donors, beneficiaries and society in general by guiding the organization with care, 
skill and integrity (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006, 2009). For many years, boards have 
been perceived in a relative narrow way. They were considered as mere 
fundraisers, cheerleaders or even as simply rubberstamping bodies. But, as will 
be seen throughout the rest of this chapter, boards play a far more active role in 
the nonprofit sector when compared to the corporate world (Coombes, Horris, 
Allen & Webb, 2011). As nonprofits grew and their internal structure became more 
complex, the directors absorbed more and more duties and tasks. Currently, 
theories about nonprofit corporate governance have evolved while the 
responsibilities of boards are growing and deepening. 
 
 
3. THE NORMATIVE APPROACH TO NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE 
 
During the 1990s, the majority of studies on nonprofit governance referred to the 
board as a unique governance mechanism and approached its workings from a 
predominantly normative viewpoint. Many authors produced manuals and reports 
with recommendations about the roles that boards should play and the activities 
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that directors had to develop (e.g., Carver, 1990; Chait, Holland & Taylor, 1991; 
Houle, 1989).  
 
This normative approach is not yet outdated. Not only has this tendency continued 
(e.g., Cornforth, 2001a; Miller-Millesen, 2003), but the spectrum of expectations 
has become increasingly wide. The board is expected to cover: strategic planning; 
selection and evaluation of managers; monitoring programs and services of the 
organization; managing and controlling financial resources; improving the public 
image of the organization; and selection and training of new directors. As part of 
this, a plethora of self-assessment toolkits for board members has been developed 
by academics, consultants and umbrella organizations. Tools, such as the Board 
Self-Assessment Questionnaire (BSAQ) (Holland, 1991), the Board Self-Assessment 
Tool (McKinsey & Company, ND), the Governance Self-Assessment Checklist 
(GSAC) (Gill, Flynn & Reissing, 2005), the Good Governance Tool Kit (VicSport, 
2015), or the Charities Toolkit (Kingston Smith, 2013), are designed to assess the 
skillset of directors and the degree of compliance of board members with essential 
tasks.  
 
A number of criticisms have been raised with this approach. First of all, these tools 
and models frequently lack strong supporting empirical evidence (Hough, 2006; 
Jackson & Holland, 1998) and their prescriptions are rarely compared, and related, 
to actual board practices (Herman, Renz & Heimovics, 1997; Ostrower & Stone, 
2010; Zimmermann & Stevens, 2008). This lack of contextualization is further 
problematic in that proposed “best practices” are indiscriminately applied across 
the wide range and characteristics of NPOs (Miller-Millesen, 2003; Parker, 2007): 
from small local charities and family trusts to international NPOs and multimillion 
corporate foundations. Furthermore, by advocating “ideal” board behaviors (e.g., 
Cornforth, 1996; Hall, 1990; Herman, 1989), the expectations promulgated within 
these tools might be unrealistic and, when boards fail to live up to these standards, 
demotivating. The extent to which these guides, or tools, are used is also unknown, 
as is the case when foundations’ groups produce apparently tailored guides for 
their members (Jenkins, 2012). Finally, as studies give prominence to describing 
boards, or defining good practice, there is also a notable lack of theoretical 
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underpinnings (Speckbacher, 2008). The next section will therefore outline key 
theoretical frameworks that can inform our understanding of nonprofit 
governance and assess the extent to which these perspectives are supported by 
empirical evidence. 
 
 
4. THE RESOURCE DEPENDENCY APPROACH TO NONPROFIT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
For many years, the most influential theory in governance studies was “resource 
dependency”. This perceives organizations as open systems, constrained by their 
context. As Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 1) state, "to understand the behavior of an 
organization you must understand the context of that behavior –that is, the ecology 
of the organization–”. To reduce environmental uncertainty and dependency, an 
organization can accumulate power or control over vital resources (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins, 2009; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  
 
Within NPOs, this was understood as a need to develop a strong board, one that 
includes directors who are in a position to influence the outside world to the NPO’s 
advantage (Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010). Boards, thereby, are considered to 
function as resource catalysts: they provide linkages to necessary resources and 
act as “boundary spanners” (e.g., Brown, 2005; Harlan & Saidel, 1994; Provan, 
1980). Such boundary spanning can take various forms and cover numerous 
activities. Reflecting the notions of treasure, time and talent, these can range from 
fundraising activities, as for example required by community foundations, to 
developing a foundation’s relationships with external stakeholders, such as 
government, public relations, or offering specific advice and counsel.  
 
Within this school of thought, a board’s boundary spanning activities is directly 
related to organizational performance as these help to reduce dependencies 
between the organization and external contingencies (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
This relationship has been widely tested in the nonprofit field. The board’s ability 
to provide resources is related to board size, linkage (interlocking) and diversity, 
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as well as to individual features of the directors, such as demographic 
characteristics, knowledge and skills. Early studies concentrated on the ability of 
the board to accumulate resources (e.g., Green & Griesinger, 1996; Herman & Renz, 
2000; Provan, 1980), but soon a growing body of work emerged that recognized 
the strategic role of the board as a key factor in affecting nonprofit performance 
(e.g., Green & Griesinger, 1996; Herman et al., 1997).  
 
Thus, all studies from the resource dependence approach were only concerned 
with obtaining resources for the nNPOs’ activities. However, none of them chose to 
evaluate the proper allocation of financial resources (donations) or the fulfilment 
of the strategic plan proposed by the board. In the next stage of the development of 
the literature, various authors proposed to introduce the agency arguments within 
the nonprofit governance debates. 
 
 
5. THE AGENCY THEORY APPROACH TO THE NONPROFIT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
According to agency theory, an organization is a legal fiction, a nexus of contracts 
that allows individuals to develop an activity together (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The main concerns of this perspective are the issues that arise between those who 
act (agents) on behalf of others (principals) while performing some service in the 
organization. This agency relationship requires that the principals delegate some 
decision making authority to the agent, who usually has the knowledge and skills 
to act on behalf of the principal. However, the agent might not always act in line 
with the principal’s expectations (Berle & Means, 1932). The resulting conflict of 
interests between principal and agent is the “agency cost” and governance 
mechanisms are aimed at reducing this through monitoring the agent’s behavior.  
 
This disciplinary perspective of agency theory is the most widely used theoretical 
approach for the study of corporate governance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & 
Johnson, 1998). Similarly to the corporate setting, where differences between 
shareholders (as principals) and managers (as agents) might arise (Wellens & 
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Jegers, 2014), the principal-agent argument has wider applicability; it is relevant 
to relationships between actors of any kind. Within a foundation, for example, the 
board is responsible for the effective use of resources and the avoidance of their 
expropriation: the principal is the donor and those administering and running the 
foundation are the agents (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Miller, 
2002).  
 
Nevertheless, as Harrow and Phillips (2013) contend, there is also ongoing debate 
within NPOs as to who “owns” them –in the case of foundations, the original 
funders or their descendants, the business which created them, the multiple 
donors and contributors in foundations which fundraise, or combinations of these 
groups, salaried employees and volunteers–. For foundations seeking, or having, a 
specifically local presence, their community engagement decisions may include 
expansion of board membership to local “voices”, who are not themselves donors, 
whilst also not beneficiaries (Harrow, 2011).  
 
There is then still some reluctance to apply traditional agency theory to both 
philanthropic and nonprofit settings, the argument being that without any profit to 
distribute to those who control these organizations opportunistic behavior by 
employees or managers is avoided (Brody, 1996; Hansmann, 1980). Although the 
constraints of nonprofit settings might eliminate the figure of a residual claimant, 
like a shareholder in firms, it does not reverse the incentives that other insiders 
could have to misappropriate the organization’s resources (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Another argument by those challenging the appropriateness of agency theory for 
the nonprofit sector point out that it presumes the existence of a goal conflict 
between the donor and the management team. Miller (2002) shows that NPO’s 
board members do not expect conflict between staff and the purpose for which the 
organization was created. This, however, only indicates that board members are 
unaware, not that there is no conflict. As Jensen (1994: 49) notes, “altruism ... does 
not turn people into perfect agents who do the bidding of others”. In fact, there is 
plenty of opportunity for opportunistic behavior and fraud across philanthropic 
contexts (Smith et al., 2016) and, therefore, it makes sense to analyze nonprofit 
governance from a purely disciplinary agency approach. 
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When studying the optimal board composition from an agency perspective, one 
usually finds one of the following areas as the central focus of research: the board 
size, its independence, or the presence of donors among its directors. With respect 
to size, agency theory considers that smaller boards reduce agency problems 
because they speed up decision making, reduce potential free rider behaviors, and 
consequently cut down administrative costs (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). In the 
nonprofit field, though, boards are usually larger than their counterparts in for-
profit organizations (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Steane & Christie, 2001). Empirical 
data as to whether this has any negative effects on their performance is 
inconclusive (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006; Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003; Dyl, 
Frant & Stepphenson, 2000; O’Regan & Oster, 2005). On the subject of board 
independence, agency theory holds that the presence of outsiders on the board 
positively affects the performance of the organization (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
assumption is that outsiders provide greater objectivity and independence of 
perspectives, thus reducing the potential for opportunistic behavior (Andrés-
Alonso et al., 2006; Brickley, Van Horn & Wedig, 2010; Callen & Falk, 1993; Dyl et 
al., 2000; O’Regan & Oster, 2005; Oster, 1995). While boards of trustees are 
generally composed of a majority of outsiders (Oster, 1995), the effects on NPO’s 
performance are uncertain. 
 
Beyond the board, there are other mechanisms that monitor the managerial team. 
As mentioned earlier, major donors (public or private), NPO’s capital structure, or 
the organization’s transparency can act as governance mechanisms that influence 
organizational performance. Agency theory also suggests that the involvement of 
donors or founders on the board enhances a board’s effectiveness through 
increasing its motivation to monitor (Callen et al., 2003; Hough, McGregor-
Lowndes & Ryan, 2005; Hyndman & McDonell, 2009; Jegers, 2009). But, again, the 
empirical evidence-base is inconclusive. Although donors and founders might lack 
residual rights in some foundations, they do represent the organizational 
equivalent of a shareholder: they are concerned about the use of the resources 
they have provided to the organization. As Fama and Jensen (1983) posit, major 
donors monitor the organization better than donors on board. When the major 
donor is public (e.g., the case of the Big Lottery Fund in the United Kingdom), that 
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monitoring power appears to be even greater, although the sense of “ownership” 
will also be diffused. Public donors may have enough power and access to 
information to become efficient monitors (Herman & Renz, 2000; O’Regan & Oster, 
2002) because they usually demand detailed plans, financial budgets and 
information on each project they finance (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006; Callen et al., 
2003; Frumkin & Kim, 2001).  
 
Finally, capital structure and nonprofit transparency have recently been 
introduced as governance mechanisms in the nonprofit field. From an agency 
perspective, debt is considered as an indirect way to limit managerial behavior 
(Jensen, 1986); managers are curtailed by debt and interest payment obligations 
and by the continuous screening of their lenders. While traditionally of less 
relevance to philanthropic foundations than the wider nonprofit sector, this might 
increase as some foundations recast themselves as foundations banks and social 
investors (Salamon, 2014). In this line, transparency supposes an increase in the 
exposure of managerial and board decisions to social screening. Although there is 
no empirical evidence of the direct effect of these two mechanisms on 
performance, they might be an effective disciplinary governance mechanism.  
 
Taken together, only major donors, especially public ones, seem to have proven 
effective in monitoring the managerial team of NPOs. Board features that have 
traditionally been studied only provide cursory support for shaping an effective 
governing body; there is not enough evidence of the effect of debt and 
transparency on NPOs’ performance. As these shortcomings are partly attributed 
to the limitations of trying to apply a private sector theory to the nonprofit field 
(Brown, 2005; Miller, 2002), there have been increasing calls to complement 
agency theory with other approaches to adequately capture all the implications for 
how corporate governance can help NPOs (Andrés-Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela & 
Romero-Merino, 2010; Callen et al., 2010; Steinberg, 2010; Van Puyvelde et al., 
2012). 
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6. TOWARDS AN EXTENDED MODEL OF NONPROFIT CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
So far, efforts of building an extended model of governance for the nonprofit field 
have been geared towards effectively configuring a board of trustees. To this end, 
it is useful to combine the issues raised by agency theory with the underlying 
principles of resource dependency (Callen et al., 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Miller-Millesen, 2003). To better understand the social processes that guide 
behaviors on boards, incorporating group/decision theories also seems relevant 
(Brown, 2005), while a cognitive approach helps to delve deeper into the 
processes involved in innovation and knowledge creation (Andrés-Alonso et al., 
2010). Some of these factors encourage monitoring while discouraging the board’s 
strategic role and vice versa (Callen et al., 2010; Ostrower & Stone, 2010). As such, 
it is necessary to reflect on the potential challenges and opportunities for bringing 
these perspectives together to inform research and practice.  
 
The cognitive perspective is rooted in the work of Charreaux (2005). Based on 
evolutionary economics and organizational learning, it puts special emphasis on 
knowledge generation as an open and subjective element, resulting from the 
interpretation of the environment made by the multiple participants within an 
organization (Treichler, 1995). It points to the importance of directors’ diverse 
characteristics: each has a different set of experiences, knowledge, perceptions, 
interpretations and actions that partially reflects his or her own cognitive schema. 
These differences result in “cognitive conflicts” which in turn improve the quality 
of strategic decision making in uncertain environments through the consideration 
of more alternatives and evaluating these alternatives more carefully (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Given board of directors’ commitment to strategic planning and 
effective decision making, this approach seems to be especially suitable for 
nonprofit contexts (Bradshaw, Murray & Wolpin, 1992; Judge & Zeithmal, 1992) as 
it supplements the ideas of agency theory. On the one hand, the high level of 
information asymmetries and uncertainty that characterizes the nonprofit sector 
increases agency problems, and so the need for effective mechanisms of control; on 
the other hand, this high level of uncertainty links to the need for critical 
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interactive decision processes to create value, which in turn is relevant to cognitive 
conflict and strategic decision making (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2010).  
 
Relating this to practical questions surrounding board configuration, potential 
conflicts do, however, arise: board size and independence need to be considered, 
alongside board capital, board diversity, and the proactive character of the 
directors and their group dynamics. While agency theory recommends smaller and 
more independent boards to reduce costs and increase objectivity in the 
monitoring activity, once the cognitive role of the board is included, the 
assumptions surrounding board size and board independence on the 
organization’s performance are questioned: more board members, though slower 
in decision making, would provide more information and cognitive resources 
(Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Olson, 2000), resulting in a positive effect on NPO’s 
performance (Abzug, DiMaggio, Gray, Useem & Kang, 1993; Aggarwal, Evans & 
Nanda, 2012; Ostrower, 2002; Ostrower & Stone, 2010). Similarly, outsiders, 
although potentially more objective in monitoring proceedings, might lack specific 
knowledge to support innovation and creative decision-making, as well as the 
commitment and motivation of those more closely related to the cause. While we 
have not found empirical evidence to support a positive relationship between 
insiders and NPO’s performance, many authors maintain that directors’ motivation 
is a determinant of board effectiveness (Steane & Christie, 2001; Taylor, Chait. & 
Holland, 1991). Therefore, the influence of board size and independence on the 
organization’s performance must be reconsidered in an extended model of 
governance.  
 
Closely related to this is the notion of board capital. This combines human capital 
(expertise, experience and reputation) and relational/social capital (networks and 
linkages to external constituencies) (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Human capital gives 
directors exposure to making complex managerial and financial decisions (Olson 
2000); the board benefits from the accumulation of the different kinds of 
knowledge and skills that individual board members bring to the table (Ostrower 
& Stone, 2010; Vidovich & Currie, 2012). Social capital provides political 
engagement, connections to influential funders and social ties; it is essential for 
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NPOs to access key networks within their respective organizations and in the 
communities they serve (King, 2004). Taken together, these factors are also 
considered as determinant of board performance (Brown, 2007; Brown, Hillman & 
Okun, 2012; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Preston & Brown, 2004) by both being 
cumulative, but also by offering another important factor: diversity.  
 
Diversity strengthens the creativity of a board (Bantel & Jackson, 1989) and, thus, 
its strategic role. It relates to both observable attributes, such as ethnicity, age, or 
gender, and to less visible ones, such as education, technical abilities, functional 
and socioeconomic background, status, personality characteristics or values 
(Milliken & Martins, 1996; Tsui, Egan & O’Reilly, 1992). Heterogeneous groups 
have a greater breadth of perspective to bring to decision-making and, as they can 
draw on a wider set of expertise, might arrive at more potential solutions to a 
problem (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). Diversity thus 
has a positive effect on board effectiveness and, consequently, on NPO’s 
performance, a view empirically supported by the work of Andrés-Alonso et al. 
(2010). Whether, as part of that, it is more important for board members to be 
proactive (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2010; Brown et al., 2012; Coombes et al., 2011; 
Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001) or for boards to act as a team (Nicholson, Newton & 
McGregor-Lowndes, 2012) is unclear, with further research combining the two 
needed to examine board effectiveness and NPO’s performance.  
 
In sum, by adding agency theory arguments and a cognitive approach, we reach a 
more complete perspective to understand nonprofit governance. At this juncture, 
the traditional board features, like size and independence, seem to lose some of 
their importance while other, new characteristics, like diversity, proactivity or 
strategic decision-making groups, gain weight in the governance literature. 
However, the search for an optimal board configuration requires a far more robust 
empirical support for this assessment before it can be used as guidance for good 
practice.  
 
 
   Good Governance in Philanthropy and NPOs 
 43 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE LINES OF RESEARCH ON NONPROFIT 
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE 
  
Although theoretical approaches on nonprofit corporate governance have 
advanced greatly in recent decades, there is still a long way to go in terms of 
empirical testing. Especially in relation to “good” governance for foundations and 
NPOs in general, much more work is required. While this chapter has pointed to 
some of the key studies, a lot of them are derived from cross-sectional data from 
the United States (US) nonprofit sector: as Wellens and Jegers (2014) suggest, 
longitudinal and cross-country research is necessary to draw overall conclusions.   
 
This line of research is difficult to implement, though, given the lack of structured 
databases of these organizations, especially outside the US. As such, researchers 
must currently develop their studies on the basis of primary data (surveys, 
interviews, case study), which makes it challenging to obtain cross-national or 
longitudinal samples. In addition, the latest theoretical advances introduce 
variables related to cognitive schemata and group thinking that require very 
specific information about individuals, reiterating the need for better and more 
overarching research approaches that can be applied across times and contexts.  
  
Contextual factors are increasingly critical for scholars, as the foundation form 
itself demonstrates degrees of differentiation as well as similarity, arising from 
governmental intervention. Developments and decisions pertaining to the rise of 
the Italian banking foundations, with their governance structures reflecting a 
particular (legally enshrined) approach to the linkages between strategic and 
executive functions, and their funding drawn from public savings banks’ assets 
rather than donations (Leardini, Rossi & Moggi, 2014) is an important case in 
point. Varying foundation contexts will also create differentiations in the 
interactions between internal and external governance questions. Steen-Johnson, 
Eynaud and Wijkström (2011: 556) argue that these two subfields of scholarship, 
in nonprofit governance generally, are importantly intertwined and need to be 
studied as such: “The internal governance game shapes the conditions for the 
organization’s positions and actions in the external government environment and 
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vice versa”. For foundations, this inter-twining will be especially relevant, for 
example, when they decide to collaborate with governments or fellow foundations.  
 
Furthermore, there are other governance aspects to consider that are beyond the 
scope of this chapter. For example, the chapter has not given attention to 
endogeneity problems that may exist among the different kind of mechanisms or 
between the features (size, age, prestige) of a foundation and its governance 
requirements. These might relate to the power and influence of donors and 
funders to shape the selection of board members (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2009) or to 
how transparency expectations lead to boards’ configurations (Saxton, Kuo & Ho, 
2012). While these have been touched upon in the nonprofit research literature 
(Abzug et al., 1993; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Moore & Whitt, 2000; Ostrower, 2002; 
Ostrower & Stone, 2010), the relationship between these and other governance 
factors have not been explored widely. While there is thus still no clear answer to 
the question of how to best configure an internal governance system, bringing 
together the insights from diverse theories and perspectives, to critically reflect on 
their complementarity and differences, as well as to consider the future research 
trajectories they highlight are important steps towards a more coherent 
understanding of the complex nonprofit governance landscape.  
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THE DANGERS OF ASSESSING THE FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY OF 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS USING TRADITIONAL MEASURES: THE CASE OF 
THE NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM20 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes the financial vulnerability of 228 Non-Governmental 
Development Organizations (NGDOs) from the United Kingdom during the period 
2008-2012. To do this, we use the Financial Vulnerability Index developed by Trussel 
et al. (2002). This index is commonly used in the literature on nonprofit 
organizations. However, we observe a very poor adaptation of the index to the reality 
of this industry, at least in predictive terms. The chapter goes deeply into each of the 
variables that are used to calculate this index, and we offer explanations of their 
inadequacy to this subsector of nonprofit organizations. 
 
Keywords: financial vulnerability, nonprofit organization, development cooperation, 
United Kingdom 
 
Resumen 
Este capítulo analiza la vulnerabilidad financiera de 228 Organizaciones No 
Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo (ONGDs) de Reino Unido durante el periodo 
2008-2012. Para ello, empleamos el Índice de Vulnerabilidad Financiera desarrollado 
por Trussel et al. (2002). Este índice es comúnmente usado en la literatura sobre 
entidades no lucrativas. Sn embargo, observamos una adaptación de este índice a la 
realidad del sector, al menos en términos predictivos. Este capítulo profundiza sobre 
cada una de las variables empleadas para calcular el índice, ofreciendo explicaciones 
sobre su inadecuación a este subsector de entidades no lucrativas. 
  
Palabras clave: vulnerabilidad financiera, entidades no lucrativas, cooperación al 
desarrollo, Reino Unido 
                                               
20 A version of this chapter is published as “Andres-Alonso, P., Garcia-Rodriguez, I. & Romero-
Merino, M. E. (2015). The dangers of assessing the financial vulnerability of nonprofits using 
traditional measures. The case of the Non-Governmental Development Organizations in the United 
Kingdom. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 25(4): 371-382”. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate financial diagnosis has been exhaustively studied, especially since the 
work of Altman (1968). Academicians have repeatedly attempted to find suitable 
models to predict, first, corporate bankruptcy (Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980) and, 
afterward, financial distress (Frydman, Altman & Kao, 1985; Zmijewski, 1984). 
However, financial vulnerability of nonprofit organizations has been ignored by 
the academic literature until the 1990s. Since then, the great economic growth of 
this sector and, most important, the several fluctuations of the global economy, 
have led to the need to take into account this topic in the nonprofit sector also. 
Because of the lack of data on nonprofit bankruptcies, the first challenge was to 
define when a nonprofit organization (NPO) is considered financially vulnerable. 
 
In 1991, Tuckman and Chang elaborated a model to evaluate NPOs’ financial 
problems. After them, authors such as Trussel and Greenlee have tried to develop 
predictive models to detect in advance potential financial problems without 
reaching conclusive results (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Trussel 2002; Trussel & 
Greenlee, 2004; Trussel, Greenlee & Brady, 2002). Some of these researches have 
stressed the importance of considering the specific characteristics of each 
subsector so as to obtain better predictors of the financial vulnerability (Hager, 
2001; Trussel, 2002; Trussel et al., 2002). 
 
We join these recommendations as we attempt to evaluate the financial 
vulnerability of the Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs). This 
subsector has its own distinctive features. First, it is highly dependent on 
donations (both public and private). So, NGDOs are particularly vulnerable in times 
of crisis, when private donations are drastically reduced and public funds for 
development cooperation also suffer an important cutoff. Second, a large amount 
of the NGDO’s budget is allocated to organizations located in different countries. 
This fact not only complicates the oversight role carried out by the board and the 
donors, but also the analysis of their financial vulnerability as their resources are 
handled by those foreign organizations whose accounts are not included in the 
forecast. 
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Moreover, the strong impact of the recent financial and economic crisis in this 
sector has revealed the importance of appropriate income and expense structures 
to mitigate the consequences of a financial shock and, consequently, to enable 
these organizations to continue providing their services to society. 
 
Particularly, we evaluate the ability of the Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI) 
introduced by Trussel et al. (2002) and broadly used by academics and 
practitioners, to predict the financial situation of NGDOs. According to our results, 
this index cannot reflect the reality of this subsector of NPOs. Considering these 
results, we describe the main problems of the index, and we explain the limitations 
of each of its components, particularly some contradictions with organizational 
efficiency. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the chapter begins with a 
review of the literature on financial vulnerability in the nonprofit sector. Then we 
describe the sample and the methodology used, and we present the obtained 
results by using traditional techniques. The chapter finishes with a discussion of 
the results and presentation of the main conclusions. 
 
 
2. FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
 
The forecast of financial vulnerability has been scarcely studied in the nonprofit 
sector in comparison with the for-profit one. Its importance in the nonprofit sector 
has increased during the past two decades, especially from the study conducted by 
Tuckman and Chang in 1991. However, in spite of this growing relevance, financial 
vulnerability in NPOs has still to be developed. Indeed, even the definition of 
financial vulnerability is not clear among the scholars of the nonprofit sector (as we 
will see in the next chapter), where the difficult measurement of inactive and 
extinct organizations is a hard barrier to overcome (Hager, 2001). Throughout the 
literature we find traditional concepts such as “a significant reduction in net 
assets”, “the removal of programs provided by the organization”, “a significant 
reduction in revenues”, or simply “insolvency” (total liabilities exceeding total 
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assets) to define this nonprofit financial vulnerability. Nevertheless, none of them 
seems to excel above the others. 
 
But it is not necessary only to find a conclusive definition; the estimation of 
financial vulnerability is a developing field. Beginning this line of research, 
Tuckman and Chang (1991) were the first researchers who evaluated nonprofit 
vulnerability by using accounting ratios. 
 
Particularly, they proposed that a NPO is financially vulnerable if it is in the lowest 
quintile of at least two of the following four ratios: net assets, administrative costs, 
revenue sources, and operating margin. Tuckman and Chang (1991) consider that 
a NPO is financially vulnerable if it is “likely to cut back its service offering 
immediately when it experiences a financial shock” (p. 445). So, implicitly, they 
understand NPOs’ financial vulnerability as a large decrease of program expenses. 
 
Using this definition of financial vulnerability almost a decade later, Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000) developed the first predictive model in this field with four variables 
similar to those introduced by Tuckman and Chang (1991). They observed the 
variables during three consecutive years to ensure that it was not a situational 
trouble, and they used a logit model, which constitutes a reference for future 
research. Shortly afterward, Hager (2001) applied the Tuckman and Chang (1991) 
model to the nonprofit arts sector, concluding that it is necessary to adapt this 
measure to each subsector. Finally, Thomas and Trafford (2013) developed a 
Financial Exposure Index (the mean value of the four Tuckman and Chang [1991] 
ratios), but they proposed to exclude the administrative costs ratio because of its 
dichotomy between efficiency and financial vulnerability. 
 
A second group of studies defines the financial vulnerability as a large reduction in 
the NPO’s net assets. In addition to the four traditional ratios previously described, 
Trussel (2002) and Trussel et al. (2002) included two: the organizational size 
(measured by total assets) and the subsector of activity. Both studies found that 
large NPOs are less financially vulnerable and also that there are significant 
differences among the different nonprofit subsectors. 
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In recent years, other researchers have been attempting to improve the prediction 
of NPOs’ financial vulnerability by considering other variables. Bowman (2011) 
included the effect of inflation and differences between the short and long-term by 
considering concepts such as capacity, sustainability and resilience. Gordon, 
Fischer, Greenlee and Keating (2013) compared four models of financial 
vulnerability from nonprofit and for-profit sectors to identify the most significant 
ratios. They included in their model variables such as the existence of an audit, the 
existence or absence of restricted net assets, and financial ratios such as 
fundraising expenses to total expenses and program-related officers’ 
compensation to program expenses. However, these developments are not settled 
in the literature yet. 
 
In brief, after more than twenty years of research activity, there are no firm 
conclusions on this issue except that it is important to consider the specific sector 
of activity because it causes differences among the financial behavior of NPOs. In 
this line, we assess financial vulnerability on the international cooperation and 
development sector. Moreover, our sample, composed of NPOs from the United 
Kingdom (UK), could provide different empirical evidence on this issue, highly 
dominated by North American samples. 
 
 
3. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The target population consists of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
specialized in international cooperation. Our sample is composed by entities 
belonging to BOND, the membership body of the UK for NGOs working in 
international development. BOND is a member of the European Confederation of 
NGDOs (Confederation for Cooperation and Relief and Development [CONCORD]), 
and it has 370 members. Among its members, we have selected only those NGDOs 
with 2008 to 2012 financial statements published before March 2014, following 
the usual format, and comprising twelve-month periods. So, our final sample is 
composed of 228 NGDOs. 
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We have used not only the website of the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales21 but also the websites of each NGDO to obtain their financial statements. 
Once we had the sample, we calculated the FVI defined by Trussel et al. (2002) 
(and also utilized by Hodge and Piccolo [2005]) to assess the financial position of 
each NGDO using the following equation: 
 
FVI = 1 / (1 + e-z), 
 
where e = 2.718; and z = 0.7754 + 0.9272 DEBT + 0.1496 CONCEN - 2.8419 
MARGIN + 0.1206 ADMIN - 0.1665 SIZE; being DEBT the leverage ratio defined by 
total liabilities to total assets; CONCEN a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
calculated as ∑ (Revenuesi / Total revenues)2; MARGIN the surplus margin 
measured as total revenues minus total expenses, divided by total revenues; 
ADMIN the administrative cost ratio defined by administrative expenses to total 
revenues; and SIZE the natural log of total assets. 
 
According to Trussel et al. (2002), the decision rule of the results of the previous 
equation is that low index values (FVI < 0.10) indicate a healthy position of the 
nonprofit; high index values (FVI > 0.20) indicate a vulnerable financial position of 
the nonprofit; and, intermediate index values (0.10 < FVI < 0.20) do not allow a 
conclusive evaluation. 
 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
 
We include in Table 2.1 the main descriptive parameters of the index, its 
components, and also some other variables (related to the components) that can 
help us to better interpret the index and its results. 
 
As we can appreciate in the table, the proportion of debt (excluding provisions and 
pension schemes) is around 24% of total assets, a lower percentage than in other 
                                               
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission  
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studies of this field (Trussel, 2002; Tuckman & Chang, 1991). Also, we can observe 
how it is majority composed (around 85%) by short-term debt. 
 
Related to the revenue concentration, Table 2.1 shows a high value of the index 
(around 0.84) during the five years. This value is higher than those obtained in 
prior literature (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001; Trussel, 2002; Trussel & 
Greenlee, 2004). This concentration is derived from the high volume of voluntary 
income (above 60%) of these NPOs. According to the financial statements, income 
is classified into “voluntary income”, “activities for generating funds”, “investment 
income”, “incoming resources from charitable activities”, and “other incoming 
resources”. As we can see in Table 2.1, the most important income source is the 
one related with voluntary income (above 60%); income derived from charitable 
activities is the second source, with less than a half of the previous one (above 
25%). Following the explanation given by the Charity Commission (2005), and 
attempting to reflect the income emanated from donations, we have added the 
“voluntary income” and the “activities for generating funds” to approximate our 
measure to those traditionally used by the nonprofit literature (income from 
donations, income from sold products and provided services to the beneficiaries, 
and investment income) (Gordon et al., 2013). The income derived from sold 
products and provided services to the beneficiaries is represented by “incoming 
resources from charitable activities”. Finally, income originated from investment is 
calculated by adding “investment income” to “other incoming resources”. 
 
The operative margin is the most volatile variable of the five index components. Its 
negative sign indicates that the NPOs have expended on average more than what 
they have received. This result is opposite to the habitual results of the sector. 
When we analyze its components we see that, in spite of the crisis, incomes have 
increased 18% from 2008 to 2012 (which is similar to the percentage found by 
Thomas and Trafford [2013] during a growth economic period [2002-2007]), but 
the expenses have risen much more (23%) during the period. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Years 2008 -2012 
Name Definition Year Mean Max. Min. SD 
Variables included in the Trussel et al. (2002)’s equation 
FVI 
Financial Vulnerability Index 
(Trussel et al., 2002) 
2008 0.26 1.00 0.03 0.16 
2012 0.25 1.00 0.02 0.14 
DEBT 
Ratio of debt to total assets 
(Trussel et al., 2002) 
2008 0.24 2.26 0.00 0.27 
2012 0.24 1.04 0.00 0.23 
CONCEN 
Revenue Concentration Index 
(Trussel et al., 2002) 
2008 0.82 1.00 0.34 0.18 
2012 0.85 1.00 0.44 0.18 
MARGIN 
Operative margin (Trussel et al., 
2002) 
2008 -0.15 0.95 -37.16 2.49 
2012 -0.01 0.81 -4.01 0.41 
ADMIN 
Ratio of administrative 
expenses to total revenues 
(Trussel et al., 2002) 
2008 0.17 3.68 0.00 0.29 
2012 014 1.01 0.00 0.14 
SIZE 
Total assets (Trussel et al., 
2002) (£millions) 
2008 13.48 538.70 0.01 59.90 
2012 16.41 655.40 0.01 72.83 
Other variables 
CRED<1 
Ratio of current liabilities to 
total assets  
2008 0.21 2.26 0.00 0.25 
2012 0.22 1.04 0.00 0.21 
VOLUNT 
Ratio of “Voluntary income” to 
total revenues 
2008 0.64 1.00 0.00 0.35 
2012 0.61 1.00 0.00 0.38 
GENER 
Ratio of “Generating income” to 
total revenues 
2008 0.06 0.78 0.00 0.12 
2012 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.14 
INVEST 
Ratio of “Investment income” to 
total revenues 
2008 0.03 0.94 0.00 0.09 
2012 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.09 
CHAR_INC 
Ratio of “Charitable income” to 
total revenues 
2008 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.36 
2012 0.31 1.00 0.00 0.38 
OTHER_INC 
Ratio of “Other income” to total 
revenues 
2008 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.04 
2012 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.01 
INCOME Total revenues (£millions) 
2008 15.27 644.82 0.00 53.67 
2012 18.06 781.29 0.03 63.43 
EXPENSES Total expenses (£millions) 
2008 14.69 619.19 0.00 51.62 
2012 18.10 785.33 0.03 64.01 
FUNDR 
Ratio of “Fundraising expenses” 
to total expenses 
2008 0.12 0.00 0.99 0.15 
2012 0.11 0.00 0.84 0.13 
GOVERN 
Ratio of “Governance expenses” 
to total expenses 
2008 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.10 
2012 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.04 
CHAR_EXP 
Ratio of “Charitable expenses” 
to total expenses 
2008 0.84 1.00 0.00 0.17 
2012 0.86 1.00 0.16 0.14 
OTHER_EXP 
Ratio of “Other expenses” to 
total expenses 
2008 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.01 
2012 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.03 
FIXASSETS 
Ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets 
2008 0.15 0.98 0.00 0.24 
2012 0.15 0.99 0.00 0.25 
Note: Exchanges rates: 31/12/2008: 1£ = 1.0270€ = 1.4476$; 31/12/2012: 1£ = 1.2234€ = 1.6168$ 
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The administrative costs ratio is around 14% over the analyzed period, which is in 
line with the results obtained in previous studies (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Trussel & Greenlee, 2004). We have considered as administrative expense every 
outflow that is not intended for the mission of the nonprofit. So, along with the 
usual format of these financial statements, we have supposed as administrative 
costs those classified as “governance”, “fundraising”, and “others”. 
 
These NPOs have on average more than £15 million in assets in 2012. Most of 
these assets are current assets (around 85%); in fact, 17% of the NPOs have only 
currents assets in their balance. Similarly to the incomes and expenses, the amount 
of assets has increased during the analyzed period (22% from 2008 to 2012). 
 
Finally, Table 2.1 reflects the FVI, which has been calculated with the previous 
variables. As Table 2.1 reflects, this index remains stable from 2008 to 2012 with a 
value greater than 0.20. So, the UK NGDOs would be on average in a delicate 
financial situation. Nevertheless, this value, that seems quite hopeless, could not 
correctly reflect the reality of this subsector of the nonprofit field. To assess its 
predictive ability, we have conducted a more detailed analysis of the index in the 
following section, where we attempt to test its predictive ability along the 
guidelines of Trussel et al. (2002). 
 
 
5. EXPLANATORY RESULTS 
 
Along with Trussel et al. (2002), the FVI allows us to predict the financial 
vulnerability of NPOs measured by a reduction of at least 20 percent of the entity’s 
net assets during a three-year period. With our sample, we can calculate the index 
value in 2008 and 2009, and we can test afterward whether the net assets of the 
vulnerable NPOs have been effectively reduced (at least 20%) in 2011 and 2012, 
respectively (after the three-year period). 
 
According to our estimations of the index, only 21 of the 228 NPOs (9.21%) are 
financially healthy in 2008. Most of them, 134 NGDOs (58.77%), are considered 
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financially vulnerable, and the rest of the sample, 73 NPOs (32.02%), remains in an 
indeterminate position. If we calculate the FVI in 2009, we obtain similar 
percentages, with 128 NPOs (56.14%) in a delicate situation, 79 (34.65%) in an 
intermediate position, and 21 (9.21%) financially healthy. 
 
However, when we analyze the reduction in net assets over a three-year period, 
we note that the index does not correctly classify the organizations of our sample. 
Thus, during the period 2008-2011, only 48 NPOs (21.05%) reduced at least 20% 
of their net assets. Of these 48 entities, only 29 (60.42%) had been classified as 
vulnerable in 2008 by applying the index developed by Trussel et al. (2002), while 
the other 19 NPOs (39.58%) were not detected by this FVI. Furthermore, among 
the 134 NPOs that the index classified as financially vulnerable organizations, only 
29 (21.64%) decreased their net assets at least 20% over the next three years. 
 
Regarding the period 2009-2012, 46 NPOs (20.18%) reduced their net assets at 
least 20%. Only 28 of them (60.87%) had been considered financially vulnerable 
according to the FVI. Also, among the 128 NGDOs classified as vulnerable by the 
index, only 28 entities (21.88%) confirmed this prediction with a reduction in their 
net assets at least 20% until 2012. 
 
As our results show, the index seems to have a very poor explanatory power for 
the subsector of NGDOs. However, to achieve a better understanding of its 
strengths and weaknesses, we carry out an in-depth analysis of the index 
components and its predictive ability. Thus, we use a logistic regression to test the 
relationship between each component of the index and a binary dependent 
variable that takes the value “1” if net assets have decreased at least 20% (after a 
three-year period) and “0” otherwise. 
 
Table 2.2 indicates that not all variables are significant. Regarding the period 
2008-2011, the administrative costs ratio is the only significant parameter (95% 
confidence), and its sign is opposed to that explained in the literature. Concerning 
the period 2009-2012, we obtain that smaller NPOs with more diversified income 
sources are more vulnerable (95% confidence). The latter is also in contrast to 
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expectations of the literature. In this way, we can observe that neither the index 
nor its components in isolation are useful in predicting the financial vulnerability 
of NPOs. 
 
Table 2.2. Estimations of the Logit Analysis. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Net 
Assets over Three Years 
Variable 
Predicted sign 
(Trussel et al., 2002) 
2008-2011 2009-2012 
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
Constant  0.293 (1.373) 3.050** (1.457) 
DEBT + 0.110 (0.595) 0.426 (0.568) 
CONCEN + -0.767 (0.905) -1.859** (0.878) 
MARGIN - 0.231 (0.141) 0.944 (0.919) 
ADMIN - 1.895** (0.939) -0.504 (1.203) 
SIZE - -0.098 (0.079) -0.218** (0.087) 
*, **, ***: significant coefficient with a level of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
 
Following the previous literature, and going deeper into this analysis of the 
components’ ability to explain the financial position of NPOs, we introduce the 
other common measure of financial vulnerability: the reduction in program 
expenses (Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; Hager, 2001). We also use a logit regression 
to test the relationship between the index components and a dummy dependent 
variable that, in this case, takes the value “1” if program expenses have been 
reduced at least 20% (after a three-year period) and “0” otherwise. 
 
As we see in Table 2.3, neither are there many significant components when 
attempting to explain the reduction in program expenditures of the nonprofit. Only 
size (in the period 2008-2011) and revenue concentration (in the period 2009-
2012) seem to have enough explanatory power to be significant in the model. 
Their sign is also the same that we found when using the decrease of net assets, 
although the period in which they are significant changes. 
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Table 2.3. Estimations of the Logit Analysis. Dependent Variable: Reduction in 
Program Expenses over Three Years 
Variable 
2008-2011 2009-2012 
Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
Constant 1.765 (1.628) 1.780 (1.420) 
DEBT 0.688 (0. 643) -0.121 (0.599) 
CONCEN -1.058 (1.010) -1.869** (0.888) 
MARGIN 0.047 (0.228) -0.694 (0.647) 
ADMIN -0.466 (1.233) -0.215 (1.227) 
SIZE -0.204** (0.098) -0.119 (0.083) 
*, **, ***: significant coefficient with a level of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
 
These results confirm the weak consistency of the FVI developed by Trussel et al. 
(2002) for the case of the subsector of NGDOs, and also the inconclusive results 
derived from its components in isolation. Except for the size and revenue 
concentration, which repeatedly show their sign and significance, the rest of the 
components seem to be unable to predict the financial position of a NPO. Also, it is 
noteworthy the contradictory effect of revenue concentration on the financial 
vulnerability of these entities. Contrary to what prior studies present, the revenue 
diversification makes the nonprofit more vulnerable to economic shocks. In short, 
these results lead us to the need to look for some reasons that allow us to explain 
such poor findings. 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS 
 
Given the limited ability of the variables analyzed to assess financial vulnerability 
(both measured in terms of net assets and program expenses) in this subsector, we 
offer some likely causes that we have observed for each of them. 
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Regarding the administrative costs ratio, it has been justified by the possibility of 
reducing “excessive” administrative costs when a financial shock occurs. However, 
that reduction could not arrive in time, because the adjustment process is not 
immediate. Moreover, this ratio has been used as an efficiency measure (Thomas & 
Trafford, 2013). So, NPOs have usually opted for a reduction in the administrative 
costs for efficiency (more program expenses), and it seems highly complicated to 
reduce them more though their incomes go down. In fact, NGDOs are faced with a 
contradiction when setting limits for this ratio: high values are beneficial to reduce 
financial vulnerability, but, at the same time, the efficiency of the nonprofit 
decreases. According to this argumentation, the most efficient entities would be 
the most financially vulnerable. However, as Wellens and Jegers (2014) point out, 
many donors pay particular attention to efficiency ratios, conditioning their 
donations to their effective use by the nonprofit. Thus, many studies reveal a 
negative relationship between the total volume of donations and the 
administrative costs ratio (Calabrese, 2012; Carroll & Stater, 2009). In this way, 
during an economic shock, although those NGDOs with a high value of this ratio 
could use these resources to offset the drop in revenue, donors who have become 
even more cautious in the crisis scenario would select those more efficient entities. 
So, a high value of administrative costs ratio could threaten the survival of the 
nonprofit. These competing effects of the ratio could lead to a lack of significant 
effect of the administrative cost ratio on the financial vulnerability. 
 
According to the agency theory, we should not omit the disciplinary role played by 
debt against opportunistic behavior of managers. We hardly find studies about 
debt in the nonprofit sector (Jegers, 2011; Jegers & Verschueren, 2006); however, 
the few that have been published indicate that the cost of equities is lower than the 
cost of debt. These studies go for equity funding, and, following the same 
arguments as the financial vulnerability literature, they limit the use of debt only to 
those situations in which NPOs are not able to meet the requirements of planned 
investment with their equity only (Jegers, 2011). The NPOs of our sample use debt 
in a very limited proportion, as reflected in the descriptive data (see Table 2.1), 
with debt less than a quarter of the nonprofit assets. This low leverage, far away 
from the 44% presented by Trussel (2002) for the charities in the United States, 
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could be the explanation for the lack of effect of debt on financial vulnerability. It is 
probably that the debt ratio does not affect financial health of NPOs until it reaches 
a higher figure. 
 
The third component of the FVI, the operating margin, is supposed to be negatively 
related to nonprofit financial vulnerability. So, low or negative values of this 
variable are associated to a more vulnerable position of the nonprofit. Although 
Calabrese (2012) provides three arguments to justify the accumulation of 
resources (increase the expenses, invest in fixed assets, and preserve these 
resources as internal capital), we must also consider its impact on the efficiency 
ratios. Though negative margin values are detrimental to efficiency and threaten 
the future of the nonprofit, positive and high margins can also have a negative 
impact on the incomes because donors could consider that spending on charitable 
programs might be higher than it is, which may cause the interruption of their 
regular contributions (Calabrese, 2012). In fact, there even exist limits for the 
accumulation of profits by organizations if they want access to some kind of public 
funds. Again, the conflicting effects of this component can lead to a lack of impact 
on the nonprofit financial health. Thus, NPOs should keep a balance between a 
sufficient margin (to resolve eventual financial problems) and the effective use of 
resources, avoiding an excessive accumulation that could have a negative impact 
on the total volume of donations. 
 
On the subject of revenue concentration, the literature on financial vulnerability 
suggests than excessive concentration undermines the financial viability of the 
NPOs because it limits their autonomy and flexibility to adapt to environmental 
changes (Carroll & Stater, 2009). So, if a financial shock occurs, the organization 
could not turn to other sources of income to avoid restricting the services 
provided. But, at the same time, the existence of a main donor in a NPO is related to 
lower expenditures on fundraising and administration (Andrés-Alonso, Martín-
Cruz & Romero-Merino, 2006) and, therefore, to a more reduced possibility of 
crowding-out effect (Carroll & Stater, 2009). Thus, considering this issue, a higher 
concentration of resources can improve efficiency, and the nonprofit can be better 
positioned to attract donations. Once again, the concepts of financial vulnerability 
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and efficiency seem to confront themselves, though in this case we find that the 
latter explanation seems to prevail over the commonly used in the literature on 
financial vulnerability. 
 
Also, it is important to think about the typology of sources in which the revenues 
are classified to calculate the concentration index. We have divided incomes into 
three groups, but there are some other alternative classifications (Hodge & Piccolo, 
2005; Thomas & Trafford, 2013). In the NGDOs subsector most of the revenues 
come from donations; that is why the concentration index is so high. If we wanted 
to be more methodical in the index definition, we would need to consider the 
different groups of donors because donations are not a homogeneous group. Thus, 
donors may have different features, which implies that all donations do not have 
the same probability of interruption, and it is necessary to disaggregate this vast 
group. In this subsector, it is important to maintain the distinction between public 
and private income, not only because of the heavy reliance of these organizations 
on the first of them (Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006), but also because of their different 
fluctuations (public grants are usually more stable, although they tend to fluctuate 
with changes in political leadership) (Hodge & Piccolo, 2005), and also because of 
the restrictions and control derived from the use of some kinds of public grants 
(Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006; Calabrese, 2012). The disaggregation of public 
revenue into the different levels of the administration (European, national, and 
regional) would also be positive, because the conditions are different in each case. 
In short, the inadequate classification of income could also explain the 
contradictory sign of this variable in some of the tests. 
 
Finally, the NPO’s size should protect organizations during financial crisis. Larger 
organizations might be better able to survive than smaller. In fact, size is usually 
associated with visibility of NPOs, and visibility with the income volume. These 
arguments are in line with our results in the logit analyses. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study we have applied the traditional financial vulnerability measures in 
NPOs to the case of the UK NGDOs subsector. Calculating the FVI of Trussel et al. 
(2002), we have noted the difficult application of these traditional measures to the 
NGDOs during a period of economic shock. NGDOs from the UK presents very low 
debt ratios and high income concentration indexes. Also, we have found negative 
operating margins and higher volatility of income sources as a result of the 
economic crisis. As a result, neither the FVI nor its components seems to be able to 
predict a reduction in the net assets or the program expenses of NPOs. 
 
In addition to the reasons directly related to the components of the index that we 
have offered in the chapter, there may be other causes that provoke the failure 
implementing the index to the NGDOs from the UK. First, financial vulnerability 
studies have traditionally used North American samples. However, our data come 
from UK organizations (as well as the study of Thomas and Trafford [2013]), which 
implies the existence of disparities across the information sources, as well as 
possible differences in the behavior of organizations. Most of the previous studies 
have used the information contained in the Form 990 from the Internal Revenue 
Service, while we use the published financial statements. This fact may lead to a 
divergence in the classification of revenues, expenses, assets, and debts. Thus, 
several variables were approximated. Second, no study had ever analyzed the 
NGDOs subsector exclusively. As it is indicated at the beginning of this chapter, this 
subsector has various features that could cause the index not to fit as it does for 
the whole nonprofit sector. In fact, as we have shown in the discussion of results, 
some of the components are confronted with nonprofit efficiency. Finally, there is 
no doubt that the economic crisis has caused an exceptional shock for this sector. 
This could explain that previous research, during expansive years, did not adapt to 
financially troubled periods. 
 
It is necessary now to take the next step, proposing an index that allows a better 
prediction of the financial survival of NGDOs, not only facilitating the work of 
practitioners but also helping donors and public bodies in making decisions. So, in 
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future research we suggest two kinds of adjustments. On the one hand, it is 
necessary to modify some of the components of the index (the most significant 
variables) and introduce others that reflect better the reality of this subsector in a 
specific country and period of time, avoiding contradictions with traditional 
efficiency measures. And on the other hand, we propose a rethinking about when 
an organization is considered to be financially vulnerable, that is, which is the 
dependent variable that best reflects this concept. 
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DISENTANGLING THE FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS22 
 
 
Abstract  
This chapter analyzes the concept of financial vulnerability of nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) in depth. We review the definitions given by the prior 
literature, concluding that none of them is complete. We propose a definition in 
which financial vulnerability consists of three dimensions: operational (variation of 
net assets over time), leverage (relationship between total assets and debt), and 
liquidity (ratio of current assets to short-term debt). We use a sample of 212 Non-
Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs) from the United Kingdom to 
analyze these measures, observing a limited number of NPOs simultaneously 
classified as vulnerable according to the different traditional concepts. Applying our 
proposed multidimensional model, we find that 6% of the sample is highly financially 
vulnerable according to the three dimensions, and a high proportion (18%) of NPOs 
is simultaneously vulnerable in leverage and liquidity dimensions. Finally, we 
compare the obtained results using traditional variables and those derived from our 
model. 
 
Keywords: financial vulnerability, financial survival, nonprofit organizations, 
NGDOs, United Kingdom  
 
 
Resumen 
Este capítulo analiza en profundidad el concepto de vulnerabilidad financiera de las 
entidades no lucrativas. Repasamos las definiciones dadas por la literatura previa, 
concluyendo que ninguna de ellas es totalmente completa. Por ello, proponemos una 
definición según la cual la vulnerabilidad financiera está compuesta por tres 
dimensiones: operativa (variación de activos netos en el tiempo), de solvencia 
                                               
22  A version of this chapter is published as “Andres‐Alonso, P., Garcia‐Rodriguez, I. & 
Romero‐Merino, M. E. (2016). Disentangling the Financial Vulnerability of Nonprofits. Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(6): 2539-2560. 
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(relación entre activo y deuda totales) y de liquidez (ratio de activos corrientes 
respecto deuda a corto plazo). Empleamos una muestra de 212 Organizaciones No 
Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo (ONGDs) de Reino Unido para analizar estas 
medidas, observando un escaso número de entidades que sean simultáneamente 
clasificadas como vulnerables de acuerdo con las distintas medidas tradicionales. Al 
aplicar nuestra propuesta de modelo multidimensional, obtenemos que el 6% de la 
muestra es muy vulnerable financieramente de acuerdo con las tres dimensiones, y 
que una elevada proporción de las organizaciones (18%) es vulnerable en las 
dimensiones de solvencia y liquidez simultáneamente. Finalmente, comparamos los 
resultados obtenidos al utilizar las medidas tradicionales y los derivados de nuestro 
modelo. 
 
Palabras clave: vulnerabilidad financiera, supervivencia financiera, entidades no 
lucrativas, ONGDs, Reino Unido 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of the financial vulnerability of organizations (both companies and 
nonprofit organizations [NPOs]) has gained importance in the recent years, 
especially after the economic and financial crisis which has been a hard shock to 
their annual budgets and, therefore, to the continuity of their projects and the 
achievement of their primary goals. But, what does “financial vulnerability” mean? 
Prior authors have focused on the definition of indicators of financial vulnerability, 
that is, on the general symptoms that organizations suffer from having problems 
tackling their debts and/or seeing themselves in other dangers of financially 
failing. However, we have observed throughout the literature that not only are 
there no robust indicators to predict financial vulnerability, but also that the 
definition of vulnerability is a problem in itself, mainly when we refer to the 
nonprofit sector, where bankruptcy is not always immediately transferred to the 
legal registers. Following these arguments, our aim in this is to find an accurate 
answer to the question “what is a financially vulnerable organization?”. 
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Financial vulnerability of companies has been studied in the for-profit sector since 
the 1960s (Altman, 1968), and it has been generally understood as those 
companies that go bankrupt. As there seemed to be no problem defining 
vulnerability, the authors could focus on finding a formula for predicting 
bankruptcy, that is, the situation in which a company is not able to pay its debts. 
However, this definition, although commonly accepted, is far from being 
unanimous. As Pindado, Rodriguez and De la Torre (2008) point out, bankruptcy 
focuses on the legal consequences arising from financial problems. Therefore, 
some years later, researchers introduced financial distress as a new way to define 
financial vulnerability. Financial distress is much more useful if we want to find a 
combination of factors to predict financial difficulties, and so to stay alert to the 
risk of disappearance of the company. Unlike bankruptcy, financial distress can be 
defined quite ambiguously. In fact, there is no consensus about how this concept 
can be operationalized. For example, Gilbert, Mennon and Schwartz (1990) define 
distressed companies as those that have negative cumulative earnings over three 
consecutive years, while Jostarndt and Sautner (2008) consider them as such if 
their earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) are less than their interest 
expenses during two consecutive years. Purnanandam (2008) defines financial 
distress as ‘‘a low cash-flow state in which the firm incurs losses without being 
insolvent’’ (p. 707), and Pindado et al. (2008) identify a financially distressed 
company when its earnings before interest, taxes depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) are lower than its financial expenses for two consecutive years and, at 
the same time, its market value declines between two consecutive years. 
 
The study of financial vulnerability in the nonprofit sector has a later beginning, 
the article by Tuckman and Chang (1991) being the seminal paper. Although the 
literature in this field is not abundant, the majority of prior researchers tried to 
find predictors of financial problems. The search for ratios or scores that 
accurately forecast financial vulnerability in the nonprofit sector has not been very 
successful; researchers continue searching for the best formula to predict the 
future financial problems of these organizations. Moreover, those authors faced 
another problem, which is the definition of financial vulnerability itself. Contrary 
to what occurs in the for-profit sector, it is difficult to find NPOs going into 
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bankruptcy or ceasing their activity. With the exception of Clemenson and Sellers 
(2013), who describe the case of Hull House, an organization that shut down after 
more than one hundred years in existence, and Hager (2001), who identifies failed 
NPOs by their disappearance from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reports, 
there are no studies on a sample of NPOs that have ceased operating. Thus, before 
continuing with the search for a predictive index for financial vulnerability in the 
nonprofit sector, the definition of this concept should be much less ambiguous. 
 
In this chapter, we attempt to bring some light to this field, because if the concept 
of financial vulnerability were clearer, its prediction would be more accurate and 
valuable for practitioners. Thus, we review all the different measures considered in 
the literature, evaluating their accuracy and proposing a multidimensional 
definition of vulnerability to sum up some of the most recognized traditional 
measures and to add other aspects of financial problems related to the short-term 
funding of the organization. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: we begin with a review of the literature on 
financial vulnerability of NPOs, and based on the lights and shadows of the most 
traditional definitions, we propose a new multidimensional model to evaluate the 
financial situation of the organizations. In the next section, we describe the sample, 
and we analyze it first using the traditional measures of financial vulnerability, and 
then with the new comprehensive model we propose. Afterward, we compare the 
obtained results using the traditional variables and the multidimensional model. 
Finally, we present our main conclusions. 
 
 
2. FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY AND NONPROFIT SECTOR 
 
In the nonprofit sector, financial problems were not analyzed until the 1990s. Due 
to the great difficulty of measuring the number of failed entities, only Hager (2001) 
(and the above-mentioned case study of Clemenson and Sellers [2013]) studied 
bankrupt companies supposing that a NPO disappears when it does not report to 
the IRS. The researchers introduced the concept of ‘‘financial vulnerability’’ from 
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the very beginning. However, this concept has become a ‘‘slippery term’’ (Hager 
2001), much more ambiguous than the financial distress of the for-profit 
companies. Although financial vulnerability of the nonprofit seems to be related to 
a high risk of disappearance due to financial problems and not being able to 
continue to provide services, the question of how to make it operational is a much 
more difficult and uncertain task. 
 
The seminal study of this field (Tuckman & Chang, 1991) defined a financially 
vulnerable NPO as ‘‘if it is likely to cut service offerings immediately when a 
financial shock occurs’’ (p. 445). Due to the relative methodology they used, they 
did not need to measure this concept directly because a NPO was considered 
vulnerable (‘‘at risk’’) or very vulnerable (‘‘severely at risk’’) when it was in the 
bottom quintile of at least one or all four, respectively, of the four variables 
analyzed (equity balances, revenue concentration, administrative costs, and 
operating margins). Their model was subsequently applied by Thomas and 
Trafford (2013) to calculate a Financial Exposure Index. They calculated the 
variation (increases or decreases) of the variables (equally weighted) introduced 
by Tuckman and Chang (1991) during a five-year period, but neither did they 
define the concept of financial vulnerability. 
 
Tevel, Katz and Brock (2015) studied the predictive capacity of Tuckman and 
Chang’s model (1991) in addition to an adaptation of Ohlson’s (1980) model (this 
model, coming from the for-profit literature, introduces several variables 
measuring solvency, liquidity, and profitability) and another formed from 
recommendations of practitioners (this model includes five variables: staying 
power, current cash flow, interest cover ratio, assets divided by total revenue, and 
management wages divided by total revenue). In this case, the authors explicitly 
defined financial vulnerability as ‘‘an organization’s susceptibility to financial 
problems’’ (Tevel et al., 2015: 2502). However, they operationalized the concept as 
the average of variables included in each of the three models, so they were actually 
testing whether the models themselves are good predictors. 
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Almost a decade after the model of Tuckman and Chang (1991), Greenlee and 
Trussel (2000) proposed the first predictive model of the field. This was the first 
time someone tried to make operative the concept of financial vulnerability. In this 
study, the authors assumed that ‘‘program expenditures provide a reasonable 
proxy of the year-to-year changes in program services needed to identify 
financially vulnerable organizations’’ (p. 202). Based on this, they defined financial 
vulnerability as a reduction in program expenses (as a proportion of total 
revenues) in each of three consecutive years. 
 
Just two years later, Trussel (2002) proposed an alternative variable to 
operationalize financial vulnerability: the reduction in the net assets of an 
organization over several years. Specifically, he said that a NPO is financially 
vulnerable if it has ‘‘more than 20% decrease in its funds balance over three years’’ 
(p. 20). Similar definitions are given by Trussel, Greenlee and Brady (2002) and 
Trussel and Greenlee (2004), although the latter added a second model in which 
the reduction in net assets must be at least 50%. All of these authors defend this 
measure because if it occurs, it ‘‘will lead to a reduction in services and eventually 
result in the organization’s inability to carry out its mission’’ (Trussel et al., 2002: 
67) and such reduction ‘‘would manifest through a reduction in revenues and/or 
increase in expenses’’ (Trussel & Greenlee, 2004: 101). 
 
Afterward, some authors have jointly used both the proxies that we have already 
described (reduction in program expenses and reduction in net assets) in their 
analysis of the NPOs’ financial vulnerability so as to better identify those 
organizations that face financial problems. In this line, Andres-Alonso, Garcia-
Rodriguez and Romero-Merino (2015) assessed the predictive and explicative 
capacity of the financial vulnerability index of Trussel et al. (2002) by defining 
financial vulnerability as the reduction in the net assets or the program expenses, 
in both cases, by at least 20% over three years. Also, Cordery, Sim and Baskerville 
(2013) evaluated three predictive models of financial vulnerability over a three-
year period: program expenditure model (reduction in program expenses / 
revenues during the overall period), net assets model (reduction in net assets in 
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that period), and net earnings model (reduction in net earnings –income minus 
expenses– during the four years). 
 
Likewise, Keating, Fischer, Gordon and Greenlee (2005) analyzed four different 
concepts of financial vulnerability, each of them measured in a different way, but 
‘‘all of which relate to the ability of a nonprofit organization to carry out its 
mission’’ (p. 11). On one hand, two of these concepts correspond with both the 
previous proxies (reduction in net assets and in program expenses): financial 
disruption (reduction of at least 25% in net assets in a year) and program 
disruption (drop of at least 25% in program expenses in a year). On the other 
hand, this study added two new terms to the literature: technical insolvency (when 
total liabilities exceed total assets in a single year) and funding disruption (when 
total revenues decrease at least 25% in a year). All these four measures were used 
as dependent variables of their predictive models of financial vulnerability. This 
model was restructured in Gordon, Fischer, Greenlee and Keating (2013) by 
expanding the years included in the study, but reducing the number of dependent 
variables to only one –technical insolvency (liabilities greater than assets)–. 
Therefore, both studies (Gordon et al., 2013; Keating et al., 2005) introduced a 
static concept of financial vulnerability because the relation between liabilities and 
assets (technical insolvency) is measured in a particular moment, which confronts 
with the dynamic perception that the reductions of net assets or program expenses 
involve. 
 
It is important to note that all these studies (Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Cordery et 
al., 2013; Keating et al., 2005) introduced some different measures or dimensions 
of the financial vulnerability. However, none of them defined a single 
multidimensional construct. Instead, they tested their models independently, in 
isolation, without seeking coincidences among the organizations that are 
considered financially vulnerable from the perspective of different dimensions. 
The first attempt to define a multidimensional concept of financial vulnerability 
can be found in Bowman (2011). Instead of defining financial vulnerability, he 
elaborated an alternative model, different from Tuckman and Chang’s traditional 
approach, by introducing two concepts related to financial performance: financial 
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capacity and financial sustainability. Bowman (2011) also introduced the temporal 
dimension of the financial vulnerability, as he considered both financial capacity 
and sustainability in the short and long-term. On one hand, financial capacity 
‘‘consists of resources that give an organization the wherewithal to seize 
opportunities and react to unexpected threats,’’ reflecting ‘‘different degrees of 
managerial flexibility to reallocate assets in response to opportunities and threats’’ 
(p. 38). And, on the other hand, financial sustainability is measured by ‘‘the rate of 
change in capacity in each period’’ (p. 38). 
 
All these definitions are summarized in Table 3.1. We can clearly observe that the 
reduction in net assets (the difference between assets and liabilities) is the most 
widely used measure in the literature (Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Cordery et al., 
2013; Keating et al., 2005; Trussel, 2002; Trussel & Greenlee, 2004; Trussel et al., 
2002), although the periods under consideration or the cutoff percentage applied 
to calculate the dummy vary. This measure, due to the non-distribution constraint 
and following Jegers (2003), who calculates the organization’s profitability as the 
variation of net assets divided by total assets, directly reflects the difference 
between revenues and expenses. Net assets will diminish if expenses are higher 
than revenues (as a result of a reduction in revenues without a corresponding 
decrease in expenses or an increase in expenses that is not accompanied by a 
growth in revenues). When this situation is repeated over the years, the 
organization faces a persistent operational problem and it may suspend its activity. 
Also in this line, when we find the terms ‘‘insolvency risk’’ or ‘‘technical 
insolvency,’’ the authors are referring to the net assets, though not considering its 
dynamic dimension (variation over time) but its static one (Gordon et al., 2013; 
Keating et al., 2005). Furthermore, some of the most recent papers add the short-
term and long-term dimensions of this technical insolvency (Bowman, 2011; Tevel 
et al., 2015). 
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Table 3.1. Definitions of Financial Vulnerability in the Nonprofit Literature 
Article 
Concept of financial 
vulnerability 
Financially vulnerable NPOs 
Tuckman & Chang 
(1991) 
Cut service 
offerings 
At the lowest quintile of at least one 
variable (equity, administrative costs 
ratio, revenue concentration, margin) 
Greenlee & Trussel 
(2000) 
Reduction in 
program expenses 
Program expenses / Total Revenues 
decrease during three consecutive years 
Hager (2001) Capacity of survival 
Do not report to the IRS during four 
following years 
Trussel (2002) 
Reduction in net 
assets 
Reduction ≥20% in net assets over three 
years 
Trussel et al. 
(2002) 
Reduction in net 
assets 
Reduction in net assets over three years 
Trussel & Greenlee 
(2004) 
Reduction in net 
assets 
Net assets reduce ≥20% over three years 
Net assets reduce ≥50% over three years 
Keating et al. 
(2005) 
Insolvency risk Liabilities > Assets 
Financial disruption Reduction ≥25% in net assets in a year 
Funding disruption Total revenues decrease ≥25% in a year 
Program disruption 
Drop ≥25% in program expenses in a 
year 
Bowman (2011) 
Financial capacity 
Months of spending 
Equity ratio 
Financial 
sustainability 
Mark Up 
ROA 
Gordon et al. 
(2013) 
Technical 
insolvency 
Liabilities > Assets 
Thomas & Trafford 
(2013) 
Relative measure 
Variation of the four Tuckman and 
Chang’s (1991) variables 
Cordery et al. 
(2013) 
Reduction in 
program expenses 
(Program expenses / Revenues) decrease 
over three years 
Reduction in net 
assets 
Reduction in net assets over three years 
Negative net 
earnings 
accumulated 
(Income-expenses) ≤ [(Income-expenses) 
of the three previous years] 
Andres-Alonso et 
al. (2015) 
Reduction in net 
assets 
Net assets reduce ≥20% over three years 
Reduction in 
program expenses 
Program expenses reduce ≥20% over 
three years 
Tevel et al. (2015) 
Organization’s 
susceptibility to 
financial problems 
Average of Tuckman and Chang’s (1991) 
variables 
Average of Ohlson’s (1980) variables 
Average of Practitioners’ variables 
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The other common measure in the literature is the reduction in program expenses 
(Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Cordery et al., 2013; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Keating et al., 2005). However, far from being a measure free of drawbacks, this 
variable can result quite inaccurate to define a financially vulnerable position. In 
fact, if program expenses decrease without the previous drop in revenues, it would 
not indicate a problem of financial vulnerability but an inefficiency problem 
instead. And, even when revenues decrease, if program expenses decrease in a 
higher proportion than revenues, the situation would also reveal an inefficient 
entity. Moreover, by following the arguments of Tuckman and Chang (1991), a 
NPO that experiences financial difficulties first would try to reduce redundant 
administrative expenses instead of those related to its mission. 
 
On the other side of the profit and loss account, Keating et al. (2005) use the 
reduction in total revenues as a proxy of financial vulnerability (funding 
disruption). Nonetheless, as it happened with the program expenses, we do not 
think this is an accurate concept of financial vulnerability. Not all reductions in 
revenues result in a decrease in net assets, because, as expenses are much more 
controllable than revenues, NPOs may (in fact, they should) diminish their 
expenses if revenues decline. In this way, a reduction in revenues solely 
constitutes a problem of financial vulnerability if expenses do not adjust and do 
not decrease in the same proportion. Therefore, a reduction in revenues actually 
means a reduction in the NPO’s size (in terms of total revenues), but this variable 
by itself does not involve a financially vulnerable position. 
 
We have also observed how the literature has evolved toward the use of more than 
one variable, although none of the previous papers has operationalized ‘‘a 
financially vulnerable NPO’’ simultaneously based on more than one criterion 
except Bowman (2011), who does not define the financial vulnerability of an 
organization but its financial capacity and sustainability. In this line, we perceive 
the need for a multidimensional measure of financial vulnerability that combines 
many facets of this concept, clarifies the relationships among all of them, and 
examines in greater depth some forgotten aspects such as the capacity of short-
term financing. In fact, as Jegers (2008) notes, predictive models do not obtain 
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highly satisfactory results, which could be caused by an inadequate 
operationalization of financial vulnerability. 
 
 
3. A THREE-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY 
 
Following Bowman (2011), we defend the idea that financial vulnerability is not a 
one-dimensional concept, but it forms a complex construct. It is necessary to 
observe more than a sole variable to be able to affirm that an organization is 
financially vulnerable. In this line, we propose a model that evaluates three 
dimensions in order to assess if a NPO is financially vulnerable or not: operational, 
leverage, and liquidity (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Three-dimensional Model of Financial Vulnerability 
 
As we can see in the figure, the three dimensions we have selected only use data 
from the balance sheet (assets and liabilities). This decision is derived not only 
from the fact that some of these dimensions are the most commonly used in the 
traditional literature (variation of net assets as operational vulnerability, and ratio 
of total assets to debt as leverage vulnerability), but also because we defend that 
they are the most suitable to represent financial vulnerability. This is why we have 
discarded other usual concepts derived from the profit and loss account (both 
program expenses and revenues), because, as we have previously explained, they 
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either mingle the concepts of inefficiency and financial vulnerability (program 
expenses) or they only reflect a very small fragment of the vulnerability (revenues) 
that is, in fact, contained in other traditional variables (net assets). 
 
Following these premises, we have integrated in our multidimensional model both 
dynamic (operational) and static (leverage and liquidity) perspectives of financial 
vulnerability, taking into account both the long-term (leverage) dimension and the 
short-term dimension (liquidity) of the static perspective. 
 
3.1. First Dimension: Operational Vulnerability 
 
The first dimension of financial vulnerability is derived from the key concept 
defined by the previous literature, that is, the variation of net assets over time 
(Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Cordery et al., 2013; Keating et al., 2005; Trussel, 
2002; Trussel & Greenlee, 2004; Trussel et al., 2002). As we have previously 
explained, this dimension is associated with the recent variation of revenues and 
expenses of the organization such that when the net assets are reduced over the 
years, the organization faces a persistent operational problem; thus we give it the 
name ‘‘operational vulnerability.’’ The need of using a dynamic analysis (reduction 
over the years instead of only one year) in this dimension is derived from the fact 
that the margin (difference between income and expenses) is a highly volatile 
variable (Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Thomas & Trafford, 2013). 
 
Although this variable is the most widely used in the prior literature, it, however, 
does not fully include all the aspects of financial vulnerability. Operational 
vulnerability involves a mismatch between operational inflows and outflows 
which may result in a financial problem of greater or lesser importance depending 
on the financial condition of the organization. In this way, if operational revenues 
are reduced (decrease in revenues, one of the traditionally used variables) and the 
organization reduces its expenses equally, the operational dimension of financial 
vulnerability is not affected, but it does not prevent the nonprofit from 
experiencing problems related to its financial structure (the relationship between 
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its debts and its assets). This is the reason why it is necessary to incorporate other 
dimensions to the definition of financial vulnerability. 
 
3.2. Second Dimension: Leverage Vulnerability 
 
The second and third dimensions of the concept are directly related to the way in 
which the NPO finances its payments. Although the reduction in net assets for 
many years in a row ends up affecting the financial vulnerability of the NPO, the 
accumulation of losses over time does not necessarily mean that the organization 
is in a critical financial situation. If the entity had a very healthy financial situation 
(low debts and high equity) at the beginning, it can survive for several years 
without problems in dealing with its payments. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that a NPO can have financial difficulties (leverage or liquidity 
vulnerability) without any operational vulnerability because it had an excess of 
long or short debt from the beginning. That is why we consider it essential to 
evaluate the second (leverage vulnerability) and third (liquidity vulnerability) 
dimensions in addition to the operational one. 
 
When we focus on the NPO’s capacity to pay both its short and long-term liabilities 
with its assets, which is related to the entity’s financial structure, we refer to the 
second dimension. This dimension is commonly analyzed in the for-profit 
organizations as it measures solvency. Some researchers in the nonprofit sector 
(Gordon et al., 2013; Keating et al., 2005) have also studied this measure as 
‘‘technical insolvency’’ or ‘‘insolvency risk.’’ It refers to the ability of an entity to 
meet the payment of its debt by analyzing the proportion of total assets to debt. 
This dimension has great importance especially if NPOs are also in a weak position 
in the other two dimensions. An organization whose net assets have been reduced 
during the last three years does not have the same financial problem if its ratio of 
assets to debt is high rather than low. However, this dimension cannot be 
considered in isolation, because, as Bowman (2011) suggests, some organizations 
have learned to live with high levels of debt. Thus, it is important to consider this 
model in a comprehensive way. 
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3.3. Third Dimension: Liquidity Vulnerability 
 
When we focus on the short-term capacity of the nonprofit to pay its debts, we use 
this third dimension. This is what we call the liquidity vulnerability following the 
terminology used in the for-profit sector (as in Ohlson’s [1980] model). In this 
sense, an organization may have sufficient assets to meet the payment of all its 
debts but it may have problems with short-term financing or vice versa. The 
interest of this dimension resides in analyzing the NPO’s ability to reduce its assets 
when its revenues are insufficient. Thus, if the NPO opts for reducing assets to 
meet expenses, it has two options. On one hand, it could make use of its current 
liquid assets. On the other hand, it could sell its fixed assets, which would be 
converted into current assets, and then used to meet expenses. Obviously, the first 
option is easier for the organization and it does not depend on external factors that 
condition the sale of fixed assets. This dimension does not necessarily go in the 
same direction as the leverage vulnerability. That is why it is important to study all 
three in order to get a global vision of the financial problems of the entity. 
 
3.4. A Comprehensive Model 
 
After separately analyzing each of the three dimensions, it is necessary to make an 
overall assessment of the NPO’s financial vulnerability to clearly identify if it is in a 
critical financial situation. Thus, if a NPO is simultaneously classified as vulnerable 
according to the three dimensions we analyze, it is considered in a highly 
financially vulnerable position because its expenses have exceeded its revenues 
during the last three years and its balance sheet shows a weak financial situation, 
with a low proportion of assets to debt both in general and current terms. If the 
organization is rated as financially vulnerable based on two criteria, its financial 
situation is better, although it still remains at high risk. In case of the entities which 
are classified as vulnerable according to only one dimension, their financial risk is 
less, but they have to take important precautions in order to avoid aggravating 
their position. We consider these last entities in a low financially vulnerable 
position. Finally, if the NPO is not determined to be vulnerable by any of the 
dimensions, it is considered to be in a healthy financial position. 
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Once we have defined our model and its relationship with the traditional measures 
of financial vulnerability, we conduct an empirical analysis to test if our model is 
truly helpful to achieve a clearer and more unambiguous understanding of the 
financial situation of NPOs. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION 
 
To test the convergence of traditional definitions of financially vulnerable 
organizations and our multidimensional model, we use a sample of Non-
Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs) from the United Kingdom 
(UK). The NGDOs are NPOs that carry out their work, at least partially, in the fields 
of international cooperation and development. 
 
Our sample is extracted from those NGDOs belonging to BOND, the UK 
membership organization of these entities. Although this organization has over 
400 NGDOs members, we have only chosen those which have published their 
financial accounts of the 2008-2012 period online, and whose financial statements 
followed the recommendations given by the Charity Commission for England and 
Wales (2005). Thus, our final sample is composed of 212 organizations. 
 
4.1. Analysis of Traditional Variables 
 
Our first empirical analysis consists of the concordance between the different 
proxies of financial vulnerability employed in the prior literature. According to 
Table 3.1, we analyze three of the most widely used variables: reduction in net 
assets, reduction in program expenses (deflated by total revenues), and reduction 
in revenues. Although several researchers have used these variables, their 
operationalization differs among them. Therefore, in this section, we consider 
these measures by assessing their variations during the prior three years and 
classifying as financially vulnerable (according to each of the three variables) those 
NPOs situated in the bottom quintile of the sample (those whose net assets, 
program expenses, or revenues have declined more in the last three years). 
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Consequently, our purpose here is to test if all these variables truly identify those 
organizations with serious financial problems, or, on the contrary, if each of the 
variables is actually measuring a different concept. To get more robust results, we 
carry out the analysis twice: from December 2008 to December 2011, and from 
December 2009 to December 2012. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Number of Financially 
Vulnerable NPOs according to the 
Traditional Variables 2008-2011 
 
Figure 3.3. Number of Financially 
Vulnerable NPOs according to the 
Traditional Variables 2009-2012 
 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the number of organizations which are considered as 
financially vulnerable according to the three variables. The first noteworthy 
finding is the exiguous number of NPOs that meet the three criteria (none and 
three, respectively). Thus, we notice that although these three variables 
supposedly assess the same concept, actually, they measure different ideas. 
Another interesting result is the high number of organizations that are financially 
vulnerable according to a single criterion, especially program expenses. Examining 
the variables two by two, one last important outcome is the low number of entities 
that meet two criteria when one of them is the reduction in program expenses. 
Thus, there is a greater correlation between reduction in net assets and reduction 
in revenues than between these two variables and reduction in program expenses. 
These findings are in line with those presented by Cordery et al. (2013) and they 
are not unexpected if we examine each concept in depth. The reduction in net 
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assets reflects a negative variation in the difference between revenues and 
expenses over time, so the decrease in revenues is a partial side of it. Although 
there is a higher coincidence between these two variables, as we have already 
explained, a reduction in revenues does not automatically involve a decrease in net 
assets but it depends on the capacity of the NPOs to adjust their expenses. At this 
point, someone could think that it would be more appropriate to use the reduction 
in total expenses as a proxy variable of the financial vulnerability. However, this 
variable has not been previously used in the literature. In its place, authors have 
opted for the reduction in program expenses (instead of total expenses) as a sign 
that the nonprofit is not fulfilling its mission, despite the fact that, as we have also 
noted, this variable is more related to NPO’s inefficiency. 
 
In this analysis, we have illustrated the importance of choosing the appropriate 
dependent variable that identifies financial vulnerability, because depending on 
the selected variable, the sample of vulnerable NPOs varies greatly. We have also 
provided theoretical reasons which suggest that none of the previous variables 
completely define the concept of financial vulnerability. Therefore, we test our 
three-dimensional model below. 
 
4.2. Analysis of the Three-Dimensional Model 
 
Once the three-dimensional model has been explained in the theoretical section, it 
is necessary to operationalize it. With regard to operational vulnerability, we 
evaluate the variation of net assets over time, which is the same variable we have 
previously studied in the analysis of traditional variables. As we previously did, we 
observe its variation during a three-year period and we define the bottom quintile 
of the sample as vulnerable instead of using an arbitrary cutoff percentage of 20% 
or 50%. 
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Table 3.2. Variation of Net Assets 
Panel A. Period 2008-2011 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 615% 71% 23% -3% -43% 134% 
Median 209% 67% 22% -3% -36% 22% 
Maximum  7,185% 121% 40% 10% -17% 7,185% 
Minimum 121% 43% 10% -16% -96% -96% 
Panel B. Period 2009-2012 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 263% 48% 19% -5% -47% 56% 
Median 147% 46% 20% -5% -44% 20% 
Maximum  1,115% 82% 29% 6% -19% 1,115% 
Minimum 87% 29% 7% -18% -87% -87% 
 
We can observe in Table 3.2 that the behavior of NPOs is similar in the two 
periods, except for the extraordinary positive value that distorts the total and first 
quintile means in the period 2008-2011. There are important differences between 
quintiles. Thus, the top three quintiles have positive growth in net assets during 
both periods, while such variation is negative (on average) in the fourth and fifth 
quintiles. In fact, all the NPOs in the bottom quintile had a decrease in net assets of 
more than 15% over the three years. 
 
After the analysis of the first dimension (operational vulnerability), we evaluate 
the leverage vulnerability of the NPO. We operationalize this dimension as the 
ratio of total assets to total debt. This variable indicates how many times the NPO’s 
assets cover its liabilities. This ratio (as well as the third dimension) is only 
calculated at the end of the period because the operational dimension already 
considers the recent fluctuation of revenues and expenses (variation of net assets). 
Accordingly, we present below the corresponding data for the years 2011 and 
2012. 
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Table 3.3. Ratio of Total Assets to Total Debt 
Panel A. 2011 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 136.31 14.12 5.94 3.13 1.68 32.09 
Median 47.79 13.72 5.69 3.03 1.70 5.69 
Maximum  2,292.64 22.59 8.80 4.03 2.38 2,292.64 
Minimum 22.71 8.95 4.07 2.38 0.81 0.81 
Panel B. 2012 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 70.70 11.39 5.78 2.97 1.66 18.42 
Median 34.52 11.10 5.73 2.80 1.99 5.73 
Maximum  354.44 18.08 7.51 4.30 2.18 354.44 
Minimum 18.47 7.71 4.32 2.25 0.96 0.96 
We have omitted one nonprofit with no liabilities to estimate the mean and maximum of the 
entire sample and the first quintile in each Panel. 
 
Table 3.3 shows similar outcomes in both years, excluding the lowest and highest 
values that distort the means. All the NPOs situated in the bottom quintile have 
values below 2.40. It implies that their assets cover, on average, less than twice the 
value of their total liabilities. These NPOs are in a more critical situation, because 
they have a high level of debt that limits their ability to deal with other financial 
problems. It is also noteworthy that few organizations are in technical insolvency, 
that is, with a level of debt greater than their assets (only one each year). 
 
Finally, we study the liquidity vulnerability of the NPO by calculating the relation 
between current assets and short-term debt. This measure indicates the number of 
times that, in the short-term, the assets cover the debt. As in the case of leverage 
vulnerability, we assess this ratio for the years 2011 and 2012. 
 
As observed in Table 3.4, the fifth quintile has a lower value for this ratio (2.16 as 
maximum). In fact, there are some organizations whose short-term debt is greater 
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than their current assets, presenting a value lower than 1 in the ratio (six NPOs in 
2011 and three in 2012). These low values (around 1.5 as average) involve serious 
problems in meeting current financial obligations, placing the organizations in a 
critical position. 
 
Table 3.4. Ratio of Current Assets to Short-term Debt 
Panel A. 2011 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 124.08 12.72 5.68 2.93 1.47 29.24 
Median 40.98 11.78 5.37 2.93 1.45 5.37 
Maximum  2,292.64 20.95 8.39 3.80 2.16 2,292.64 
Minimum 20.96 8.44 3.89 2.18 0.36 0.36 
Panel B. 2012 
 Quintile 
All 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Mean 60.82 10.37 5.35 2.88 1.52 16.12 
Median 28.59 10.04 5.16 2.72 1.47 5.16 
Maximum  347.29 16.70 6.89 3.92 2.13 347.29 
Minimum 16.75 6.97 4.05 2.14 0.55 0.55 
We have omitted one nonprofit with no short-term debt to estimate the mean and maximum 
of the entire sample and the first quintile in each Panel. 
 
Finally, after the separate evaluation of the three dimensions, we conduct an 
overall test, attempting to detect if there are organizations with financial problems 
in all three categories. 
 
When we observe Table 3.5 and Figures 3.4 and 3.5, we can see that, with slight 
differences, the results of both years have a similar distribution. Almost two out of 
three NPOs in the sample do not have any symptoms of financial vulnerability. By 
contrast, about 6% have all three kinds of financial difficulties simultaneously, 
being highly financially vulnerable. These organizations are in a critical situation 
since their expenses have been higher than revenues during last three years and 
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they have a low proportion of total assets and current assets in relation to total 
debt and short-term debt, respectively. Almost 14% of the sample are financially 
vulnerable according to two dimensions, and about 16% of NPOs present only one 
financial problem. 
 
Table 3.5. Number of NPOs with Financial Vulnerability Problems. Years 2011 and 
2012 
Problem 
Number of NPOs (%) 
2011 2012 
Without financial problems 137 (64.62%) 136 (64.15%) 
Operational problems 43 (20.29%) 43 (20.29%) 
Leverage problems 43 (20.29%) 43 (20.29%) 
Liquidity problems 43 (20.29%) 43 (20.29%) 
Operational and leverage problems 15 (7.08%) 14 (6.60%) 
Operational and liquidity problems 14 (6.60%) 12 (5.66%) 
Leverage and liquidity problems 37 (17.45%) 39 (18.40%) 
Operational, leverage and liquidity problems 12 (5.66%) 12 (5.66%) 
TOTAL 212 (100%) 212 (100%) 
 
With the use of quintiles, there are 43 NPOs that suffer each of the three financial 
problems (the bottom quintile of the sample). However, it is noteworthy how the 
number of organizations that simultaneously have two of these problems differ. 
We observe that the more usual relationship is between leverage and liquidity 
vulnerability (around 18% of the sample has both problems, including those NPOs 
which also have operational problems): about 90% of NPOs with leverage 
difficulties have also liquidity problems and vice versa. By contrast, only 6-7% of 
the sample has operational and leverage problems or operational and liquidity 
difficulties at the same time (including in both cases those entities with the three 
troubles). In other words, one of every three organizations with operational 
vulnerability also suffers leverage vulnerability, being a similar proportion of NPOs 
with simultaneous operational and liquidity problems (although the great majority 
of entities coincide having all three difficulties). Thus, leverage and liquidity 
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problems largely appear simultaneously, while operational vulnerability is more 
likely to occur in isolation. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Number of Financially 
Vulnerable NPOs in 2011 according 
to the Three-dimensional Model 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Number of Financially 
Vulnerable NPOs in 2012 according 
to the Three-dimensional Model 
 
These findings can be explained by the relationship between the ratios that 
operationalize leverage and liquidity vulnerability. The ratio necessary to calculate 
the liquidity dimension (current assets to short-term debt) constitutes a part of the 
one used to measure the leverage vulnerability (total assets to total debt), limiting 
assets, and debt only to the short-term. Furthermore, both ratios refer to the 
balance sheet, reflecting the present situation of properties and obligations of the 
organization. However, the relations between the variation of net assets over time 
and the ratios of assets to debt (total or current) are not as immediate. 
 
4.3. Comparison between the Assessments of NPOs’ Financial Vulnerability Performed 
with Traditional Measures and our Multidimensional Proposal 
 
To conclude, we make an empirical comparison between the estimations of NPOs’ 
financial vulnerability done with the traditional one-dimensional measures and 
our proposed multidimensional model. In doing so, we examine if those NPOs that 
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are classified as highly financially vulnerable according to our model are also rated 
as vulnerable following the different traditional criteria. 
 
Table 3.6. Comparison of Vulnerable NPOs according to the Traditional Variables 
and the Multidimensional Model 
  Financially Vulnerable NPOs: Multidimensional Model 
  
Three 
dimensions 
(12 NGDOs) 
Operational 
vulnerability 
(43 NGDOs) 
Leverage 
vulnerability 
(43 NGDOs) 
Liquidity 
vulnerability 
(43 NGDOs) 
 
Years* 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
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Reduction 
in net assets  
(43 NGDOs) 
12 12 43 43 15 14 14 12 
Reduction 
in program 
expenses 
(43 NGDOs) 
1 2 1 6 7 4 10 5 
Reduction 
in revenues 
(43 NGDOs) 
1 4 17 21 4 7 3 5 
* Traditional variables and operational vulnerability are calculated as reductions over a three-
year period: 2008-2011 and 2009-2012. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the number of NGDOs that are simultaneously considered as 
financially vulnerable by traditional variables and the multidimensional model. 
Note that the leverage and liquidity vulnerability use data from a single year (static 
dimension of vulnerability), while all the traditional variables and the operational 
vulnerability have been calculated as a reduction over a three-year period 
(dynamic dimension of vulnerability), but in these last cases, a NPO is not 
considered as “vulnerable” along the analyzed period, but at the end of it if the 
reduction has occurred. 
 
As observed in the first two columns (Three dimensions), there are important 
differences between the traditional variables: reductions in program expenses and 
revenues occur in few of those NPOs which are classified as highly financially 
vulnerable (problems in the three dimensions). Obviously, reduction in net assets 
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appears in all of them because it is introduced as the operational vulnerability in 
the multidimensional model. 
 
The third and fourth columns of the table (Operational vulnerability) show the 
number of vulnerable organizations according to the operational dimension and 
the traditional variables. Here again, the NPOs with operational vulnerability (43) 
are those that have reduced their net assets in a higher proportion (by definition). 
Almost half of them are vulnerable according to the reduction in revenues, but 
when considering the reduction in program expenses, the number is much smaller. 
These results correspond to those presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
The fifth and sixth columns (Leverage vulnerability) indicate the number of 
entities with problems of leverage vulnerability and also with some of the 
traditional variables. We can observe that it coincides with the reduction in net 
assets in a higher proportion (one out of three), as we explained when referring to 
the operational vulnerability, but the relationship with the other two traditional 
variables is much smaller (16% as maximum). 
 
Finally, the seventh and eight columns (Liquidity vulnerability) show the 
comparison between the vulnerable NPOs according to the liquidity dimension of 
our model and those NPOs that present the financial difficulties according to the 
variables used by the prior literature. Once again, reduction in net assets is the 
variable that best corresponds with this dimension (around 30% of NPOs with 
liquidity problems are also in a weak position regarding the decrease in net 
assets), compared with reduction in program expenses (23% as maximum) and 
revenues (12% as maximum). 
 
This analysis is in line with the theoretical explanation given in the previous 
sections. Reduction in net assets appears as the traditional variable that best 
defines financial vulnerability, but it needs to be supplemented, as it does not 
include all the aspects of this complex concept. In contrast, reductions in revenues 
and program expenses, far from representing financial vulnerability, may be 
measuring extraneous concepts such as the NPO’s inefficiency in its resources 
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allocation (reduction in program expenses) or in its fundraising activity (drop in 
revenues). 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
While many authors are looking for accurate indicators of the NPOs’ financial 
vulnerability, we focus in this chapter on the concept of financial vulnerability 
itself. The difficulty in finding failed NPOs has constrained the researchers in 
appraising the financial problems through very different proxy measures which 
lead the studies about vulnerability predictors to blurred results and ambiguous 
conclusions. In our opinion, it is necessary to stop and reflect on what is really 
meant by financial vulnerability before continuing the search for its determinants. 
 
In this chapter, we gain insight into the concept of financial vulnerability, offering a 
multidimensional definition that compiles the main aspects of the previous 
definitions and completes them by introducing short and long-term issues related 
to the financial structure of the NPO. 
 
After reviewing how prior literature defines financial vulnerability, we select the 
most utilized measures to analyze their consistency in identifying the truly 
vulnerable NPOs. We use a sample of NGDOs from the UK to test this consistency 
and we observe that none of the previous one-dimensional definitions of financial 
vulnerability is complete and that, actually, such variables measure different 
concepts. The most commonly used measure –the reduction in net assets– does not 
automatically imply a critical financial situation, because it depends on other 
variables that may maximize or minimize the impact of such decrease. The 
situation varies greatly if an organization has accumulated net assets in the years 
before the decrease. Another of the most common measures –the reduction in total 
revenues– does not imply a financially vulnerable position by itself because NPOs 
may avoid negative margins by adjusting their expenses to their income drop. 
Finally, the reduction in program expenses (deflated by total revenues) does not 
show a problem of financial vulnerability. A decrease in the program expenses is a 
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problem of organizational efficiency which should not be confused with any kind 
of financial vulnerability. 
 
In contrast to these traditional variables, we propose a multidimensional definition 
for financial vulnerability. This multidimensional approach implies that we need to 
observe more than only one variable to confirm that a NPO is vulnerable, as it has 
already been done in the for-profit field. We suggest a definition in which an 
organization is classified as ‘‘highly financially vulnerable’’ if it simultaneously 
meets three different criteria: a large reduction in net assets during the last three 
years, a low proportion of total assets to debt, and a low ratio of its current assets 
regarding short-term debt. If a NPO meets only one or two criteria, its grade of 
vulnerability is reduced, while organizations that are not graded as vulnerable in 
any dimension are considered to have no financial difficulties. Following this 
framework, when we analyze our sample, we observe that only 6% of all NPOs are 
highly financially vulnerable, but when we consider two dimensions the 
percentage of vulnerable organizations increases to 14%, and almost 16% present 
financial problems in one dimension. We have also noticed that most of the 
vulnerable organizations in terms of liquidity also have problems of leverage 
vulnerability, and vice versa. When we compare these results with those obtained 
using traditional variables, we can conclude that the reduction in net assets is the 
traditional measure that best defines financial vulnerability, not only considering 
the operational dimension (because it is exactly the same measure), but also the 
leverage and liquidity ones. However, the model we propose here adds some 
aspects of financial vulnerability that are directly related to the ability of the 
nonprofit to cope with its debts which was not considered by traditional variables. 
 
This chapter can be useful for both researchers and practitioners because it offers 
a thoughtful and comprehensive measure of the financial vulnerability. This 
measure may give certain homogeneity to future papers about determinants or 
indicators of financial vulnerability. Using the same dependent variable, it will be 
much easier to get unambiguous results on signs that an organization will have 
severe financial problems. This study can also help NPOs’ managers to assess the 
financial problems they may have to deal with in the future. 
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The main limitation of this study is that we only make a proposed definition; we 
have not verified its actual explanatory power because we do not have failed NPOs 
that could allow us to check whether these dimensions actually lead to bankruptcy, 
and if so, how long the process takes. Accordingly, an interesting line of future 
research would be to find such entities and test if these dimensions truly reflect 
the financial problems of the organizations. Another limitation is the measurement 
we have used for each dimension. We have opted for using quintiles to avoid the 
setting of arbitrary limits that divide the sample. However, the classification of a 
NPO as vulnerable depends on the remainder of the sample, assuming that one out 
of every five organizations has financial problems. In this line, future studies could 
use a different, larger sample from another country or nonprofit sector. 
 
Further research is necessary in this field to find and accept a convincing and 
consensual definition of financial vulnerability that identifies those NPOs with 
serious financial difficulties and, thereafter, improves the prediction of such 
problems –which is the real need of practitioners–. 
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THE ROLE OF BOARDS IN THE FINANCIAL VULNERABILITY OF NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes the relationship between the board composition of 65 
nonprofit organizations from Spain and their financial vulnerability. This 
relationship is a novel one in the nonprofit literature; however, the for-profit 
literature has justified it both theoretically and empirically. Adapting its reasoning to 
the nonprofit sector, we consider a multi-theoretical approach to explain the double 
role of the board (advisory and monitoring) and a multidimensional model of 
financial vulnerability. Contrary to the theoretical reasoning, our results support the 
inexistence of a significant relationship between the board composition (in terms of 
board structure and directors’ experience and education) and the financial 
vulnerability of nonprofit organizations. This finding indicates that the board has not 
been able to develop their roles effectively due to several reasons that we suggest in 
the discussion. 
 
Keywords: financial vulnerability, governance, nonprofit organizations, board, 
NGDOs 
 
 
Resumen 
Este capítulo analiza la relación entre la composición del consejo de 65 entidades no 
lucrativas españolas y la vulnerabilidad financiera de las mismas. Esta relación es 
novedosa en la literatura del sector no lucrativo; sin embargo, la literatura 
empresarial la ha justificado tanto teórica como empíricamente. Adaptando su 
razonamiento a la realidad del sector no lucrativo, consideramos un enfoque 
multiteórico para explicar el doble rol del consejo (asesor y supervisor) y un modelo 
multidimensional de vulnerabilidad financiera. Contrariamente al razonamiento 
teórico, nuestros resultados apoyan la inexistencia de relación significativa entre la 
composición del consejo (en términos de estructura del consejo y experiencia y 
educación de sus miembros) y la vulnerabilidad financiera de las entidades no 
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lucrativas. Este resultado indica que el consejo no está siendo capaz de desarrollar 
sus roles de una manera efectiva debido a varias razones que proponemos en la 
discusión. 
 
Palabras clave: vulnerabilidad financiera, gobierno, entidades no lucrativas, 
consejo, ONGDs 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Since the pioneering works of Daily and Dalton (1994a, 1994b), many authors 
have attempted to provide a definitive answer to the question about the role of the 
board in the reduction of bankruptcy risk and costs. Although these research 
studies are far less prolific than those that analyze the effect of a board on 
corporate performance, they become noteworthy when times of economic 
prosperity lead into the financial crisis, and consequently, the concern about 
increasing corporate results makes way for the worry about financial survival.  
 
The literature on nonprofit organizations (NPOs) is always one step behind the 
literature on the for-profit industry. There is some research on the influence of a 
board on NPOs’ performance (or efficiency), but in the field of bankruptcy the 
literature is almost nonexistent. The lack of specific studies on nonprofit 
bankruptcy is mainly due to the general conviction that economic failure is not a 
real problem in this sector, assuming that their financial structure is always 
healthy. It is also because there are no contrasted indicators to measure the 
bankruptcy risk. However, when the recent economic and financial crisis caused a 
difficult scenario for NPOs, the literature on insolvency and financial vulnerability 
began to grow.  
 
Before questioning which kind of board can avoid the financially failure of a NPO, 
the authors searched for indicators that allow for assessing bankruptcy risk in 
advance. This line of research began in the 1990s, which is considerably later than 
in the for-profit sector (Altman, 1968). Since then, some researchers addressed the 
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financial vulnerability of NPOs before the last financial crisis (e.g., Greenlee & 
Trussel, 2000; Keating, Fischer, Gordon & Greenlee, 2005; Tuckman & Chang, 
1991). From them on, attention on this issue has been on the rise, especially after 
some bankruptcy cases in this sector.23 These nonprofit bankruptcies cases have 
caused rethinking the need to change how some of them finance their activity. 
 
As the volume of literature on nonprofit bankruptcy indicators grows, even they 
are far from being conclusive (Jegers, 2008), it is starting to become necessary to 
identify which factors influence NPO’s vulnerability in order to prevent it, if 
possible. Specifically, we propose analyzing whether the board of trustees can 
avoid financial vulnerability by functioning as the main internal governance 
system. The board, which is the apex of the organization, is the guarantor of the 
well-functioning of the company (Jensen, 1993). It would be responsible if the 
organization reaches a financial distress situation or it goes bankrupt (Simpson & 
Gleason, 1999), as they are both considered to be extreme cases of poor 
organizational performance (Lajili & Zéghal, 2010). Therefore, our goal in this 
study will be to analyze the differences between the board composition of 
financially vulnerable NPOs with respect to the financially healthy ones, as well as 
the impact that board composition has on the probability of classifying an NPO as 
financially vulnerable.  
 
As the relationship between the board and the organization’s financial problems 
has been previously tested in the for-profit scope, it is possible to use the same 
theoretical frameworks already verified, but adapting their reasoning to the reality 
of the nonprofit sector. Accordingly, we raise our hypotheses based on the 
arguments of the two most common frameworks for governance, including the 
agency theory and the resource dependence approach.  
 
We use a sample of Spanish Non-Governmental Development Organizations 
(NGDOs) to test the hypotheses about the potential effects of board composition 
(i.e., size, independence, duality, accumulation of knowledge and experience) on 
                                               
23 For example, Hull House in Chicago, Visiting Nurse Association of Long Island and FUNDESO in 
Spain. 
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the NPOs’ financial vulnerability. However, our results show no differences 
between the board composition of vulnerable and healthy NPOs. Additionally, we 
do not find any governance variable to have explanatory power on the likelihood 
of an NPO is being classified as vulnerable or not, so we suggest some reasons that 
could explain these results. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a literature 
review related to nonprofit governance and financial vulnerability. After that, we 
explain the sample, variables and methodology we use, to later show our obtained 
results. Finally, we discuss the results, and we expose the main conclusions 
derived from this chapter, as well as the limitations and possible areas for future 
research. 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Despite the existence of some other mechanisms (i.e., relevant donors, regulation, 
debt, and external audit), most articles on NPOs’ governance identify the board as 
the main governance mechanism of these organizations due to its major 
effectiveness (Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2003; O’Regan & Oster, 2002). The board 
is the responsible for protecting the interest of founders, donors, beneficiaries and 
society in general since its members are responsible for leading the NPO with 
ability and integrity towards the achievement of its mission. Furthermore, in the 
nonprofit scope, the board has an especially active and instrumental role 
(Coombes, Horris, Allen & Webb, 2011; O’Regan & Oster, 2005).  
 
The roles of the board, as in the for-profit sector, have been explained using 
different theories, but the majority has focused on the agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and the resource dependence approach (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Each of them supports a different main role of the board (i.e., monitoring and 
advisory, respectively). Nevertheless, during the last decade, several authors 
propose the idea of adopting a multi-theoretical approach to explain the role of 
NPOs’ boards in a larger and more accurate way (Brown, 2005; Callen, Klein & 
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Tinkelman, 2010; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). Hence, the optimal 
board composition (i.e., the one that allows it to effectively develop a dual role as 
supervisor and strategist) is defined using arguments coming from the agency 
theory (i.e., board size and independence), and from the dependence resource 
approach, such as human capital (i.e., education and experience of board members) 
and relational capital (i.e., experience in boards of other organizations) (Andrés-
Alonso, Azofra-Palenzuela & Romero-Merino, 2010; Dalton & Dalton, 2005). 
 
As we have already noted, previous literature on the nonprofit sector has 
traditionally focused on the relationship between the board and NPO’s efficiency 
(e.g., Andrés-Alonso, Martín-Cruz & Romero-Merino, 2006; Brown, 2005; Callen et 
al., 2003, 2010). To our knowledge, only Hodge and Piccolo (2005) study the 
impact of board effectiveness and private contributions on financial vulnerability. 
These authors predict that higher board participation involves a lower level of 
financial vulnerability, but this relationship has not proven to be significant. 
 
In contrast, in the for-profit sector, the effect of the board has previously been 
studied in regards to organizational performance and in relation to bankruptcy 
and financial difficulties suffered by companies (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; 
Darrat, Gray & Wu, 2016; Lajili & Zéghal, 2010; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Platt & Platt, 
2012; Simpson & Gleason, 1999). In line with these studies, our general hypothesis 
for the nonprofit sector is that the board composition is related to the financial 
vulnerability of NPOs, but we disaggregate it into different specific aspects, some of 
them derived from the traditional agency theory (i.e., board structure) and from 
the resource dependence approach (i.e., experience and knowledge of directors). 
 
2.1. Board Structure 
 
When the role of the boards is analyzed under an agency focus, it is usually 
described through variables, such as the board size and independence as well as 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality or the directors’ ownership. Using only 
the agency arguments, the expected influence of all these variables on the financial 
vulnerability would be quite clear, but when we combine them with the resource 
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dependence approach, the expected effects turn out to be puzzling. According to 
this line of thought, the arguments coming from the two theories support opposite 
effects of board size on the organization’s financial problems (De Maere, Jorissen & 
Uhlaner, 2014; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Platt & Platt, 2012). On the one hand, agency 
theory explains that a smaller board is more beneficial for the well-functioning of 
the organization because it implies a quicker and more active decision process. On 
the other hand, a bigger board allows a greater volume of skills and expertise that 
could improve the decisions of the body. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
H1. Board size does not influence the NPO’s financial vulnerability. 
 
The effect of board independence on financial vulnerability, in contrast with what 
occurred with board size, is reinforced by the two theories. Agency arguments 
support a positive effect of a more independent board on the financial health of the 
organization because external directors might monitor the work of the 
management team in a better way than if they were insiders (Chancharat, 
Krishnamurti & Tian, 2012; Platt & Platt, 2012). Also these outsiders could provide 
the NPO with additional resources (i.e., human and relational capital) to those that 
are already in the organization because of its employees. Thus, we expect that 
H2. Board independence has a negative effect on the NPO’s financial vulnerability. 
 
Using an agency approach, the CEO duality is understood as a severe lack of 
independence. CEO duality supposes a decrease in board oversight, which will 
have a negative effect on the organization’s financial vulnerability (De Maere et al., 
2014; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella, 2014). By contrast, resource dependence 
approach argues that this duality favors the leadership of the organization and, 
therefore, its effectiveness (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998; Krause et al., 
2014). Consequently, as in the case of board size, we hypothesize that 
H3. CEO duality does not have an effect on the NPO’s financial vulnerability. 
 
Previous literature on boards and financial difficulties has also considered other 
variables related to ownership, such as the percentage of stocks owned by the 
board members or the proportion of members elected by the highest stakeholder, 
which supports a double role for the director. On the one hand, it allows aligning 
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the interests of directors and the organization. On the other hand, it might cause 
the organization to take an excessive level of risk that increases directors’ profits 
(Platt & Platt, 2012). This excessive level of risk could lead to a higher financial 
vulnerability. Although this literature cannot be directly applied to the NPOs, it 
could be related to the presence of the founders on the board. In this way, founders 
might feel similar to owners because they set up the organization. However, as 
they cannot obtain profit from this position, they might be only interested in 
attempting to achieve that the NPO endures over years by avoiding financial risks, 
and, for that reason, we argue that 
H4. The presence of founders on the board has a negative effect on the NPO’s 
financial vulnerability. 
 
2.2. Board Experience and Education 
 
Directors provide the board with their personal background, that is, their human 
and social capital. Board capital might have a positive impact both in the strategic 
and the monitoring roles of the board (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In particular, 
directors’ skills, previous experience and expertise could enhance the quality of 
their advice (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Gales & Kesner, 1994; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003), and specific expertise and experience on certain financial situations may 
improve its ability to monitor the managerial team in such circumstances 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). More specifically, the 
financial health of NPOs might benefit more from directors with experience in the 
decision-making process, and from directors with experience in economic fields, 
such as banking and finance, or the specific subsector in which the NPO operates 
(Harris, 2014; Platt & Platt, 2012; Ritchie & Eastwood, 2006). Accordingly, we 
present the following hypothesis 
H5. Boards with a higher proportion of directors with experience in decision-making 
positions, in finance, or in the specific subsector of the organization are negatively 
related to the NPO’s financial vulnerability. 
 
As in the previous case, the directors’ formal educational background might impact 
the effectiveness of the board (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Having specific knowledge 
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on economics or a field related to the functioning of the NPOs, directors possess 
additional resources that might allow them to carry out their roles (i.e., monitoring 
managers and contributing to the financial strategy of the NPO) in a better way. 
Therefore, higher levels of formal education imply a deeper ability to process and 
apply information and to address complex environments (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Ritchie & Eastwood, 2006; Schroder, Driver & Steufert, 1967; Wally & Baum, 
1994), which may also improve the directors’ quality of tasks. Therefore, we 
expect that 
H6. Boards with a higher proportion of directors with specific or higher knowledge 
are negatively related to the NPO’s financial vulnerability. 
 
 
3. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1. Sample  
 
In this chapter, we study a particular field of the nonprofit sector: International 
Cooperation for Development. The organizations in our sample, namely, NGDOs, 
work in international cooperation and humanitarian aid in less developed 
countries. We also focus our study on a single country, Spain, where NGDOs have 
suffered from the reductions in both public subsidies (Official Development Aid 
[ODA]) and private donations (Fundación Lealtad, 2013). Actually, our sample is 
composed of NGDOs that belong to the Spanish Platform of NGDOs (CONGDE) in 
2011. Among them, we have only included those that had their board composition 
and annual accounting and financial information from 2011 to 2013 available. 
Based on these criteria, our final sample is composed of 65 Spanish NGDOs and 
806 board members, 10 of which serve on two organizations in the sample 
simultaneously. 
 
The data were manually collected. The financial variables are calculated by using 
the NGDOs’ financial statements, which are publicly available on their websites or 
in their annual reports. Information related to revenue was obtained from the 
annual reports, which were elaborated by CONGDE. The data regarding the board 
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members’ curricula vitae was obtained from the website of each organization, and 
finalized using information found by web search engines. Finally, the age of the 
NGDO was obtained from the website of each entity. 
 
3.2. Variables 
 
The main milestone in the definition of variables is how to measure the one we 
want to explain, in this case, the financial vulnerability. It has been scarcely studied 
in the nonprofit sector in comparison with the broad literature related to 
bankruptcy and financial distress of for-profit companies (Andres-Alonso, Garcia-
Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2015). Although this issue needs deeper progress 
(Gordon, Fischer, Greenlee & Keating, 2013), since the seminal study of Tuckman 
and Chang (1991) conducted more than two decades ago, its importance in the 
nonprofit literature has continuously increased. In this way, the most predominant 
traditional concepts are “significant reduction in net assets” (e.g., Andres-Alonso et 
al., 2015; Keating et al., 2005; Trussel, 2002; Trussel & Greenlee, 2004), “reduction 
in program expenses” (Andres-Alonso et al., 2015; Greenlee & Trussel, 2000; 
Keating et al., 2005), “reduction in revenues” (Keating et al., 2005), or “insolvency” 
(Keating et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2013). It is important to highlight that while in 
the for-profit scope it was possible to study the bankruptcy since the very 
beginning and, afterwards, the financial distress, nonprofit literature had to start 
by analyzing the financial difficulties of NPOs (financial vulnerability) directly, due 
to the great difficulty in measuring inactive and disappeared entities (Hager, 
2001). All of these variables have been operationalized in a large range of different 
ways, but the most recent literature bets on a multidimensional approach (Andres-
Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2016; Bowman, 2011). Specifically, 
we follow Andres-Alonso et al. (2016), who has made one of the most recent 
contributions, and we consider the following three dimensions: a reduction in net 
assets of at least 20% from 2011 to 2013 (VARNA); a value lower than 1.5 in the 
ratio of total assets divided by total debt (TATD); and, a value lower than 1.5 in the 
ratio of current assets divided by short-term debt (CASD).24 We created a dummy 
                                               
24 The value 1.5 has been chosen because it is included by the Spanish Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AECID) during the accreditation process of NGDOs. 
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variable for each of these dimensions that take the value “1” if the NGDO fulfills the 
criterion (i.e., it is in a vulnerable position), otherwise it is “0”. Then, for each 
organization we add the values of the previous three variables, obtaining a value 
between 0 and 3 (ordered from least to most financial vulnerability). Finally, we 
group the above results into two: "not financially vulnerable organizations" 
(values "0" and "1") and "financially vulnerable organizations" (values "2" and 
"3"). 
 
To measure the board structure, we consider the most traditional variables in 
these studies, such as the board size and independence (BOARDSIZE and INSIDER, 
respectively), the duality CEO/chairman of the board (DUALITY), and the presence 
of founders in the board (FOUNDER). We quantify the directors’ experience by 
measuring the number of executives and members of other boards both in 
companies and NPOs (EXEC_COMP, EXEC_NPO, BOARD_COMP, and BOARD_NPO). 
We presume that all of them are usually involved in complex decision-making 
processes. In the same way, we also study the types of experience that may be 
relevant to prevent and address financial distress situations. Specifically, we 
calculate the number of directors who work in the field of banking, insurance or 
finance (BANKING), and those with professional experience (not volunteer) in 
international cooperation (COOP). In relation to educational background, we 
include the number of directors with higher studies in economics and business 
(ECO), and the directors with specific studies on international cooperation or 
management of NPOs (NPOSTUDY). We also consider the mean of the directors’ 
academic level (EDUCGRADE). To calculate this variable, we first assess the level of 
each director’s educational background between 0 and 3 (“3” if PhD, “2” if Master, 
“1” if Bachelor, and “0” otherwise), and afterwards we calculate the mean of the 
board.  
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Table 4.1. Variables 
Name Definition 
Dependent variables 
VARNA Dummy variable that takes “1” if the NGDO has reduced its net assets at 
least 20% during the 2011-2013 period, and “0” otherwise 
TATD Dummy variable that takes “1” if the value of the ratio Total Assets / Total 
Debt in 2013 is lower than 1.5 and “0” otherwise 
CASD Dummy variable that takes “1” if the value of the ratio Current Assets / 
Short-term Debt in 2013 is lower than 1.5 and “0” otherwise 
FINVULN Dummy variable that takes “1” if the sum of the three previous ones 
(VARNA, TATD and CASD) is two or three, and “0” otherwise 
Independent variables (all of them measured in 2011) 
BOARDSIZE Size of the board, measured by the number of members 
DUALITY Dummy variable that takes “1” if the chairman of the board is also the 
CEO of the NGDO and “0” otherwise 
INSIDER Percentage of members that work in the same NGDO 
FOUNDER Percentage of members that are founders of the NGDO 
EXEC_COMP Percentage of members with experience as managers of companies 
EXEC_NPO Percentage of members with experience as managers of NPOs 
BOARD_COMP Percentage of members with experience in board of companies 
BOARD_NPO Percentage of members with experience in boards of other NPOs 
BANKING Percentage of members with professional experience in banking, 
insurance or finance 
COOP Percentage of members with professional experience in a NGDO 
ECO Percentage of members with higher education in economics or business 
NPOSTUDY Percentage of members with specific studies related to NPOs 
EDUCGRADE Mean of members’ educational level (PhD=3; Master=2; Bachelor=1) 
Control variables (all of them measured in 2011) 
NGDOSIZE Total assets of the NGDO (in euros) 
REVCON Revenue concentration (Herfindahl Index based on seven sources of 
revenues) 
AGE Age of the NGDO (in years) 
PUBLIC Percentage of public funding 
 
Finally, we introduce four control variables that are usually considered to be 
predictors of financial vulnerability: organizational size (NGDOSIZE), measured as 
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total assets; revenue concentration (REVCON), which me measure with a 
Herfindahl Index that includes seven sources of revenues25 (i.e., “1” being the most 
concentrate and “1/7” the most diversified); age of the organization (AGE), as 
years of activity; and the proportion of public funding (PUBLIC). According to 
previous literature, organizational size, public funding and age have negative 
effects on financial vulnerability (Kingma, 1993; Tevel, Katz & Brock, 2015; 
Trussel, 2002; Yan, Denison & Butler, 2009) while a higher revenue concentration 
would involve higher vulnerability (Tuckman & Chang, 1991). See Table 4.1 for a 
summary of all these variables. 
 
3.3. Methodology and Model 
 
In this study, we classify NGDOs as financially vulnerable or not, grouping them 
into two categories. We first compare the board composition of both groups by 
using the Mann-Whitney test (instead of the t-test, due to the sample size), and 
afterwards, we estimate a logistic regression, in which FINVULN is the 
dichotomous dependent variable. As can be seen in the model, we use it to test our 
hypotheses, and we analyze the board composition two years prior (in 2011) to 
the organization being classified as financially vulnerable or not (in 2013): 
 
Financial Vulnerabilityit = 0 + 1*Board sizeit-2 + 2*Dualityit-2 + 3*Independenceit-
2 + 4*Founderit-2 + 5*Experienceit-2 + 6*Educational backgroundit-2 + 7 *Control 
variablesit-2 + εit-2, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 International public funds, national public funds, regional and local public funds, periodic and 
child sponsorship, one-time donations, contributions from other private organizations, and 
revenues from sales and services. 
                                                                    The Role of Boards in the Financial Vulnerability of NPOs 
 109 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
 
As we have previously said, the data we use in this chapter has been manually 
collected because there are no standardized databases available for this sector. 
Hence, we consider the descriptive results to be an advance in the knowledge of 
the sector since we not only provide a description of the financial structure of the 
Spanish NGDOs but also an in-depth description of the board composition in terms 
of background and experience26. 
 
We see in Table 4.2 that the effects of the economic crisis persisted in this sector 
during the period of 2011 to 2013. Although the mean of the net assets variation 
presents an increase of 110%, this figure is somehow misleading because the 
median shows a decrease of 27% and, in global terms, 36 of the 65 NGDOs (i.e., 
55% as it can be seen in Table 4.2 as the mean of VARNA) reduced their net assets 
by at least 20%. Regarding the NGDOs’ capital structure, the average proportion of 
total assets to total debt is 16.86. This value reflects a more promising situation 
than the previous dimension, although it hides high data dispersion because 26 
organizations (i.e., 40% as it shows the mean of TATD in Table 4.2) have a 
proportion of total assets to total debt lower than 1.5. Finally, 24 of the 65 NGDOs 
(i.e., 37% as we observe in Table 4.2 as the mean of CASD) have a ratio of current 
assets to short-term debt lower than 1.5. This ratio shows a mean value of 15.37 
(or a median of 2.64), which, as in the case of the total assets and debt, reveals an 
overall satisfactory situation. When we consider the three dummies related to 
financial vulnerability jointly, as we have explained in Table 4.1, we find 25 NGDOs 
(i.e., 38%) classified as financially vulnerable (i.e., 12 organizations are highly 
vulnerable as they have problems in all three dimensions, and 13 are only 
vulnerable as they have problems in two of them), and 40 NGDOs (i.e., 62%) that 
are not vulnerable (i.e., 24 are a little vulnerable as they have problems in one 
variable, and 16 are healthy as they do not present any financial difficulties 
according to the dimensions we have defined). 
                                               
26 A more exhaustive analysis can be found in García-Rodríguez and Romero-Merino (2014). 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Financial vulnerability variables 
Variation of Net 
Assets 
110.30% -27.06% -111.18% 6,356.57% 810.35% 
Total Assets / 
Total Debt 
16.86 3.32 0.23 137.60 30.32 
Current Assets / 
Short-term Debt 
15.37 2.64 0.18 121.24 26.84 
VARNA 0.55 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
TATD 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
CASD 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
FINVULN 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Board composition     
BOARDSIZE 12.40 10.00 4 56 9.00 
DUALITY 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.29 
INSIDER 6.59 0.00 0.00 40.00 9.63 
FOUNDER 7.67 0.00 0.00 75.00 13.72 
EXEC_COMP 17.44 5.26 0.00 100.00 23.61 
EXEC_NPO 12.62 11.11 0.00 50.00 11.48 
BOARD_COMP 11.95 0.00 0.00 91.07 19.97 
BOARD_NPO 28.80 27.27 0.00 81.82 21.62 
BANKING 8.98 0.00 13.81 0.00 63.63 
COOP 13.58 9.09 0.00 100.00 17.88 
ECO 20.63 14.29 0.00 100.00 22.08 
NPOSTUDY 7.03 0.00 0.00 42.86 11.01 
EDUCGRADE 1.33 1.32 0.30 2.11 0.38 
Control variables 
NGDOSIZE 23,713,061 6,108,148 14,782 719,768,000 89,122,123 
REVCON 0.49 0.42 0.25 1.00 0.21 
AGE 29.45 24.00 12 147 21.25 
PUBLIC 54.28 62.37 0.00 100.00 33.77 
 
Regarding the board of the NGDOs in this sample, the average size is 12 members 
(i.e., one director less than in Andrés-Alonso et al., 2006), and it has a low 
proportion of insiders (7%, which is even lower than the 8% shown in Andrés-
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Alonso et al. [2006]). The CEO of 6 NGDOs (9% of the sample) is also their 
chairman, and donors represent 8% of the board (in fact, there is at least one 
founder in each of the 26 organizations, which is 40% of the sample). According to 
our data, 2 out of the 12 directors (17%) have experience as top executives in 
companies and one or two directors (13%) as executives in NPOs. Only 12% (i.e., 
one or two people) of the board members have experience as a director on 
companies’ boards, while 29% (i.e., three or four directors) of them also 
participate in boards of other NPOs. In this sample, one (9%) of the directors of the 
average board has worked in banking, assurance or finance and another one or 
two (14%) in international cooperation (this figure includes the 7% of insiders). 
Regarding their educational background, only 7% of board members have specific 
studies on international cooperation or NPOs, and one out of every five (21%) 
have studied business or economics. The educational level is 1.3, which implies 
that, on average, all members have at least a bachelor’s degree. 
 
Finally, the mean value of the assets of the NGDOs that compose our sample is 
almost 24 million euros, although variability is quite high. In this way, 
organizations’ size varies from less than 15,000 euros to more than 700 million 
euros. The mean number of years for NGDOs is 29 years. This value indicates the 
maturity that this subsector is achieving in Spain, where it began its development 
in the 1980s. Revenue concentration is 0.49, showing an average high 
diversification of sources. Another signal of this average diversified structure of 
revenue is the balance between public and private funding (54% and 46%, 
respectively), although there exist some extreme cases (i.e., NGDOs without public 
or private revenue). 
 
After this first descriptive analysis and following other studies (Chancharat et al., 
2012; De Maere et al., 2014; Lajili & Zéghal, 2010; Lee & Yeh, 2004; Platt & Platt, 
2012), we undertake a mean test of the previous variables, comparing the board 
composition of the financially vulnerable NGDOs with respect to the healthy ones. 
Because of the reduced size of our sample, we use the non-parametric test of 
Mann-Whitney (25 vulnerable organizations vs 40 non-vulnerable ones). As we 
can see in Table 4.3, neither the variables related to the board composition of 
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neither NGDOs, nor the control ones show significant differences between 
vulnerable and healthy organizations. 
 
Table 4.3. Comparison between Vulnerable and No Vulnerable NGDOs and Mann 
Whitney Test 
 Vulnerable NGDOs  
(n=25) 
No vulnerable NGDOs 
(n=40) 
 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Significance 
Dependent variables 
VARNA 0.56 1.00 0.55 1.00  
TATD 0.96 1.00 0.08 0.00 *** 
CASD 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.00 *** 
FINVULN 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Independent variables 
BOARDSIZE 12.40 10.00 12.40 9.00 - 
DUALITY 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.00 - 
INSIDER 6.79 0.00 6.26 0.00 - 
FOUNDER 7.32 0.00 7.88 0.00 - 
EXEC_COMP 14.81 5.26 19.09 4.55 - 
EXEC_NPO 12.00 9.09 13.00 12.92 - 
BOARD_COMP 9.98 0.00 13.19 2.94 - 
BOARD_NPO 27.93 28.57 29.33 24.50 - 
BANKING 7.47 0.00 9.92 3.85 - 
COOP 13.01 7.69 13.93 12.10 - 
ECO 17.61 12.50 22.52 17.14 - 
NPOSTUDY 5.17 0.00 8.19 0.00 - 
EDUCGRADE 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.29 - 
Control variables 
NGDOSIZE 11,294,835 5,748,740 31,474,453 6,364,165 - 
REVCON 0.46 0.35 0.52 0.44 - 
AGE 26.36 22.00 31.38 25.00 - 
PUBLIC 57.24 62.37 52.10 57.10 - 
*, **, ***: significant difference with a level of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
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4.2. Explanatory Results 
 
Despite the fact that the results we obtained in the previous test are not very 
hopeful, we conduct a logit analysis to determine if the variables related to the 
board composition influence the NGDOs’ financial vulnerability (i.e., dummy 
FINVULN). This relationship contains less endogeneity problems than the 
traditional relationship between the board composition and organizational 
efficiency. As Andreoni and Payne (2011) state, donors tend to perceive only the 
"general welfare" of the organization, while its financial situation is more difficult 
to determine. The same argument can be used for directors, who may choose the 
entity they provide service for reasons of visibility, reputation or efficiency, but 
doubtfully for the financial health of the organization. The potential 
multicollinearity problems and the intuitive relationship between the dependent 
variable and each of the explanatory ones can be observed in the matrix of 
bivariate Pearson correlations in Table 4.4.  
 
As we can see in Table 4.4, it is noteworthy the lack of significant correlation 
between the variable of financial vulnerability (FINVULN) and those related to the 
board composition, which corroborates the results of the Mann-Whitney test that 
we obtained in the previous section. We also observe some high values between 
independent variables, which could constitute problems of multicolinearity if we 
would want to estimate our global model as a whole. In light of this, we separate 
the variables into groups, creating several partial models. 
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The results of the different logit regressions are presented in Table 4.5. The first 
column includes the most traditional variables studied in this relationship, such as 
board size, duality, independence and the proportion of founders (BOARDSIZE, 
DUALITY, INSIDER, and FOUNDER). The experience variables have been tested in 
two different models (second and third columns in Table 4.5) due to 
multicolinearity problems. On the one hand, the second model (Column 2 in Table 
4.5) includes experience as executives of companies and NPOs (EXEC_COMP and 
EXEC_NPO), as well as participation in boards of other NPOs (BOARD_NPO). On the 
other hand, the third model (Column 3 in Table 4.5) analyzes the experience in 
banking and finance (BANKING) and international cooperation (COOP). Finally, we 
test a fourth model (Column 4 in Table 4.5) focused on educational background, 
including the knowledge in economics and finance (ECO), the specifics of the 
industry (NPOSTUDY), and the educational grade of the board (EDUCGRADE). In 
all five models, the dependent variable is FINVULN, that, as we have already 
explained, takes “1” when the organizations are financially vulnerable and “0” 
otherwise, and we include the four control variables although, in this case, size and 
age are introduced by the value of the natural logarithm of the NGDOSIZE and AGE 
variables (LNSIZE and LNAGE, respectively).  
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Table 4.5. Estimations of Logit Analysis. Dependent Variable: FINVULN 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff. (St. E.) Coeff. (St. E.) Coeff. (St. E.) Coeff. (St. E.) 
BOARDSIZE -0.003 (0.035)    
DUALITY -1.381 (1.297)    
INSIDER 1.889 (3.427)    
FOUNDER -0.966 (2.486)    
EXEC_COMP  -0.603 (1.367)   
EXEC_NPO  -0.702 (2.559)   
BOARD_NPO  -0.608 (1.466)   
BANKING   -1.693 (2.306)  
COOP   -0.366 (1.616)  
ECO    -1.964 (1.725) 
NPOSTUDY    -1.913 (3.086) 
EDUCGRADE    0.631 (0.851) 
LNSIZE -0.047 (0.192) -0.046 (0.189) -0.052 (0.185) -0.049 (0.188) 
REVCON -1.805 (1.678) -1.563 (1.802) -1.822 (1.705) -1.558 (1.782) 
LNAGE -0.418 (0.692) -0.458 (0.686) -0.369 (0.651) -0.528 (0.710) 
PUBLIC 0.818 (1.012) 0.799 (1.009) 0.761 (1.021) 0.917 (1.037) 
Constant 2.274 (3.361) 2.566 (3.245) 2.346 (3.188) 2.095 (3.370) 
Cox & Snell R2 0.069 0.054 0.056 0.080 
Nagelkerke R2 0.092 0.073 0.076 0.107 
Percentage of global 
correct predictions  
59.3% 64.4% 64.4% 59.3% 
*, **, ***: significant coefficient with a level of confidence of 90%, 95% and 99% respectively 
 
As we can see in Table 4.5, there are no significant variables in any of the models 
we consider. These results support the previously obtained results in the Mann-
Whitney test and the correlation matrix, confirming that there is no relationship 
between the board composition and financial vulnerability of Spanish NGDOs. In 
this way, neither the board size, independence, or duality, as well as directors’ 
educational background and experience show significance in our analysis to 
explain the financial vulnerability of these NPOs. Therefore, these results support 
our hypotheses 1 and 3 (no effect of the board size and duality) and reject the 
remainders (impact of the board independence, founders and the directors’ 
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experience and education). It is also remarkable that none of the control variables 
are significant in every model we have tested. Previous literature supports that a 
higher size, age, revenue diversification and public funding prevent financial 
vulnerability (Tevel et al., 2015; Trussel, 2002; Tuckman & Chang, 1991), although 
there exist differences depending on the subsector (Hager, 2001). According to our 
results, these variables do not seem to have any explanatory power to predict 
vulnerability of NGDOs (Andres-Alonso et al., 2015). Finally, we also observe low 
values of R2, which confirms the limited predictive power of board composition 
and control variables. 
 
To reinforce these results, we ran the same models, but considered as dependent 
variables each of the individual dummies of financial vulnerability (VARNA, TATD 
and CASD). 
 
As we can observe in Table 4.6, none of the variables of the board shows 
significance in any of the models, and among the control variables, only PUBLIC is 
positively related with VARNA. These results confirm those obtained when we 
consider the multidimensional dependent variable. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
In this study, we have analyzed the relationship between the board of NPOs and 
the organization’s financial vulnerability. Although for-profit literature justifies 
this relationship, both theoretically and empirically, our results indicate that there 
is no relationship between the board composition and the financial problems in 
the nonprofit sector. In this way, we have not found significant differences 
between the boards of financially vulnerable and healthy NPOs. Likewise, we 
obtained a lack of significant explanatory power of board variables on the 
probability of classifying an organization as financially vulnerable. 
 
When reviewing the main results of the research, most of the studies focus on 
giving reasons for the ones that are statistically significant. However, here the most 
significant result is just the absence of significant results. But, what does this lack 
of results really mean? The first thought that comes to our mind is that the board is 
not effectively accomplishing either its monitoring role (i.e., when setting and 
approving an annual budget) or its advising one (i.e., because directors are not 
giving advice to preserve the organizations’ assets or, if they are, the managerial 
team is not listening to them). In sum, they are not fulfilling their mission to 
safeguard the NPO’s continued well running. Of course, as Mintzberg (1983) notes, 
the board has other roles (i.e., fundraising, co-opting resources, or building the 
firm’s reputation) which, in fact, can be especially important in the nonprofit 
sector where there are not stable shareholders, but punctual donors, who decide 
each year if it is worthy to go on donating and, if so, which entity deserves their 
donations. However, we are not assessing here if the board is not effective in 
carrying out those other roles, but we are focused on the financial monitoring role 
(or even the financial advising one).  
 
Many previous authors have noticed the lack of effectiveness of boards in 
monitoring nonprofit finance. In fact, there is a big gap between the prescriptive 
functions of the board (i.e., those that it should do) and the real ones (i.e., those 
that it actually does) (Ostrower & Stone, 2010; Zimmermann and Stevens, 2008), 
but we cannot forget that even though we all know that reality differs from 
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prescription when talking about nonprofit governance, the board goes on being 
responsible for the well-functioning of the organization. According to our results, it 
seems that financial monitoring is only being carried out in a formal aspect, in that 
the managers are in charge of planning, designing and monitoring the financial 
strategy. In this way, we could consider boards as a rubber stamp or CEO-
dominated governance mechanisms where the chief executive and other senior 
managers exercise the main power and directors play a largely symbolic role by 
simply rubber stamping decisions (Cornforth, 2001b). In this way, although boards 
seem to follow formal procedures in the financial control, actually they might not 
be using them in an active way (Parker, 2008).  
 
These outcomes derive from a single part of the nonprofit sector, that is, the 
Spanish organizations that work in the international cooperation and 
humanitarian aid. At least in this case, we find that either directors are not 
conscious of their responsibility to monitor the managerial team or that they may 
not have been able to develop their monitoring role effectively. This begs the 
question, why is this break between board and financial vulnerability in NPOs 
happening? 
 
On the one hand, directors may be unable to monitor managers because executives 
do not want to be controlled by the board. If the NPO’s managerial team is not 
interested in the board participating in the functioning of the organization, they 
can avoid it by not giving enough information in order to not allow directors to 
factually oversee their work. Alternatively, maybe directors might not be aware of 
their responsibility or, if they are, they might lack time, competence or motivation 
to effectively develop their monitoring role. The question is how to change this 
situation to let the NPO benefit from the directors’ support.  
 
Therefore, our results (or, in this case, the lack of them) ought to be a wakeup call 
for the NPOs’ directors and practitioners. First, executives should allow boards to 
take part in the decision-making of the NPO to benefit from their expertise. Second, 
directors should enroll in a nonprofit board only if they have time and are capable 
of playing their role. NPOs’ directors have to be mindful about their duties. When 
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they belong to too many boards, they may not have enough time for each 
organization (either for-profit or nonprofit); when they do not know the sector, 
they may not be able to understand the functioning of the organization; and when 
they lose their motivation, they may not be dedicating enough effort to achieve 
their goals. In any case, the NPO could reconsider their enrollment processes (i.e., 
to get those people who can offer what the NPO really needs) and re-evaluate how 
to motivate these directors without using monetary rewards. 
 
Nonetheless, our results only refer to a specific subsector of the nonprofit industry 
and in a single country. In fact, the main limitation of this study is the cross-
sectional character of the sample. The analysis comprises a single moment (and 
influenced by the crisis effect), country and subsector, so the results could not be 
generalized to the whole nonprofit sector. Additionally, we note the method we 
use to compile the data, as the level of detail (both quantity and quality) of the 
information greatly differs depending on the public importance of the director. As 
it is shown in the business sector, the level of complexity and sophistication of 
organizations influence the relationship between the board and financial problems 
(Darrat et al., 2016), so this result could not occur in other areas of the third sector. 
Consequently, one of the future lines of research we propose is to enlarge the 
sample to study by including more countries, years, or different nonprofit 
subsectors. Additionally, it could be interesting to complement the study of the 
board by analyzing the top executives using the same terms (i.e., knowledge and 
experience), attempting to determine who is assuming the financial planning of 
NPOs. As our results indicate that board members do not have an influence on the 
prevention of financial problems, another option is to study the effect that boards 
have in other fields, such as fundraising or the reputation of the organizations. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
The path walked throughout this doctoral thesis has allowed us to advance in the 
knowledge about the relationship between the board of trustees of nonprofit 
organizations (NPOs) and their financial vulnerability. During the different stages 
of this journey we have carried out an updated review of the literature on 
nonprofit governance and we have looked at the concept of financial vulnerability 
of these organizations. While it is true that the journey we have begun in this thesis 
is far from complete and that, in fact, there are many future lines of research that 
arise from the point where we are, it is not less true that we have done some 
progress that we will describe in the following lines. 
 
The main conclusion we draw from this doctoral thesis is the lack of any kind of 
relationship between the structure and composition of the board and the financial 
vulnerability of the NPOs. This result, expressed in the fourth chapter, contrasts 
with those obtained in the for-profit field, where prior literature has theoretically 
and empirically tested the influence of the board on the financial difficulties of the 
organization, considering both financial distress and bankruptcy. In the case of the 
nonprofit sector and, more specifically, the Non-Governmental Development 
Organizations (NGDOs), it seems that the usual practice is to have boards that are 
far from making financial decisions. They could be considered, at least in this 
aspect, like rubber stamps boards. That is, despite having a considerable de jure 
power (we should not forget that they are the ultimate legal responsible for the 
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organization), the boards of the NPOs, lack (or elude) de facto power. In this sense, 
it would be advisable that directors are aware of their real responsibility with the 
organization that they "govern" and are effectively involved in the decision-making 
in all areas of the NPO. Thus, as already indicated in the previous chapter, directors 
should only accept a position of this nature if they really have the knowledge, 
motivation and time to assume such responsibility. And, on the other hand, 
managers should search mechanisms to take advantage of the human and social 
capital provided by directors, allowing them to participate actively, both in the 
supervision of their work and in the design of the organizational strategy. 
Although it is true that, following the results obtained by prior literature, the board 
influences the efficiency of NPOs, by changing the central question of our research 
and focusing our study on analyzing the effect of the board on the financial 
vulnerability of the entity, we find an absence of relationship between the board 
composition and this purely financial aspect of the organization. It is important to 
note that this lack of effect between boards and financial vulnerability of NPOs is 
tested by following the recommendations of the most recent governance literature 
(Brown, 2005; Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & 
Jegers, 2012), and under an eclectic theoretical umbrella that combines arguments 
coming from different theories to explain the reality of the nonprofit sector. 
 
The use of this extended approach, with arguments derived from the main theories 
on governance, arises precisely from the theoretical revision made throughout the 
first chapter. Thus, the journey through the different approaches of governance 
literature has led us to conclude that none of these approaches, individually 
considered, can fully explain the performance of the list of roles and functions that 
have been assigned to the board. That is why it is necessary to combine the 
postulates of different theories to build a theoretical framework that contemplates 
the performance of the governance mechanisms in the different facets considered 
by the literature. More specifically, we have based our study of the fourth chapter 
fundamentally on the two most common theoretical approaches in the governance 
literature, that is, the agency theory and the resource dependency approach. Thus, 
we have analyzed the effectiveness of the board in terms of its performance as 
monitor and advisor of the management. On this basis, the board has been 
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characterized by its structure (size, independence, presence of founders and 
duality between the Chief Executive Officer [CEO] and the chairman of the board) 
and the directors’ human and social capital (experience as managers or directors 
of companies or NPOs, average educational level, specific experience and studies in 
the field in which the organization operates, and specific experience or studies in 
banking or finance) and we have analyzed its influence on the financial viability of 
the organization. However, as we have already indicated, we have not found any 
significant relationship between the board configuration and the financial 
vulnerability of the NPO. In some cases (e.g., board size), the use of opposite 
arguments coming from various theories has led us to hypothesize in terms of the 
lack of direct effect on financial vulnerability. Only on these occasions the absence 
of a significant relationship between board and vulnerability could be understood 
as the empirical evidence of our multi-theoretical approach. 
 
Besides the study of nonprofit governance and its effect on the financial health of 
NPOs, this doctoral thesis has reflected deeply on the concept of financial 
vulnerability of these organizations. As we have already mentioned in the previous 
chapters, this is a relatively recent topic in the third sector research, since the 
seminal study of this issue dates back to 1991. This explains why its degree of 
empirical and theoretical development is not very elevated. For this reason, this 
research has attempted to bring clarity to the state of the art of this topic in 
relation to both the definition of financial vulnerability itself and the predictors 
used to anticipate it. First, the measure of financial vulnerability itself had not been 
directly studied in the literature, and several measures had been used without any 
consensus on which of them was the most appropriate although, as shown in the 
third chapter, they differ from each other. In this chapter, we defended the use of a 
multidimensional model that allowed us to collect different aspects of the financial 
vulnerability. The operational dimension reflected the variation of net assets over 
a three-year period (which, given the non-distribution constraint of NPOs, is the 
difference between revenues and expenses in such period), while the leverage and 
liquidity dimensions allowed us to capture the ability of the organization to meet 
its total or short-term debt respectively. Thus, the first dimension included a 
dynamic aspect of the financial vulnerability, while the second and third analyzed a 
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static concept, taking into account the long and short-term. This model is the one 
we use in the analysis that has been carried out in the fourth chapter, although we 
had to adapt it following some particular circumstances, such as the criteria of the 
Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID) and the 
measures in which they have been made operative by the traditional literature. 
This multidimensional model of financial vulnerability allows the joint analysis of 
several particularities of this concept, since none of the dimensions considered in 
isolation can reflect all the complexity that it entails. This multidimensional 
assessment differentiates this study from others (Andres-Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez 
& Romero-Merino, 2015; Cordery, Sim & Baskerville, 2013; Keating, Fischer, 
Gordon & Greenlee, 2005) that introduce several variables of financial 
vulnerability but they do not use them simultaneously to form a single construct. 
In this way, the weakness in one of the three defined dimensions leads to a more or 
less serious problem depending on whether the NPO has a delicate position in the 
other two dimensions or not. However, despite the progress we have made in this 
regard, much remains to be done in this area, as it will be discussed in the final 
part of this chapter. 
 
Regarding the financial predictors that prior literature has used, as discussed in 
the second chapter, they present a confrontation depending on whether they are 
analyzed from a financial vulnerability perspective or from an organizational 
efficiency point of view. From this double perspective, the global effect of these 
predictors of the financial vulnerability becomes unclear and a tradeoff between 
their advantages and disadvantages turns out to be necessary. Our reasoning is in 
line with the most recent literature on nonprofit finance (Calabrese, 2012; Mitchell 
& Calabrese, 2016). This literature suggests the need to think carefully about those 
relationships that we assume that are valid and accepted when the empirical 
results are not conclusive. For this reason, it is necessary to bring arguments from 
other fields (in our case, the research on organizational efficiency) to analyze how 
some of the different expected effects could offset or void others. In our research, 
the most obvious example of all this is the operating margin of the NPO (difference 
between revenues and expenses). The literature on financial vulnerability argues 
that when the margin is high, it allows the NPO to use reserves in case of future 
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financial problems, and, therefore a high operating margin would be related to a 
better financial health. However, based on the literature on efficiency, a high 
margin could be considered excessive by donors since a large part of the available 
resources (mainly donations and public grants) are not allocated directly for the 
purpose for which they were conceded, that is, the fulfillment of the organization’s 
mission. In this way, the NPO would be classified as inefficient, and donors could 
interrupt their contributions to the organization, jeopardizing their financing and, 
ultimately, their financial survival. For all this, it is necessary to find a balance so 
that the surplus exists without being disproportionate. In short, this reflection on 
each of the traditional predictors (debt ratio, revenue concentration, operating 
margin, administrative cost ratio and size) could be useful to determine the 
appropriateness of including them in a global indicator, similar to that of Altman in 
the for-profit field, that allows to anticipate the situation of a NPO’s financial 
vulnerability. In this respect, our research has also revealed the need to consider 
the particularities of each subsector of the nonprofit field, since those models that 
predict financial vulnerability in a relatively acceptable way for the third sector as 
a whole are not useful to do so for the specific area of international cooperation 
and development. This is corroborated by the results obtained in the second 
chapter, as well as by the absence of significant coefficients of the control variables 
in the fourth chapter. This need for considering the peculiarities of the subsector is 
in line with the recommendations expressed by previous literature (Hager, 2001; 
Trussel, 2002; Trussel, Greenlee & Brady, 2002) and it insists on the highly diverse 
reality that we can find throughout the nonprofit sector. 
 
In addition to the foregoing, it is also noteworthy that our empirical analyses have 
been carried out in a context of financial crisis. This contrasts with the majority of 
studies related to the financial vulnerability of NPOs, conducted during times of 
economic expansion, which provides a different framework to this type of analysis. 
There is no doubt that the crisis has been an extremely delicate scenario for NPOs, 
as their financial survival has been threatened by the reduction of donations and 
public grants and the restrictions on banking credit. Likewise, the samples we 
analyze are composed by European organizations, specifically from Spain and the 
United Kingdom (UK). This fact means a contribution of a different context to a 
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literature traditionally dominated by empirical studies based on samples 
composed by NPOs from the United States (US). In this line, such literature often 
employs the Form 990 of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), while in our case we 
have used the audited financial statements of each organization. In sum, this 
different context (subsector, time period, country, source of information) may help 
to explain the differences between our analyses of financial vulnerability and 
previous studies. 
 
Finally, this doctoral thesis also provides important recommendations for 
practitioners in the nonprofit sector. As we have already pointed out, NPOs should 
modify their internal functioning, so as to favor both the enrollment of directors 
with high human and social capital as well as their involvement in the strategic 
decision-making of the organization, besides their role as supervisors of 
management decisions. In this sense, the low presence of directors with specific 
studies of international cooperation for development or management of NPOs 
(7.03% of our sample of the fourth chapter) is particularly noteworthy. In fact, 
such data should invite reflection on the enrollment policy to the boards of NPOs; 
even more when such studies have almost become a prerequisite for applying for a 
job in the subsector. But, likewise, managers also have to facilitate and encourage 
the participation of the board allowing and promoting their involvement in the 
decision-making of the NPO. In this way, the management team (and the NPO) 
would benefit from this set of knowledge and experiences that the board as a 
whole possesses. Moreover, the application of the multidimensional model of 
financial vulnerability could help practitioners to evaluate the financial situation of 
the organization as a whole, not looking at a specific measure, but considering the 
three proposed variables simultaneously. 
 
All these results and conclusions have turned into a motivation to continue the 
research in different lines, as we will explain at the end of this chapter. And also, 
they have turned into the need to overcome some of the limitations of our 
analyses, as we will describe in the following paragraphs. 
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First, there are certain aspects that affect all the analyses conducted throughout 
the doctoral thesis. In this way, we are aware of the small size of the samples we 
use, especially compared to previous studies of financial vulnerability of US NPOs. 
This is justified by the absence of databases (such as that provided by the IRS in 
the US studies), so the information had to be gathered manually. At the same time, 
this same restriction causes that we have not been able to use specific panel data 
methodologies, since the number of years of which we have been able to obtain 
complete information has been limited, without forgetting that, in addition, the 
calculation of financial vulnerability (in particular, the operational dimension, the 
variation of net assets) requires the use of data from several periods. Likewise, in 
this research we have only analyzed one subsector of the whole nonprofit field, the 
one corresponding to international cooperation for development. As we have 
shown throughout this doctoral thesis, this subsector has a very particular 
idiosyncrasy, so the conclusions obtained might not be extrapolated to the third 
sector as a whole. Moreover, the analyses are conducted in years in which NPOs 
have suffered the consequences of the crisis, so the results we obtain might only be 
explained by this exceptional shock and, therefore, they are not transferable to 
periods of greater economic stability. 
 
Besides this limitation regarding the empirical analysis of the arguments 
presented in chapters two to four, there are also some particular limitations in 
relation to the fourth chapter. Thus, with regard to the financial vulnerability, the 
appropriateness of the proposed multidimensional model has not been empirically 
tested, so we have not been able to verify the usefulness we have theoretically 
explained. Moreover, the source of information we use to estimate the human and 
social capital of directors (the website of each NGDO and generic web search 
engines) causes that we have not achieved the same level of detail in the biography 
of each director, because it depends on both the level of public relevance and the 
transparency of the NPO in this regard. 
 
To conclude this chapter and the doctoral thesis, we present the main lines of 
research that have been opened in the light of the results obtained throughout the 
previous chapters. The first of them is related to the empirical analysis of the 
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explanatory power of the multidimensional model we propose to define financial 
vulnerability in the third chapter. In this sense, it would be interesting to confirm 
whether NPOs that have ceased activity due to financial reasons would have been 
classified as vulnerable when applying our multidimensional model. As prior 
literature notes (Hager, 2001), the difficulty to do this is that such cessation is not 
usually directly transferred to the corresponding legal registers. Along with this 
fact, it is important to note that not all NPOs cease activity due to economic and 
financial reasons. Therefore, it is hard to find a sample of organizations that meet 
the necessary requirements to test our model. Also in relation to the vulnerability, 
an index that allow to predict the financial vulnerability of NPOs remains to be 
developed. This would be a particularly useful tool for practitioners of the 
nonprofit sector, as it would allow them to anticipate situations of financial 
problems. However, before carrying out this research, it must be ascertained that 
the dependent variable, that is, the financial vulnerability itself, is correctly 
measured and it is an adequate proxy, as we have indicated previously. 
 
Another line of research to tackle in the future is to consider additional theoretical 
perspectives of nonprofit governance, such as stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman & Reed, 1983) or stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 
1997), so as to take into account other relationships between stakeholders of the 
organization and other types of conflicts in their relations. Likewise, aspects from 
cognitive approaches such as the group decision-making (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) 
or the cognitive approach of agency theory (Charreaux, 2005, 2008; Wirtz, 2011) 
could be included to take into account the proactivity of the directors, the mental 
schema of each of them and the "cognitive conflicts" that occur in the decision-
making processes when there are individuals with diverse cognitive schemas. In 
this context, it would make sense to study the diversity of the board, both in 
observable (e.g., race, gender) and unobservable (e.g., education, experience) 
terms. In fact, in the for-profit sector, a greater presence of women (related to 
gender diversity) has been associated with lower levels of risk and higher financial 
performance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Chen, Ni & Tong, 2016; Faccio, 
Marchica & Mura, 2016; Reguera-Alvarado, Fuentes & Laffarga, in press). 
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As a result of the use of other theoretical approaches of nonprofit governance, we 
could analyze the roles that the board assumes and which is the most suitable 
composition for the effective development of each of them. As mentioned above, it 
is noteworthy that, while previous literature finds a significant effect of the board 
on the organizational efficiency, we do not obtain any impact on the financial 
vulnerability of the NGDOs. Therefore, it would be interesting to simultaneously 
analyze the effect of the board on efficiency (allocative, administrative and 
fundraising), financial performance, financial vulnerability and other areas in 
which the literature is emerging in this third sector, such as reputation and 
transparency. In this way, we could study whether the correct performance of each 
function needs a different board composition, or whether the same board 
configuration allows an efficient execution of all these functions. Connected to this 
line of research, we could also include in the analysis, as already discussed in the 
fourth chapter, the characteristics of the NPO’s managerial team. It would be 
interesting to analyze managers in the same terms as those we have used for the 
board. In this way, we could study whether the managers are influencing on the 
probability of classifying the NPO as financially vulnerable, as well as their effect 
on other areas of the organization. 
 
Finally, an additional line of research is to enlarge the analyzed samples, which 
would possibly help to overcome most of the limitations noted above. Such 
extension could be developed in several directions: increasing the number of 
organizations, the number of years, the subsectors analyzed or even the countries 
to which the NPOs belong. A greater number of organizations would involve 
greater variability in data and, therefore, greater reliability of the results. Likewise, 
this would allow us to use a contingent approach (Ostrower & Stone, 2010), 
considering that the specific characteristics of each NPO result in different needs 
and, therefore, in a different configuration of the governance mechanisms. A 
greater number of periods would allow us the opportunity to use panel data 
methodologies that would give greater robustness to the results. A greater number 
of subsectors would allow us to extrapolate the results to the nonprofit scope as a 
whole, considering partial analyses that highlight the possible differences between 
subsectors. Finally, a comparative international study would mean a particularly 
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relevant contribution in this sector given the scarcity of studies that use this type 
of samples. Notwithstanding, collaboration between researchers from different 
countries is required for conducting this type of research, given the great 
differences between the regulations of each country. In this sense, a preliminary 
study has been performed (Garcia-Rodriguez & Jegers, 2016). It analyzes the 
capital structure of NPOs from Belgium, Spain and the UK, showing significant 
differences depending on the nationality of the organization. These international 
samples would allow to introduce the effect of institutional, macroeconomic and 
cultural variables, as it has been done in the for-profit field (e.g., Laitinen & Suvas, 
2016; Li & Harrison, 2008; Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami & Kwok, 2012). 
 
In short, throughout this doctoral thesis we have attempted to respond to a 
problem of the current reality of the third sector: the financial difficulties that 
NPOs have experienced during the recent crisis. To this end, we have analyzed in 
detail the concept of financial vulnerability and we have incorporated into the 
literature the study of the effect that the board composition could have on such 
vulnerability, which is not significant in our study. In this way, as we have noted 
since the introduction of this thesis, we have changed the focus of the problem, 
going from analyzing the effect on the traditional organizational efficiency to the 
extreme situation of financial vulnerability. However, the financial survival of the 
NPO should only be considered as a necessary condition for the continuity of the 
functioning of the organization. It must be emphasized that having a sound 
financial structure is not sufficient to ensure the survival of the NPO over time. 
This is because the society as a whole will demand from the organization the 
proper use of its funds, as they have obtained them mainly from private donations 
and public grants. Thus, efficiency and financial vulnerability should be considered 
as related and even complementary concepts, and therefore a balance between 
them is necessary so that the NPO continue to fulfill its mission over the years. 
 
Nevertheless, although we have been able to shed some light to some stages of the 
route we have travelled, many of them still remain in darkness and will become, 
very possibly, deviations that we will take in the future. These deviations would 
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allow us to continue clearing up some of the many questions about the third sector 
that still need to be addressed. 
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CONCLUSIONES GENERALES 
 
El camino recorrido a través de esta tesis doctoral nos ha permitido avanzar en el 
conocimiento sobre la relación que existe entre el consejo (board of trustees en 
términos anglosajones) de las entidades no lucrativas (ENLs) y su vulnerabilidad 
financiera. En las distintas etapas de esta travesía hemos realizado una revisión 
actualizada de la literatura de gobierno en las ENLs y hemos profundizado en la 
delimitación del concepto de vulnerabilidad financiera de estas organizaciones. Si 
bien es cierto que el viaje que hemos iniciado en esta tesis está lejos de finalizar y 
que, de hecho, muchas son las líneas de investigación futuras que se plantean a 
partir del punto en el que nos encontramos, no es menos cierto que hemos 
realizado algunos avances que también procederemos a describir en las líneas que 
se relatan a continuación. 
 
La principal conclusión que extraemos en esta tesis doctoral es la inexistencia de 
cualquier tipo de relación entre la estructura y composición del consejo y la 
vulnerabilidad financiera de las ENLs. Este resultado, plasmado en el capítulo 
cuarto, contrasta con los obtenidos en el ámbito empresarial, donde la literatura ha 
probado, teórica y empíricamente, la influencia del consejo sobre las dificultades 
financieras de la organización, considerando como tal tanto el financial distress 
como la quiebra. En el caso del sector no lucrativo y, más concretamente, en las 
Organizaciones No Gubernamentales para el Desarrollo (ONGDs), parece que la 
práctica habitual es contar con consejos alejados de la toma de decisiones de 
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carácter financiero que podrían ser considerados, al menos en este aspecto, como 
“consejos decorativos” (rubber stamps boards en términos anglosajones). Es decir, 
que a pesar de tener un considerable poder de iure (no debemos olvidar que son 
los responsables últimos de la organización), los consejos de las ENLs, carecen de 
(o eluden el) poder de facto. En este sentido, sería recomendable que los 
consejeros se hiciesen conscientes de su responsabilidad real para con la 
organización que “gobiernan” y se implicasen efectivamente en la toma de 
decisiones de todos los ámbitos de la ENL. Así, tal y como se indicaba ya en el 
anterior capítulo, los consejeros solo deberían aceptar un puesto de estas 
características si realmente contasen con los conocimientos, motivación y tiempo 
necesarios para asumir tal responsabilidad. Y, por otro lado, los directivos 
deberían buscar la manera de aprovechar el capital social aportado por los 
consejeros permitiendo su participación activa, tanto en la supervisión de su 
trabajo como en el diseño de la estrategia de la organización. Si bien es cierto que, 
siguiendo los resultados obtenidos en la literatura previa, el órgano de gobierno 
influye sobre la eficiencia de las ENLs, al cambiar la pregunta sobre la que gira la 
investigación y focalizar nuestro estudio en el estudio del efecto del consejo sobre 
la vulnerabilidad financiera de la entidad, hallamos una ausencia de relación entre 
la composición del consejo y este aspecto puramente financiero de la organización. 
Es importante apuntar que esta ausencia de efecto entre consejo y vulnerabilidad 
financiera de las ENLs se contrasta, siguiendo las recomendaciones de la literatura 
más reciente (Brown, 2005; Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010; Van Puyvelde, Caers, 
Du Bois & Jegers, 2012), bajo un paraguas teórico ecléctico que aúna argumentos 
procedentes de diferentes teorías para explicar la realidad del sector.  
 
La utilización de este enfoque ampliado, con argumentos extraídos de las 
principales teorías sobre gobierno, se deriva precisamente de la revisión teórica 
realizada a lo largo del primer capítulo. Así, el viaje realizado a través de los 
distintos enfoques de gobierno empleados por la literatura nos ha llevado a 
concluir que ninguno de esos enfoques, considerados de manera individual, logra 
explicar completamente el desarrollo del elenco de roles y funciones que se han 
venido asignado al consejo. De ahí la necesidad de aunar los postulados de las 
diferentes teorías para construir un marco teórico que contemple la actuación de 
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los mecanismos de gobierno en las distintas facetas consideradas por la literatura. 
De manera más específica, en el capítulo cuarto nos hemos basado 
fundamentalmente en los dos enfoques teóricos más habituales en la literatura de 
gobierno, esto es, la teoría de la agencia y el enfoque de dependencia de recursos. 
Así, hemos analizado la efectividad del consejo en función de su desempeño como 
supervisor y asesor de la dirección. En base a ello, se ha caracterizado al consejo a 
través de su estructura (tamaño, independencia, presencia de los fundadores o 
dualidad entre el Chief Executive Officer [CEO] y el presidente del consejo) y del 
capital humano y social de los consejeros (experiencia como directivos y como 
consejeros, tanto de empresas como de ENLs, nivel medio de estudios, experiencia 
y sus estudios específicos en el campo en el que actúa la organización, y 
experiencia y los estudios específicos en el campo económico-financiero) y se ha 
examinado su influencia sobre la viabilidad financiera de la organización. Sin 
embargo, como ya hemos indicado, no hemos encontrado ninguna relación 
significativa entre la configuración del consejo y la vulnerabilidad financiera de la 
ENL. En algún caso (como sucede con el tamaño del consejo), la utilización de 
argumentos contrapuestos de varias teorías nos ha conducido a plantear hipótesis 
en términos de ausencia de efecto directo sobre la vulnerabilidad financiera. Solo 
en estas ocasiones la inexistencia de relación entre consejo y vulnerabilidad podría 
entenderse como el contraste empírico de nuestro enfoque multiteórico. 
 
Junto al estudio del gobierno y su efecto sobre la salud financiera de las ENLs, esta 
tesis doctoral ha reflexionado profundamente sobre el concepto de vulnerabilidad 
financiera de estas entidades. Como ya hemos comentado en los capítulos 
anteriores, se trata de un tema relativamente reciente en la investigación del tercer 
sector, dado que el estudio seminal de esta materia data de 1991. Ello explica que 
su grado de desarrollo, empírico y teórico, no sea muy elevado, por lo que esta 
investigación ha tratado de aportar claridad al estado del arte de esta cuestión, en 
relación tanto con la definición de vulnerabilidad financiera en sí misma como con 
los predictores empleados para poder anticiparla. En primer lugar, la propia 
medida de vulnerabilidad financiera no había sido estudiada directamente por la 
literatura, habiéndose empleado varias medidas sin que existiera consenso alguno 
acerca de cuál era la más adecuada y pese a que, como se demuestra en el capítulo 
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tercero, presentan importantes diferencias entre ellas. En dicho capítulo, 
defendimos el uso de un modelo multidimensional que permitía recoger distintos 
aspectos de la vulnerabilidad financiera. La dimensión operativa recogía la 
variación de activos netos en un periodo de tres años (que, dada la restricción de 
no distribución de las ENLs, es la diferencia entre ingresos y gastos en tal periodo), 
mientras que las dimensiones de solvencia y de liquidez permitían captar la 
capacidad de la organización para hacer frente a sus deudas totales o a corto plazo 
respectivamente. Así, la primera dimensión recogía un aspecto dinámico de la 
vulnerabilidad financiera, mientras que la segunda y la tercera analizaban un 
concepto estático, teniendo en cuenta el largo y el corto plazo. Dicho modelo es el 
empleado en el análisis que se ha llevado a cabo en el capítulo cuarto, si bien, 
hemos tenido que adaptarlo siguiendo algunas circunstancias particulares, como 
son los criterios de la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el 
Desarrollo (AECID) y las formas en las que se han hecho operativas por la 
literatura tradicional. Este modelo multidimensional de valoración de 
vulnerabilidad financiera permite el análisis conjunto de varias particularidades 
del concepto, pues ninguna de las dimensiones consideradas aisladamente 
consigue reflejar toda la complejidad que este encierra. Y es precisamente esta 
valoración multidimensional la que diferencia este estudio de otros (Andres-
Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2015; Cordery, Sim & Baskerville, 
2013; Keating, Fischer, Gordon & Greenlee, 2005) que, aun introduciendo varias 
variables de vulnerabilidad financiera, no lo hacen de forma simultánea formando 
un único constructo. De este modo, el presentar debilidad en una dimensión 
conllevará un problema más o menos grave dependiendo de si la ENL cuenta o no 
con una posición delicada en las otras dos dimensiones. No obstante, pese a los 
avances realizados a este respecto, aún queda mucho por recorrer en este campo, 
tal y como detallaremos en la parte final de este capítulo. 
 
Con respecto a los predictores financieros que se han venido empleando en la 
literatura, tal y como hemos expuesto en el capítulo segundo, estos presentan una 
confrontación según se analicen desde una perspectiva de vulnerabilidad 
financiera o desde el punto de vista de la eficiencia de la ENL. Bajo esta doble 
perspectiva, el efecto global de las variables utilizadas para predecir la 
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vulnerabilidad se vuelve confuso y será necesario realizar un trade off entre las 
ventajas e inconvenientes de esos elementos utilizados como predictores. Nuestros 
razonamientos nos sitúan en consonancia con la literatura más reciente sobre 
finanzas de ENLs (Calabrese, 2012; Mitchell & Calabrese, 2016), planteando la 
necesidad de reflexionar sobre relaciones que se dan por válidas y aceptadas 
cuando, por el contrario, la realidad empírica no es concluyente. Por ello, es 
necesario traer argumentos provenientes de otras realidades (en nuestro caso el 
estudio de la eficiencia organizativa) para analizar cómo los distintos efectos 
esperados se pueden contrarrestar y anular entre ellos. En nuestra investigación, 
el ejemplo más claro de todo ello es el relativo al margen operativo de la entidad 
(diferencia entre ingresos y gastos). La literatura sobre vulnerabilidad financiera 
defiende que cuando este es elevado, permite a la ENL gozar de reservas a las que 
recurrir en caso de tener problemas financieros en el futuro, y, por lo tanto, un 
elevado margen operativo se relacionaría con una mejor salud financiera. Sin 
embargo, atendiendo a la literatura sobre eficiencia, tal margen puede ser 
considerado como excesivo por parte de los donantes dado que gran parte de los 
recursos disponibles (mayoritariamente donaciones y subvenciones públicas) no 
son destinados directamente al fin para el cual fueron otorgados, esto es, cumplir 
la misión de la organización. De esta manera, la ENL sería calificada como poco 
eficiente, y los donantes podrían suspender sus contribuciones a la organización 
poniendo en peligro su financiación y, en definitiva, su supervivencia financiera. 
Por todo ello, es necesario encontrar un equilibrio para que, existiendo un 
superávit, este no sea desproporcionado. En definitiva, esta reflexión sobre cada 
uno de los predictores tradicionales (ratio de endeudamiento, concentración de 
ingresos, margen operativo, ratio de costes administrativos y tamaño) puede ser 
de utilidad para, en una siguiente etapa, determinar la conveniencia de incluirlo en 
un indicador global, similar al de Altman en el ámbito corporativo, que permita 
anticipar la situación vulnerabilidad financiera de una ENL. A este respecto, 
nuestra investigación también nos ha permitido poner de manifiesto la necesidad 
de considerar las particularidades de cada subsector del entorno no lucrativo, pues 
los modelos que predicen la vulnerabilidad financiera de manera relativamente 
aceptable para el conjunto del tercer sector, no lo hacen para el ámbito concreto de 
la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. Ello es corroborado por los 
Conclusiones Generales   
 144 
resultados obtenidos en el capítulo segundo, así como por la ausencia de 
coeficientes significativos de las variables de control en el capítulo cuarto. Esta 
necesidad de considerar las peculiaridades del subsector se encuentra en 
consonancia con las recomendaciones vertidas por la literatura previa (Hager, 
2001; Trussel, 2002; Trussel, Greenlee & Brady, 2002) e incide en la realidad 
altamente diversa que nos podemos encontrar a lo largo de todo el sector no 
lucrativo.  
 
Además de todo lo anterior, es reseñable también que nuestros análisis empíricos 
se hayan llevado a cabo en un contexto de crisis. Ello contrasta con la mayoría de 
estudios relacionados con la vulnerabilidad financiera de las ENLs, desarrollados 
en épocas de expansión económica, lo que aporta un marco diferente a este tipo de 
análisis. No cabe duda de que la crisis ha supuesto un escenario 
extraordinariamente delicado para las ENLs, las cuales han visto amenazada su 
supervivencia financiera debido a la reducción de donaciones y subvenciones y a 
las restricciones existentes en el crédito bancario. Igualmente, las muestras 
analizadas están conformadas por organizaciones europeas, concretamente 
británicas y españolas. Este hecho supone una contribución de un contexto 
diferente a una literatura tradicionalmente dominada por los estudios empíricos 
basados en muestras conformadas por entidades estadounidenses. En esta línea, 
dicha literatura suele emplear como principal fuente de información el Formulario 
990 del Internal Revenue Service (IRS), mientras que en nuestro caso nos hemos 
valido de las cuentas anuales auditadas de cada organización. En suma, este 
diferente contexto (subsector, periodo, países, fuente de información) puede 
ayudar a explicar las diferencias de nuestros análisis de vulnerabilidad financiera 
respecto a los estudios previos.  
 
Por último, de esta tesis doctoral se derivan también importantes 
recomendaciones para los profesionales del sector no lucrativo. Como ya hemos 
apuntado, las ENLs deberían modificar su funcionamiento interno, de tal manera 
que se favorezca tanto la incorporación de consejeros con un elevado capital 
humano y social como su participación en la toma de decisiones estratégicas de la 
entidad, además de ejercer su labor como supervisores de las decisiones de los 
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directivos. En este sentido, destaca especialmente la baja presencia de consejeros 
con estudios específicos de cooperación internacional al desarrollo o de gestión de 
ENLs (el 7,03% de nuestra muestra del capítulo cuarto). En efecto, tal dato debería 
invitar a la reflexión sobre la política de incorporaciones a los órganos de gobierno 
de las ENLs; más aún cuando tales estudios se han convertido en un requisito casi 
imprescindible para trabajar en el sector. Pero, igualmente, los directivos también 
han de facilitar y fomentar la participación del consejo permitiendo y promoviendo 
que se involucren en la toma de decisiones de la organización. De esta manera, el 
equipo directivo (y la ENL) conseguiría beneficiarse de ese conjunto de 
conocimientos y experiencias que posee el órgano de gobierno en su conjunto. Por 
otra parte, la aplicación del modelo multidimensional de vulnerabilidad financiera 
puede ayudar a los profesionales a evaluar la situación financiera de la 
organización en conjunto, no fijándose en una medida en concreto, sino 
considerando las tres variables planteadas de manera simultánea. 
 
Todos estos resultados y conclusiones se traducen, no solo en una motivación por 
continuar la investigación en diferentes líneas de actuación, tal y como relataremos 
al final de este capítulo, sino también en la necesidad de superar algunas de las 
limitaciones de las investigaciones realizadas, tal y como procederemos a describir 
en los siguientes párrafos. 
 
En primer lugar, existen ciertos aspectos que inciden en todos los análisis 
realizados a lo largo de la tesis doctoral. De este modo, somos conscientes del 
tamaño reducido de las muestras empleadas, especialmente comparado con 
estudios previos de vulnerabilidad financiera de ENLs estadounidenses. Ello 
encuentra su justificación en la ausencia de bases de datos (como la proporcionada 
por el IRS en los estudios americanos), con lo que la información tiene que ser 
recopilada de manera manual. A su vez, esta misma restricción provoca que no 
hayamos podido emplear metodologías específicas de datos de panel, pues el 
número de años de los que hemos podido extraer información completa ha sido 
limitado, sin olvidar que, además, el cálculo de la vulnerabilidad financiera (en 
concreto para la dimensión operativa, la variación de activos netos) requiere la 
utilización de datos provenientes de varios periodos. Igualmente, en esta 
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investigación únicamente hemos analizado un subsector de todo el ámbito no 
lucrativo, el correspondiente a la cooperación internacional para el desarrollo. 
Como hemos expuesto a lo largo de esta tesis doctoral, este subsector cuenta con 
una idiosincrasia muy particular, con lo que puede que las conclusiones obtenidas 
no sean extrapolables a todo el conjunto del tercer sector. Además, los análisis 
corresponden a años en los que las ENLs han padecido las consecuencias derivadas 
de la crisis, motivo por el cual los resultados obtenidos puede que solo se deban a 
este shock excepcional y no sean trasladables a otros periodos de mayor 
estabilidad económica. 
 
Además de esta limitación relativa a la contrastación empírica de los argumentos 
defendidos en los capítulos dos al cuarto, también existen limitaciones particulares 
relativas únicamente al capítulo cuarto. Así, con respecto a la vulnerabilidad 
financiera, la idoneidad del modelo multidimensional propuesto no ha sido 
contrastada empíricamente, con lo que no hemos podido constatar la utilidad que 
hemos fundamentado teóricamente. Por otra parte, la fuente de información 
empleada para la estimación del capital humano y social de los consejeros (la 
página web de cada organización y buscadores genéricos de internet) provoca que 
no hayamos logrado el mismo nivel de detalle en la biografía de cada consejero, 
pues depende tanto de su nivel de relevancia pública como de la transparencia 
ofrecida por la ENL en este aspecto.  
 
Para finalizar este capítulo y esta tesis doctoral, exponemos las principales líneas 
de investigación que se han ido abriendo a tenor de los resultados obtenidos en los 
capítulos precedentes. Entre ellas se sitúa, en primer lugar, el contraste de la 
capacidad explicativa del modelo multidimensional de vulnerabilidad financiera 
propuesto en el capítulo tercero. En este sentido, sería interesante confirmar si las 
organizaciones que han cesado su actividad por motivos financieros habrían sido 
calificadas como vulnerables en el momento del cese aplicando nuestra propuesta 
de modelo. Como indica la literatura (Hager, 2001), la dificultad de ello radica en 
que la finalización de las operaciones de las ENLs no se suele transmitir 
directamente a los registros legales pertinentes. Junto a este hecho, es importante 
señalar que no todas las entidades cesan sus actividades por motivos económico-
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financieros. Por ello, es difícil encontrar una muestra de organizaciones que 
reúnan los requisitos necesarios para contrastar nuestro modelo. También en 
relación con la vulnerabilidad financiera, queda pendiente desarrollar un índice 
que permita predecir la vulnerabilidad financiera de las organizaciones. Ello sería 
una herramienta especialmente útil para los profesionales del sector, pues les 
permitiría anticipar situaciones de dificultades financieras. No obstante, para 
llevar a cabo esta labor, primero hay que cerciorarse de que la variable 
dependiente, la vulnerabilidad financiera, está medida correctamente y es una 
proxy adecuada, tal y como hemos indicado con anterioridad.  
 
Otra línea de trabajo que se puede abordar consiste en considerar perspectivas 
teóricas de gobierno adicionales, tales como la teoría de los stakeholders (Freeman, 
1984; Freeman & Reed, 1983) o la teoría stewardship (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997), para contemplar otras relaciones entre partícipes de la 
organización y otro tipo de conflictos en las relaciones. Igualmente, se podrían 
incluir aspectos provenientes de enfoques cognitivos, como la teoría de decisiones 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999) o el enfoque cognitivo de la teoría de la agencia 
(Charreaux, 2005, 2008; Wirtz, 2011), para tener en cuenta la proactividad de los 
consejeros, el esquema mental de cada persona y los “conflictos cognitivos” que se 
producen en los procesos de toma de decisiones cuando existen individuos con 
esquemas mentales divergentes. En este contexto, cobraría sentido el estudio de la 
diversidad de los consejeros, tanto de aspectos observables (raza, género) como no 
observables (educación, experiencia). De hecho, en el sector empresarial ya se ha 
constatado cómo una mayor presencia femenina (relacionado con la diversidad de 
género) está asociada a unos niveles de riesgo inferiores y a una mayor 
performance financiera (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Chen, Ni & Tong, 2016; 
Faccio, Marchica & Mura, 2016; Reguera-Alvarado, Fuentes & Laffarga, in press). 
 
Derivado de la utilización de otros enfoques teóricos de gobierno, se podrían 
volver a analizar las funciones que el consejo asume y la composición más idónea 
para el desarrollo efectivo de las mismas. Como se ha comentado previamente, es 
reseñable cómo mientras la literatura previa encuentra un efecto significativo del 
consejo sobre la eficiencia de la ENL, en nuestro caso no lo obtenemos sobre la 
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vulnerabilidad financiera de la misma. Sería interesante, por tanto, analizar 
simultáneamente el efecto del consejo sobre la eficiencia (asignativa, 
administrativa y de captación de fondos), la performance financiera, la 
vulnerabilidad financiera y otras áreas en las que la literatura es muy incipiente en 
este tercer sector, como son la reputación y la transparencia. De esta manera, se 
podría estudiar si para la correcta realización de cada función es necesaria una 
composición diferente del consejo, o si una misma configuración del consejo 
permite una ejecución eficaz de todas estas funciones. Vinculado con esta línea de 
trabajo, también podríamos incluir en los análisis, tal y como ya se ha comentado 
en el capítulo cuarto, las características del equipo directivo de la organización. 
Sería interesante valorar a los directivos en términos similares a los que hemos 
empleado para el consejo. De esta manera, podríamos averiguar si los directivos 
están influyendo en la probabilidad de que la ENL se adentre o no en situación de 
vulnerabilidad financiera, así como su efecto en otras áreas de la organización. 
 
Por último, una vía adicional, y posiblemente necesaria para superar las 
limitaciones apuntadas anteriormente, consiste en ampliar las muestras 
analizadas. Tal ampliación podría llevarse a cabo en varias direcciones: ampliar el 
volumen de organizaciones, el número de años, los subsectores analizados o 
incluso los países de pertenencia de dichas entidades. Un mayor número de 
organizaciones permitiría tener mayor variabilidad en los datos y, por ende, una 
mayor fiabilidad en los resultados. Igualmente, este mayor número de 
organizaciones permitiría adoptar un enfoque contingente (Ostrower & Stone, 
2010), considerando que las características propias de cada ENL derivan en unas 
diferentes necesidades y, por tanto, en una configuración distinta de los 
mecanismos de gobierno. Un mayor número de periodos ofrecería la posibilidad de 
aplicar técnicas de datos de panel que diesen una mayor robustez a los resultados. 
Un mayor número de subsectores nos permitiría extrapolar los resultados a todo el 
entorno no lucrativo, considerando la realización de análisis parciales que resalten 
las posibles diferencias entre subsectores. Por último, un estudio comparativo de 
carácter internacional supondría una aportación especialmente relevante en este 
sector dada la escasez de estudios que cuenten con ese tipo de muestras. No 
obstante, para llevar a cabo este tipo de trabajos de manera oportuna sería 
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necesaria la colaboración entre investigadores de los distintos países, dadas las 
grandes diferencias entre las regulaciones de cada país. En este sentido, se ha 
desarrollado un estudio preliminar (Garcia-Rodriguez & Jegers, 2016) en el que se 
analiza la estructura de capital de ENLs de Bélgica, Reino Unido y España, 
mostrando diferencias significativas en función del país de origen de la 
organización. Esta construcción de muestras internacionales permitiría introducir 
el efecto de variables institucionales, macroeconómicas y culturales propias de 
cada país, tal y como se ha realizado en el ámbito empresarial (e.g., Laitinen & 
Suvas, 2016; Li & Harrison, 2008; Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami & Kwok, 2012).  
 
En definitiva, en esta tesis doctoral hemos tratado de dar respuesta a un problema 
de la realidad actual del tercer sector, como son las dificultades financieras 
experimentadas por las ENLs en la reciente época de crisis. Para ello, hemos 
analizado detalladamente el concepto de vulnerabilidad financiera y hemos 
incorporado a la literatura el estudio del efecto que la composición del consejo de 
la organización puede tener sobre dicha vulnerabilidad, resultando, en nuestro 
caso, no significativo. De esta manera, como apuntamos desde la introducción de 
esta tesis, hemos cambiado el foco del problema, pasando de analizar el efecto 
sobre la tradicional eficiencia organizativa al existente sobre la situación extrema 
de vulnerabilidad financiera. No obstante, la supervivencia financiera únicamente 
ha de ser considerada como la condición necesaria para la continuidad del 
funcionamiento de la organización. Hay que insistir en que el hecho de que poseer 
una estructura financiera saneada no es condición suficiente para disfrutar de tal 
continuidad pues, en último término, la sociedad en su conjunto demandará a la 
organización el uso correcto de los fondos de los que dispone, ya que ha sido ella la 
que se los ha otorgado (principalmente, vía donaciones privadas y subvenciones de 
las administraciones públicas). Así, la eficiencia y la vulnerabilidad financiera han 
de valorarse como conceptos conexos e incluso complementarios, siendo necesario 
por tanto un equilibrio entre ambos para que, con el transcurso de los años, la ENL 
continúe desempeñando su misión.  
 
Con todo, si bien hemos sido capaces de aportar cierta luz a algunos tramos del 
camino recorrido, somos conscientes de que muchos otros aún permanecen en 
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tinieblas y que se convertirán, muy posiblemente, en desvíos que tomaremos en el 
futuro que nos permitirán seguir despejando algunas de las múltiples incógnitas 
del tercer sector que aún restan por abordar. 
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